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0 miserable me! how I indeed started 
when he seized me, saying: ’Perhaps
you did not think me a logician!’ 
(Inferno, Canto XXVII)
ABSTRACT
Shakespeare's villains derive their rationalistic 
traits from the Vice of medieval English drama as well 
as from the stage Machiavel. Although a number of 
critical studies have touched upon the rationalism of 
Shakespeare's villains, none have dealt adequately 
with the question of whether the presence of rational 
villainy in the plays argues an underlying distrust 
of reason on the part of the dramatist. As early as 
the Middle Ages, man had begun to doubt the efficacy 
of reason in leading him to higher knowledge. Distrust 
of reason continued into the Renaissance under the 
auspices of the Protestant Reformation. Skeptics 
such as Montaigne were making their voices heard while 
The Prince stood as dramatic proof that reason did not 
necessarily lead to goodness and virtue. Shakespeare’s 
rational villains must be viewed not only in the light 
of man's growing distrust of reason but also in the 
context of what Renaissance.thinkers termed right 
reason. Briefly, right reason recognizes an ordered 
universe created by a rational Supreme Being, and it 
regards reason and virtue as indivisible. In denying 
right reason Shakespeare's rational villains reflect
the beliefs of continental humanists. Since the 
doctrine of right reason was central to orthodox 
English humanism, Shakespeare'^ villains of reason 
must therefore represent the rebellious intellectual 
minority. They serve, finally, as a criticism of the 
Age.
An examination of the histories, tragedies, and 
comedies, reveals Shakespeare’s belief that rational 
social order has correspondences in a rationally 
ordered cosmos. In these plays, the rational villain 
functions as an agent of political and moral chaos.
The epic sweep of Shakespeare's histories denies exten­
sive character development to nearly all of the 
villains save Richard III, but their rationalistic 
tendencies are nonetheless in evidence, preparing the 
way for the tragedies and the playwright’s great 
dramatic achievements in stage villainy. Although 
penitent villains'" appear in the histories, this type 
of villain receives a far more interesting develop­
ment in the comedies. In these later works rational 
villainy produces regenerative moral effects not only 
upon the victims but frequently upon the villains 
themselves. By giving perspectives of right reason to 
his dramatic works, Shakespeare evinces the humanistic 
attitude. Moreover, the playwright seems to be moving 
from conceptions that are predominantly Aristotelian
to those that are largely Platonic. As a result, evil 
loses its force while the* Christian themes of mercy 
and forgiveness occupy the ascendant.
INTRODUCTION
A number of critics have alluded to the fact that 
Shakespeare’s villains tend to be mentally rather than 
emotionally oriented; but the most positive expression 
of this attitude— at least the statement with fewest 
qualifications— has come from Cleanth Brooks, who 
attributes to Robert Penn Warren the "penetrating 
observation that all of Shakespeare's villains are 
rationalists."1 Few would deny the importance of emo­
tion and will in coloring the motives or defining the 
actions of Shakespeare's villains: Iago, for instance,
appears to be driven by an intense, irrational hatred; 
Lady Macbeth, by a strong, uninhibited will. Yet, 
rationality emerges as perhaps the most conspicuous trait 
of villain personalities who inhabit the world of 
Shakespearean drama. In contrast, Marlowe's Tamburlaine 
operates upon a non-rational level, arguments of "expe­
diency" being hardly applicable to the excesses generated 
by the villain's rampant will. Although Mario Praz
disagrees with Brandi's interpretation of Tamburlaine
2
as Machiavellian, scholarly differences of opinion
■^Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace arid Company, 1947), p. 42.
2
Mario Praz, Machiavelli and the Elizabethans 
(London: H. Milford,192$), pp. 26-7.
suggest that rationality need not play a major part in the 
modus ouerandi of the Machiavellian villain. In applying 
the term machiavel loosely, one might simply wish to 
designate a character whose ambitions cause him to desire 
political power at any cost and whose actions demonstrate 
that he will allow nothing to separate him from the goals 
he has set for himself. Although it is sometimes dif­
ficult to distinguish between villains of will and 
villains of reason, it should become evident that a 
machiavel such as Macbeth will require rather close 
scrutiny, lest we assume too prematurely that all of 
Shakespeare’s villains are, in fact, rationalists.
To what extent does Shakespeare’s depiction of
villain intellect become relevant to Renaissance beliefs
concerning the nature and function of reason? Martin
Lings’ somewhat emphatic description of Iago and Edmund
as "out and out Humanists"3 helps to underscore the
difficulty of answering such a question. Lings defines
humanism as the "rationalistic denial of all that is
4superhuman and supernatural"; then, as further support 
of his contention that Iago and Edmund are humanists, 
the critic cites Iago’s praise of reason ("But we have
3
^Martin Lings, Shakespeare in the Light of Sacred 
Art (New York: Humanities Press, 1966), p. 4^7
i
4
Ibid.
reason to cool our raging motions..."--Othello I.iii) 
and Edmund’s praise of nature ("Thou, Nature, art my 
goddess..."— King Lear I.ii).^ The words reason and 
nature strike a familiar chord which no doubt sounds 
"humanistic" to some (and "neo-classical" to others); 
still, Shakespeare readers are likely to see a touch 
of irony in the semantic gap which dissociates Iago 
and Edmund from Renaissance humanists who had used 
classical definitions of Reason and Nature as a basis 
for highly developed ethical systems. Christian humanism 
had, in fact, drawn rather freely from reservoirs of 
Platonism, Stoicism, and Scholasticism. Shakespeare’s 
depiction of Iago and Edmund as machiavels must nat­
urally place them within the framework of continental 
humanism. But English humanists, particularly those 
who espoused the doctrines of Rationalism, regarded this 
type of thinking as a perversion of their own ideas.
Whereas common usage allows a degree of interchange­
ability in the meanings of rationalism and skepticism, 
a more deliberate use of these terms recognizes two 
opposing views of reason. Rationalism holds that it is 
within the human potential to know God and the universe 
through reason; moreover, it incorporates a system of 
ethics which makes an identification between knowledge
^Cited by Lings, ibid
and virtue. (The rationalism of Descartes was later to 
eclipse that of his Platonic predecessors.) Skepticism, 
which is generally linked to humanism on the continent 
and to such writers as Montaigne and Pascal, teaches that 
conclusions reached through the reason are invalid because 
they are subjective and therefore relative. Renaissance 
skepticism invites comparison with certain aspects of the 
Protestant Reformation, the latter having evolved a 
distrust of reason from several prominently held theolog­
ical assumptions— namely, that human reasoning had been 
corrupted by the Fall, that Divine Will was in itself 
justification for all of God's action, and that God's 
will defied rational apprehension. Calvinists thus 
viewed reason as both fallible and beside the point.
6
Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the English 
Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1962), pp. 105-11$• See also, Hiram Haydn, The Counter- 
Renaissance (New York: Scribner, 1950), pp. 9^-105, 334.
Hoopes focuses upon the humanism of the English Renaissance 
and thus he rightly regards anti-rationalism as a cross­
current which does not belong to the realm of English 
humanism. For instance, he classifies the Protestant 
Reformation as an anti-rationalistic and therefore anti- 
humanistic trend. Haydn, on the other hand, characterizes 
the rebels against established values as romanticists 
while depicting Christian humanists as classicists. The 
romanticists gave impetus to what Haydn refers to as the 
"Counter-Renaissance, since it originated as a protest 
against the basic principles of the classical renaissance, 
as well as against those of medieval Scholasticism."
Haydn finds three distinct intellectual trends in exis­
tence between the late fourteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries— classical renaissance, counter-renaissance, 
and scientific reformation.
When used in a familiar sense, rationalism is associated 
with use of logical or rhetorical proofs, love for 
expediency, contempt for emotional responses, and disbelief 
in the supernatural. Like philosophical skepticism and 
fideism, rationalism belongs to the counter-renaissance; 
but unlike skeptic or fideist, the rationalist puts his 
faith in reason and places self-interest above all else.
The Prince remains one of the most well-known rationalis­
tic documents despite its author’s belief in chance or 
fortune.
Machiavelli's influence upon the English drama is 
relevant to the problem of rational villainy insofar as 
stage machiavels owe a measure of their rationality to the 
archetype. Here, however, we are not so much concerned 
with what the Italian writer actually said as we are with 
what the English attributed to him. Both Mario Praz and 
Clarence Boyer have focused attention upon the Elizabethan 
machiavel, with Boyer noting among other English innova­
tions the stage machiavel's fondness for poison.? 
Distinctions between the original Italian source and the 
mythos later surrounding it may perhaps suggest that 
Elizabethan playwrights were less inspired by the prince's
^Clarence V. Boyer, The Villain As Hero in Elizabethan 
Tragedy (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1914), pp. 31-9.
See also, Edward Meyer, Machiavelli and the Elizabethan 
Drama (New York, n.d., orig. pub. Weimar, 1897). Praz has 
pointed out that in several instances Meyer has designated 
as "machiavellian" certain elements that actually belong 
to Senecan drama.
rationalism than by his egocentrism. Boyer, in fact, 
views stage machiavellianism as being fundamentally a 
conflict between will and conscience. And yet if the 
machiavel’s self-directed energies have lent forcefulness 
to his personality, it is his manner of thinking, either 
stated or implied, which enables him to project this 
personality with such striking clarity. Stage machiavel­
lianism need not involve elaboration of the villain’s 
mental processes, however. Disposing of accomplices, 
for example, may in itself symbolize the logic of 
expediency while expository methods— outlining plans, 
weighing alternatives, etc.— also often become emblematic 
of a rational mental operation. (Since symbolic rational­
ity invites the danger of overinterpretation, one should 
not inadvisedly assume a degree of rationality that may 
not be altogether indicative of the villain himself.) 
Besides borrowing from Machiavelli, the villain owes a 
debt to the Vice of medieval drama. The Vice’s ties 
with rationality had been tenuous but important in 
lending moral significance to his role, whereas his 
dramatic significance depended primarily upon the comic 
purposes that he served. During the process of stage
8
Bernard Spivack’s Shakespeare and the Allegory of 
Evil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) affords
an excellent view of medieval influences relevant to 
Shakespeare’s treatment of villainy.
evolution the job of persuasion which higher vices had 
charged to the Vice took on the colors of rhetoric, while 
the role of hypocrite acquired greater sophistication in 
rendering duplicity.
Although a number of critical studies have touched 
upon the rationality of ShakespeareTs villains, none 
have dealt adequately with the questions that arise 
from the playwright’s portrayal of villains as rational­
ists. Understandably, such treatment is not especially 
within the province of works which have as their emphasis 
the villain’s Machiavellian behavior, his debt to the 
Vice, his psychological make-up, or his dramatic function. 
Yet, the rationality of Shakespeare’s villains may serve 
as a unifying element or provide another way of looking 
at the histories, tragedies, and comedies. Tangential 
reading within this area is Terence Hawkes’ Shakespeare 
and the Reason in which Hawkes examines reason and 
intuition, relates them to the themes of appearance and
reality, and concludes that in the worldview of the plays
9
neither is acceptable.
The present study is perhaps more concerned with 
stating problems than with giving solutions; but it is to
9
Terence Hawkes, Shakespeare and the Reason: A
Study of the Tragedies and the Problem Plavs (London: 
Routledge. and Kegan Paul, 1964)- Professor Hawkes has 
indicated the importance of Shakespeare’s villain- 
rationalists by linking them to the weltanschauungen of 
the dramas.
be hoped that an examination of the villain-rationalists 
of Shakespeare’s histories, tragedies, and comedies will 
help to shed added light on the plays and open the way 
for further discussion. Although Shakespeare’s villains 
are treated in relation to what Renaissance thinkers 
called "right reason," one need not assume from the very 
beginning that rational villainy is a contradiction in 
terms. Despite the prominence of Reason throughout the 
Renaissance, it had begun to decline even as early as the 
Middle Ages. To examine Shakespeare's villains in light 
of right reason would therefore prove to be of little 
value unless one can also demonstrate that the doctrine 
is implicitly stated within the dramas. While anti- 
rationalistic trends did not belong to the mainstream of 
English thought, these were nevertheless strong enough 
to have perhaps exerted influence upon Shakespeare's 
thinking.
A theory of right reason figures significantly into 
virtually every philosophical system of Shakespeare’s 
day. And yet, "right reason” may suggest one thing to 
the Platonist and quite another to the Aristotelian. 
Shakespeare would naturally have been susceptible to a 
variety of interpretations of this doctrine. Briefly, 
right reason is that doctrine which deems Reason to be the 
fount of human knowledge and which, in seeking truth, aims 
toward spiritual perfection. Whenever this norm does not
appear to belong in the worldview of a particular drama 
or is not sufficiently in evidence, it must be decided 
whether the villain’s rationality has invested the play 
with an underlying distrust of reason. Skepticism is 
not the only alternative to right reason, however. Not­
withstanding his profundity, Shakespeare was a poet and 
playwright who on occasion might be expected to display 
more sympathy toward the romantic temperament than toward 
the rational mind. Shakespeare’s genius enabled him to 
weave the contrarieties of his Age into a single artistic 
pattern, yet we have no reason to suppose that he had 
resolved such conflicts within himself or that he had 
fashioned all of his plays from a consistent view of life.
I. DISTRUST OF REASON
If one argues that the quality of rationalism inher­
ited from the medieval Vice as well as from other sources 
is simply indigenous to the villain character-type and 
that the dramatist has little recourse other than to work 
within the tradition, then the villain of reason becomes 
little more than a peculiarity of Elizabethan drama, a set 
piece of historical curiosity. But when considered in 
relation to the backdrop of ideas which helped to shape 
the plays in the mind of the artist, the rational villain 
assumes a role of no small consequence. Discordant in­
fluences which bisected the Renaissance tended to have an 
undermining effect upon the prevailing attitude that man’s 
reason would lead to higher knowledge. Although such 
trends did not reflect the beliefs of English humanists, 
their influences were nonetheless strongly felt. In 
breaking with the medieval past, Copernicus, Calvin, and 
Montaigne had left marks of dissension and doubt in areas 
of traditional cosmology, theology, and philosophy while 
The Prince had rendered dramatic proof that use of reason 
did not necessarily lead to right action. Machiavelli 
typified the humanism of self-assertion and individuality. 
It was sometimes referred to as "atheistic," and it stood 
apart from the type of humanism which had its roots in 
classical philosophy. Still, continental humanists of the
11
Machiavellian school could easily have turned to classical 
antiquity, especially to the writings of the Epicureans, as 
justification for the materialism and skepticism that 
pervaded their thinking; for even with its rigorous ethic, 
Epicureanism offers an essentially worldly approach to life. 
In Book III of De Rerum Natura, for instance, the poet 
Lucretius announces to his readers that the soul is mortal, 
defining its composition through application of an atomist 
theory.*1 The irreverence of Lucian, particularly in 
Dialogues of the Gods, might also have captured the imag­
inations of those who had rejected Plato and Aristotle.
But despite classical precedents and popularity within 
circles such as the School of Night, this type of humanism 
is more descriptive of an attitude than of systematic 
philosophy and classicism.
Christian humanism, however, required more stringent 
philosophical commitments from its followers; and its 
progeny included offshoots such as neo-Platonism and neo- 
Stoicism. The Rationalism of Renaissance neo-Platonists 
stands in marked contrast to anti-rational trends which 
had begun to manifest themselves seriously during the 
time of William of Ockham, the brilliant fourteenth-century 
thinker whose ideas had sparked such great controversy, 
leading him first into disfavor and later into prison.
■^Titus Lucretius Carus, Of the Nature of Things. 
trans. William Ellery Leonard~TNew lork: The Heritage
Press, 1957), pp. 112-126.
In a way, Ockham1s views evinced an extreme or lop-sided 
Platonism. But whereas reason and intuition functioned 
harmoniously within Platonism, which equated the intuitive 
processes with the exercising of higher reason, Ockham 
viewed reason and intuition (ratio inferior and ratio 
superior) as two entirely different modes of apprehending 
knowledge. Somewhat analogously, reason (ratio) was to be 
deftly detached from right reason (recta ratio) by 
Machiavelli and later by Bacon.
Ockham believed that words interfered with apprehen­
sion and that statements should be stripped of all but the 
most basic language; and he denied the existence of univer- 
sals except as a semantic convenience. More importantly, 
at least insofar as this study is concerned, he denied 
intermediary cognition and embraced a type of subjectivism 
which accepted only primary experiences as apprehensions 
of truth. These experiences were known as "direct intui­
tions." In the Ordinatio. Ockham asserted that "we can
know nothing abstractly in itself by purely natural means
2
without first knowing it intuitively." Meyrick Carre, in 
assessing Ockham's work, has directed attention to the 
philosopher's effect on the learning of his day:
2
Ockham: Philosophical Writings. ed. and trans.
Philotheus Bohner, O.F.M. (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957),
p. 103.
In the schools of Paris and Oxford it now began 
to be openly asserted that Christian dogmas could 
not be supported by reasonable proof; natural reason 
could show them at the best to be probable infer­
ences. At the worst, when philosophic argument led 
to the opposite conclusion, the believer was in­
vited to embrace by faith what his reason rejected. 
Masters became ready...to defend theories contrary 
to theological doctrine. These opinions were often , 
put forward under the guise of dialectical exercises.
Ockham had visibly shaken the foundations of medieval 
philosophy and theology; and as Carre observes, "the dia­
lectics of the following centuries revolved round the
4
problems which he had raised." Ockham’s incipient fideism, 
by which he divorced truth from rational investigation, 
later found realization in the teachings of Martin Luther, 
his avowed disciple.
During the Renaissance reason was even more soundly 
attacked on its theological side. Following the example of 
Luther, John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion 
(1536) wrought radical changes in attitudes concerning God 
and man. Humanists had conceived of a rational God who 
created a rationally ordered universe that man could come to 
know through the use of reason, and in matters of Scripture 
they placed emphasis upon the Redemption as well as upon 
the teachings of the New Testament. But Calvin recaptured 
the severity of Old Testament convictions and attitudes by
3
Meyrick H.Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1946), p.122.
4
Ibid., p .104•
emphasizing the Fall and by fastening the attention of his
followers upon the supremacy of God’s will:
The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, 
so that everything which he wills must be held to be 
righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. There­
fore, when it is asked why the Lord did so we must 
answer, Because he pleased.5 (Inst. Ill.xxiii)
The bleak temperament that depicted an essentially erratic
God likewise painted a dark portrait of man, for Calvin
viewed man’s reason as being both ineffectual and
vestigious:
For although there is still some residue of intel­
ligence and judgment as well as will, we cannot call 
a mind sound and entire which is both weak and 
immersed in darkness.... Therefore, since reason, 
by which man discerns between good and evil, and by 
which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, 
it could not be entirely destroyed; but being partly 
weakened and partly corrupted, a shapeless ruin is 
all that remains....° (Inst. II.ii)
Like Scholastics before them, Christian humanists 
were striving to preserve harmony between philosophy and 
theology; but Protestant reformers relegated these dis­
ciplines to separate spheres by disinheriting philosophy. 
Thus, they could more easily carry religion before the 
common people into places of public preaching. Their 
avowed purpose was to return to the simplicity of early 
Christianity, and they advocated reliance upon Scripture
^John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
1957), II, 227.
6Ibid.. I, 233.
and abolition of church-instituted rituals. Although 
articulate, learned men had espoused the fideist cause, 
and had stressed the importance of education, the position 
itself was clearly anti-intellectual in its theological 
implications; thus it held wide appeal for Europe’s common 
people. Playing a large role in economic and political 
history, the Reformation naturally affected numerous areas 
of human interest. And its influences have extended even 
into the twentieth century. Here, however, we are in­
terested only in the consistency with which the Reformation 
rejected reason: It denigrated the human reasoning faculty
by reminding man that he was eternally victim of the Fall; 
it insisted that the supremacy of God’s will precluded 
rational inquiry; and it held that faith was not based 
upon reason but was instead dependent upon God’s grace.
How responsive was Shakespeare to the growing distrust 
of reason? That the question will ever be answered 
satisfactorily is doubtful. The vision of the playwright 
seems too broad to have settled into complacency and too 
sound to have been altered appreciably by knowing of 
the Reformation or by having read Montaigne, whose 
skepticism and cynicism remind one at times of Calvinistic 
attitudes:
Presumption is our natural and original disease.
The most wretched and frail of all creatures is man,
and withal the proudest.7
^The Complete Works of Michael de Montaigne, ed. 
William Hazlitt (New York: Worthington, 1889), II, 232.
Although Shakespeare probably read Florio’s translation 
of Montaigne in its entirety or a large portion of it 
in 1603-4, it is only certain that he knew "Of the 
Caniballes." (See The Tempest II.i.l47ff• Earlier 
critics have cited parallel passages in order to show
Q
Montaigne’s influence upon Shakespeare,7 but Alice Harmon 
has demonstrated that ideas and similitudes common to both 
writers also appear in Seneca, Cicero, and Plutarch as 
well as in Elyot, Lind, Baldwin, Cawdrey, and others.^ 
These classical and contemporary parallels involve compar­
isons, as in the likening of an idle mind to an unweeded 
garden, and also reflections upon general subjects such 
as death, ambition, etc.
Obviously, Shakespeare’s familiarity with one essay 
does not prove that he knew them all or that the thinking 
of Montaigne had influenced him in any way; yet speculative
8
Hereinafter all references to act, scene, and line 
divisions, are cited from G.B. Harrison, ed., Shakespeare: 
The Complete Works (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and
World, Inc., 1952).
9
John M. Robertson, Montaigne and Shakespeare 
(London: A. & C. Black, 1909; Elizabeth Hooker, "The
Relation of Shakespeare to Montaigne," PMLA, N.S. 10 
(1902), 312-66; George C. Taylor, Shakespeare’s Debt 
to Montaigne (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925).
10
Alice Harmon, "How Great Was Shakespeare’s Debt to 
Montaigne?" PMLA. 57(1942), 98S-IOOS.
comparisons frequently link the character of Hamlet with 
Apologie de Raimond Sebond in which Montaigne denies both 
the efficacy of reason and the existence of absolute 
values:
So, seeing that all things are subject to pass from 
one change to another, reason...finds itself deceived, 
not being able to apprehend anything that is subsis- 
tent and permanent....11
Hamlet’s ironic portrayals of past values and of his
inability to accept them reveal both disillusionment and
cynicism, attitudes which constantly weave in and out of
Montaigne. The hero expresses his opinion quite clearly
in an encounter with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, although
the £wo young men are unaware of what their former friend
is actually saying. After he has secured Guildenstern’s
admission that he and Rosencrantz have been sent for by
the king and queen, Hamlet agrees to answer the questions
of his schoolfellows. But Hamlet guards his explanation
by casting it into a philosophical view which masks not
only his sanity but also the real nature of his personal
calamities, while at the same time faithfully representing
his disturbed psychic condition:
...What a piece of work is a man! How noble in 
reason! How infinite in faculty! In form and 
moving, how express and admirable! In action, how 
like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god!
The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals!
And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of 
dust?... (Hamlet II.ii.315-20)
•^The Complete Works of Michael de Montaigne. II, 
xii, 307T-
Hamlet is a satirist whose well-honed intelligence 
allows him to deal ironically on the personal level 
as with Polonius or to carry his irony into the far 
reaches of metaphysical satire as with Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern.
In drawing distinctions between the collectivity
of the Middle Ages and the individuality of the
Renaissance, Professor Horkheimer views Shakespeare’s
Hamlet through the lens of social psychology— the hero
fear of death serving as an illustration of individual
ity, whereby absolute value is accorded to the life
of the singular man rather than to the life of the
collective man. The sociologist invites his readers
to think of Hamlet as the first modern individual
12
and as a "good disciple of Montaigne.” Horkheimer’s 
comparisons between Hamlet and Montaigne are espe­
cially interesting because they are derived neither 
from parallel passages nor philosophies so much as 
from the author’s perception of a convergent point 
on the continuum of man’s evolving consciousness of 
himself. But whether or not Hamlet is a Montaignian 
individual is finally not so important as whether or
12
Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 137*
or not Hamlet renders Montaigne's philosophy. For if 
the play is an expression of philosophical skepticism, 
then Shakepeare's rational villains might perhaps be 
viewed as either leading to this position or as indic­
ative of it. The failure of Hamlet's intellectuality to 
save him does not itself argue for a distrust of reason 
within the play. From the outset the audience is made 
aware of extenuating circumstances which cloud the 
hero's vision. Still, Hamlet's metaphysical uncer­
tainties have explicitly raised the question of man's 
nobility and of his place on the scale of being— if such 
a scale exists. These doubts, however, belong only to 
Hamlet; the audience may sympathize with the hero 
without necessarily adopting his point of view. T.S.
Eliot evidently gave thought to the possibility of 
linking Hamlet with Montaigne; for at the conclusion of 
the essay "Hamlet and His Problems," the poet expresses 
the desirability of knowing "whether, and when" the play­
wright had read Apologie de Raimond Sebond.^
To argue that Shakespeare's villains are rationalists 
is in no way to suggest that the rationalists of the 
plays must be villains. Moreover, the dramas include
^T.S. Eliot, "Hamlet and His Problems," Selected 
Essays: 1917-1932 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1932), p. 126.
characters who, although they strongly resemble rational­
ists in one or several ways, cannot properly be termed 
"rationalists." We may, in particular, isolate two such 
types who carry a strain of rationalism: the satirist
and the intellectual. The satirist perceives the world 
as fraud and rejects it. He appears to stand apart 
from the society he criticizes; yet, he himself is 
often satirized in the process, especially when his level 
of perception has somehow become attuned to a cynical or 
melancholy outlook that brooks extremity. Apemantus, 
who has less cause than Timon for his cynicism, becomes 
such a character, as does the melancholy moralist 
Jacques. The satirist’s diatribes tend to identify the 
character with reason because they suggest mental com­
plexity or the presence of a double vision that sees 
incongruities within seemingly natural comparisons.
Both Iago and Edmund are satirists, for instance. But 
the tendency to satirize does not in itself argue for a 
character’s rationalistic approach to life, though 
it may in fact contribute to it. More especially, he 
should be dissociated from rationalism when his tempera­
ment suggests that Elizabethan conceptions of the four 
elements or of the humours are at work.
Intelligence is another mark of the rational vil­
lain. But again, a character may be an intellectual 
without embracing a rationalistic way of life. Brutus,
<CX
for example, appears to be an admirable individual who is 
both intelligent and introspective. And yet, W.R. Bowden 
disagrees with those who describe Brutus as an intellec­
tual.^ Bowden directs attention to Plutarch's version 
of the story in which the letters from the citizens are 
real and contrasts it to Shakespeare's depiction of 
forgery, thereby reaching the somewhat dubious conclu­
sion that since the dramatist deviated from his source 
in showing that Brutus had been tricked or duped, his 
motives for doing so must somehow implicate the intel­
ligence of Brutus. Bowden likewise believes that 
Shakespeare draws Brutus' Stoicism with a censorious 
pen. But despite the critic's uncertainty about 
Brutus' intelligence and despite his dissatisfaction 
with the Stoic's relationship to Portia (who is also 
a Stoic), Bowden decides that Brutus is after all noble 
and that Antony's tribute must be accepted as valid.
Actually, Brutus' granting Antony permission to speak 
does not display stupidity, as Bowden argues, but 
rather evinces an intellect which does not descend to 
the level of Cassius' Machiavellian instincts. Both 
Brutus and Hamlet display an intellectuality that cannot 
handle the situations confronting it, but Hamlet's plans
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to feign insanity and to "catch the conscience of the 
king" bespeak a rationalism not altogether apparent in 
Brutus. Nonetheless, Hamlet’s brooding melancholy and 
Brutus’ easy faith in men raise the question of how far 
we may describe these characters as "rationalists."
Less problematical in point of view of their rational­
ity are Cicero and Octavius, both of whom clearly dem­
onstrate that theirs is a rationalistic approach to life. 
But unfortunately these same characters increase the 
difficulty of assessing the playwright’s attitude toward 
reason. In tracing Renaissance atheism to classical 
sources, George Buckley notes the popularity of Ciceronian 
oratory and ethic but hastens to point out that Christian 
humanists must have looked askance at De natura deorum 
and Be d i v i n a t i o n e . ^  The latter dialogue has as its 
participants Cicero and his brother Quintus, who 
believes in divinations. Quintus, in supporting his 
argument, provides a catalogue of examples, including 
the portentous warnings of Caesar’s death. Cicero, 
however, proves to be both scoffer and skeptic: "Upon 
my word, no old woman is credulous enough now to believe 
such stuff.'"-— (De divinatione XV).^ Moreover, many
■ ^ G e o r g e  Buckley, Atheism in the English Renaissance 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. 11-13.
^Cicero: De Senectute. De Amicitia. De Divinatione.
trans. William A. Falconer (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1923), p. 409* Falconer derives this lively translation 
from "Hoc iam, mihi crede, ne aniculae quidem existimant."
of Cicero’s arguments are specifically aimed against the
Stoics. During the Renaissance, neo-Stoics such as
Justus Lipsius were to strive hard for a reconciliation
between fate and free will, foreknowledge and predestina- 
17tion, and Cicero’s application of pagan reasoning
anticipates the problems that Christian humanists later
had to recognize:
Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and 
stability as chance. Hence it seems to me that it 
is not in the power even of God himself to know 
what event is going to happen accidentally and by 
chance. For if He knows, then the event is certain 
to happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance 
does not exist. (De div. VII)
In Julius Caesar Shakespeare has emphasized this facet
of the orator’s personality. Fearful that the night is
filled with omens, Casca says to Cicero:
When these prodigies 
Do so conjointly meet, let not men say 
’These are their reasons, they are natural.’
(Julihs Caesar I.iii.2S-30)
Cicero’s rational reply contrasts sharply with Casca’s
nearly hysterical account of unusual events:
Indeed, it is a strange-disposed time
But men may construe things after their fashion,
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves.
(Julius Caesar I.iii.33-5)
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Cicero agrees that people ought not to be out in such 
nasty weather but refuses to commit himself any further 
than that. The audience must accept the portentous 
nature of the night just as it must accept the words of 
the soothsayer— without qualification; thus, Cicero's 
appraisal of, or reaction to, the situation is incor­
rect, even if by omission.
Pinpointing the relationship between rationalism 
and moral worth proves to be something of a problem if we 
consider a character such as Octavius. In the commentary 
which Brooks, Warren, and Purser append to Antony and 
Cleopatra, the editors attempt to reconcile the diffi­
culties of Octavius' rationalism:
Octavius is all cool efficiency...He is probably 
on the side of conventional virtue, but he is cold­
ly and ruthlessly efficient....
...Shakespeare does not deny, even by 
implication, that Octavius was superior to 
Antony as a potential organizer and ruler.
But if humanity is to have any meaning other than 
ruthless efficiency, then some of the qualities 
of Antony are of intrinsic value....
Thus, while we cannot categorize Octavius as a villain, 
we nonetheless consider him an unpalatable individual, 
and primarily because of Octavius' rationalistic approach 
to life. Irving Ribner has likewise recognized the problem 
of identification that the audience must make:
18
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Octavius and Octavia together stand for a cold,
rational morality which the audience may intellectu­
ally approve, but which emotionally it must reject 
as lacking the warmth and vitality of the immoral 
and foolish Antony and Cleopatra.19
Shakespeare’s rationalists include the likeable 
Cicero and the sympathetically-drawn Horatio, both of whom 
display skeptical attitudes toward the supernatural, 
in addition to characters such as Octavius and Edmund.
But if the rationalists have been portrayed as erroneous,
disagreeable, and even villainous, and if the playwright 
has linked these elements to the rationality of his 
characters, is it then logical to assume that Shakespeare 
himself was anti-rationalist or that a distrust of reason 
underlies the worldview of the dramas? In order to ans­
wer the question properly we should first have to consider 
right reason, with all of its ramifications, so that we 
might more easily make the necessary distinctions between 
Christian or classical humanism and the paradoxical human­
ism of Shakespeare*s villains. And in order to understand 
fully the ’’rationality" of these same individuals, we 
must be willing to trace the development of the villain 
of reason. These problems are taken up in the next 
two chapters, after which follows an examination of the 
villains appearing in Shakespeare’s histories, tragedies, 
and comedies.
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II. THE HUMANISTIC SPIRIT
By the end of the Middle Ages man’s re-discovery of 
classical values had begun to coincide with his own self- 
discovery in a way that gave rise to the attitude known 
as humanism. During this period, scholars came to rec­
ognize that one of the great achievements of Greco-Roman 
civilization had been the ability of its writers to give 
form and expression to universal moral principles. Ad­
miration for classical philosophy led them to accept many 
of its teachings and to become enamored of an ancient 
precept which seemed to epitomize, particularly well, 
the ideals of Renaissance humanism. "Right reason," as 
it was known by classical and Renaissance thinkers alike, 
thus affords a valuable perspective through which one 
may view English literature of the period. In referring 
to Milton and the Cambridge Platonists, for instance,
Basil Willey uses the term humanism to mean "a belief in 
the natural dignity and virtue of man, provided that by 
due discipline the passions are subjected to Right 
Reason."■*■ Hardin Craig’s description of the various 
philosophical systems that were then in existence likewise 
suggests the importance of this doctrine in the development
^Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955),
p. 238.
of Renaissance thought:
On one principle, however, practically all were 
agreed: the road to truth was ratiocination, not
the free use of reason, but reason restricted to 
the discovery or rediscovery of a universe whose 
form and purpose were already known and whose laws 
were the legacies of a wiser past or the fiats of 
an unimpeachable God.
Although Shakespeare makes frequent use of the word 
reason, suiting it to a variety of possible interpreta­
tions, the playwright does not refer explicitly to "right 
reason" in any of the dramas. Yet, Prospero's forgive­
ness of his enemies— in lines which depict him as 
rejecting extremities of passion, evaluating alternatives, 
and finally embracing New Testament principles— evinces 
the humanistic attitude. In the following passage,
"nobler reason" appears in a context that re-inforces 
both the rational and ethical connotations of the phrase:
Though with their high wrongs I am struck to the quick, 
Yet with my nobler reason Tgainst my fury 
Do I take part. The rarer action is 
In virtue than in vengeance. They being penitent,
The sole drift of my purpose doth extend 
Not a frown further. (The Tempest V.i.25-30)
I do not wish to argue that Prospero is Shakespeare but
only that the playwright was more than unconsciously
aware of the beliefs that were associated with right
reason.
We have already observed that whenever there has 
been a breach between ratio inferior and ratio superior
2
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or between ratio and recta ratio, reason tends either to 
lose moral significance or to fall into complete disgrace 
The rise of science in the seventeenth century aided in 
achieving the former effect. Although Sir Thomas Browne 
displays both love for science and deep religious faith, 
through facile interminglings that somehow seem attuned 
to the good doctor’s prose baroque, Sir Francis Bacon 
maintains the dichotomous secular attitude. As a frag­
ment, reason regains in Baconism the respectability it 
lost at the hands of Machiavelli. But its position is 
nevertheless secondary to that of empirical observation; 
for while Bacon pays all the amenties to ethics, he 
obviously prefers to separate moral philosophy from the 
scientific philosophy which he envisions as an ideal:
The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up 
.with superstition and theology is of a much wider 
extent, and is most injurious to it, both as a whole 
and in parts. (Nov. Org♦ 1.65)3
By admonishing his readers to "render unto faith the
things that are faith’s” (Nov. Org. 1.65), Bacon hopes
ultimately to appropriate reason and philosophy to the
needs of science; and it is especially when he wishes to
liberate reason from areas of the supernatural that Bacon
"piously" awards faith the higher position— "For after
3
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the articles and principles of religion are placed and 
exempted from examination of reason...” (Adv. Learn. II)A 
The humanism of Bacon like that of Machiavelli or even 
Montaigne may be designated as "paradoxical” rather than 
"orthodox” simply on the basis of its failure to incor­
porate the principles of right reason into its rationale. 
Such distinction not only takes into account the temper 
of Renaissance England but also affords greater ease in 
our problem of relating villainy and humanism whenever 
these appear together on the Elizabethan stage. An 
examination of Shakespeare’s villains in relation to right 
reason therefore sets an agent of paradoxical humanism 
against the backdrop of Christian humanism, which placed 
emphasis upon the harmonious nature of Christian and 
classical ideals and which used such compatibilities to 
posit the existence of universal moral principles.
Unlike Medieval scholastics, Renaissance thinkers 
recognized the importance of the material world and 
attempted to cope with the problem of day-to-day living 
by applying systematic thought to daily conduct♦ The 
utilitarian strain within humanism may have owed some­
thing to religious sources, such as the exemplary lives 
of saints, but attitudes toward private virtue equally 
fell within the sphere of classical influence, as did
4
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attitudes toward public virtue. The Socratic dialogues, 
Aristotle’s care in defining relationships between 
virtue and the active life (N. Ethics, I), Cicero’s civic­
mindedness, or Renaissance studies in classical rhetoric—  
all possess a singularity that speaks of man’s awakening 
sensitivity to physical environment and of his desire to 
operate within it successfully, and morally. Italian 
feelings for self-identity, exemplified in Florentine 
displays of civic pride, gave impetus to the civic 
idealism which held sway throughout the Renaissance. 
Ironically, it is Brutus’ overwhelming sense of civic 
duty which underlies his vulnerability, making him 
susceptible to the overtures of the conspirators. And 
conversely, it is Richard II’s difficulty in acknowledging 
the responsibilities of his office, which contributes to 
his downfall.
If classical and continental influences aided in 
giving perspective tc man’s public life, England’s awak­
ening nationalism added yet another dimension to his 
role. It is evident from the history plays alone that 
Shakespeare was not only sensitive to the rising spirit 
of nationalism in England but was equally aware of the 
complexities that lay within the realm of civic morals. 
Much earliers Plato had tested the validity of public 
morality by casting into dramatic form a good man’s 
conflict with the state. Resolution of the ethical 
difficulty, however, occurs long before one reaches the
final pages of The Crito; it is self-contained in the 
Platonic way of thought, which utilizes extenuating 
circumstances (the more extreme the better) merely 
for purposes of underscoring the absoluteness of values 
accorded. Thus, Socrates refuses help from well- 
intentioned friends who have planned his escape from 
prison; moreover, he discredits the reasoning whereby 
they have reached the conclusion that innocence pre-empts 
civil authority, or that Socrates1 escape would be 
morally justified. Plato heightens the drama of the 
situation by personifying the laws so that Socrates’ 
unwillingness to desert or abandon them produces an 
emotional impact that reinforces the central argument of 
The Crito— obedience to lawful authority is placed above 
the individual welfare of the innocent man. Whether 
public or private, the "active life" meant coming to terms 
with the world around by translating virtue into action. 
This impulse toward concretization of the abstract can be 
found not only in England’s conduct books of the period 
but in its philosophical treatises as well, especially 
those of Renaissance neo-Stoics who besides testifying 
to the wisdom of the ancients were characteristically 
given to outlining for their reading audiences a way of 
life based upon Stoicism and Christianity.
The basic moral outlook of Stoicism, in many ways 
compatible with the English temperament, gained audiences
in areas exclusive of formal stoic philosophy. Cicero, 
who openly attacked certain of the precepts of classical 
stoicism, had been sensitive to its influences; these 
were manifested throughout his writings by way of a 
sober ethical outlook that held great appeal for English 
readers. An aura of stoic morality likewise hovered 
about the vestiges of scholasticism that yet remained 
within the Church of England. At the same time, the 
English stage was carrying the voice of Seneca to popular 
audiences. Berner’s and North’s translations of Guevara, 
North’s translation of Plutarch, the continued popularity 
of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy. Latin studies 
in the grammar schools, works by contemporary philosophers 
many tributaries of Stoicism flowed into the mainstream 
of Renaissance thought. Any or all of these could have 
filtered into the consciousness of Shakespeare, who 
displayed at least moderate interest in Stoicism by the 
kinds of dramatic choices he sometimes made in adapting 
sources: Julius Caesar, for instance, can almost be said
to treat philosophy as such, in that the Stoicism of 
Brutus and Portia becomes an intrinsic part of the 
characters’ actions and words. In Hamlet the playwright 
has established a rather interesting contrast between the 
hero and Horatio, insofar as Hamlet’s contemplation of 
suicide is colored by fear of death (III.i.76-£S) while 
Horatio’s casual readiness to dispense with his own life 
is ascribed to his being ’’more an antique Roman than a
Dane" (V.ii.352). The conspicuous presence of Fate in a 
number of the dramas is further suggestive of stoic 
influence, though Shakespeare’s Fate is neither so 
brooding nor omnipresent as Seneca's and the Jacobeans’.
Christian neo-Stoicism conforms to patterns of 
orthodoxy both in reconciling its deterministic view of 
the universe to the concept of free will and by insisting 
upon the importance of right reason. This doctrine, 
found in the writings of Greek philosophers as well as 
in the works of Seneca and Cicero, was understood similarly 
(though not always identically) by those who espoused it. 
DuVair's The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks. published 
in English translation shortly before the end of the 
sixteenth century, advances a theory of Nature’s benef­
icence and of man’s unlimited potential, provided that he 
act in accordance with right reason:
Well then, the good & happiness of man consis- 
teth in the right vse of reason, and what is that 
but a constant disposition of will, to followe that 
which is honest and conuenient.
Justus Lipsius' T w o  Bookes Of Constancie. translated into
English by Sir John Stradling and published in 1594>
contains a similar discussion of right reason:
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This reason is an excellent power or faculty of 
vnderstanding and iudgment, which is the perfection 
of the soule, euen as the soule is of man.... For, 
you are deceiued if you think al the soul to be 
Right reason, but that only which is vniforme, 
simple, without mixture, separate from al filth or 
corruption; and in one word, as much as is pure & 
heauenlie.®
Belief in right reason is naturally predicated upon several
important assumptions about the nature of God, man, and
the universe. But since these are built into a dialectic
that derives corollary support from classical logic—
logos providing a means by which the philosopher might
arrive at truth and the rhetorician might persuade men to
it— we ought perhaps to begin a discussion of right
reason by turning our attention for the moment to the
areas of logic and rhetoric, particularly in light of the
fact that mode of expression, as well as thought and
action, has helped to characterize Edmund, Richard III,
and others as "rational."
Rosemond Tuve has pointed out that Renaissance
poetics shared with logic and rhetoric a controlling
didactic purpose, the logical function of images being
to assist the poet in reaching truth:
...The laws of logic were the laws of thought, and 
the poet must know and use them; he will not other­
wise be able to approach truth or direct the mind 
of man toward it. This last appears to me to be 
the basic Renaissance understanding of the didactic 
function of poetry.7
6of Constancie. p. 81.
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The "laws of thought" that Aristotle had bequeathed to the 
Renaissance revealed their author's belief that men were 
desirous of finding truth and of being good individuals. 
Thus his laws included the provision that true premises 
will yield only true conclusions and that true conclusions 
will have only true premises; so if false premises have 
true conclusions (as is sometimes the case), the phenom­
enon must be regarded as alogical, the truth of the 
conclusions owning to something other than the premisesg
(Prior Analytics Il.iii); Aristotle also insisted that
Q
both end and means must be good (N. Ethics V:9), a 
dictum that diametrically opposes Machiavellian morality. 
As truth was the logician's aim, so was it the rhetoric: 
cian's; for early thinkers had recognized the power of 
persuasive speech and the necessity of turning it to 
good use. Cicero's orator, it will be remembered, not 
only spoke well but was also a good man, while Plato's 
objections to Sophistry likewise argued the necessity of 
ethos. As servants of morality, logic and rhetoric were 
viewed as means but never as ends in themselves. 
(Petrarch's disenchantment with dialectic apparently 
stemmed from the poet's belief that methodology had
g
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betrayed many men, especially those who valued it too 
greatly.
Elizabethan England displayed an avid interest in 
logic and rhetoric. Numerous texts appeared in print; 
and the grammar schools, reflecting contemporary enthu­
siasm for these subjects, sought to inculcate such 
training into their students. T.W. Baldwin’s extensive 
study of the grammar schools of the period has demonstra­
ted that Shakespeare’s early educational training more 
than likely gave him the language tools necessary for 
his art.^ The playwright’s knowledge of Aristotelian
12logic could easily have come from grammar school texts 
that he either studied as a boy or read later; but what 
is more important, he held such knowledge by the time 
he wrote the plays and was able to utilize it in creating 
his characters’ patterns of speech. Refusing to accept 
as valid the argument of Williams and Bates— that a 
monarch shares the blame whenever guilty men die in his 
service— Henry V resorts to the use of analogy and 
syllogism, arriving finally at a conclusion which disproves
"^Petrarcha, "Letter to Tommaso of Messina, against 
old dialectic cavilers," in The Renaissance Philosophy of 
Man. ed. in translation by Ernst Cassirer, et al. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 134-9.
^T.W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare’s Small Latine & 
Lesse Greeke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944),
II, 1-2W-
12Ibid.. II, 62.
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the claims made against him:
...if they die unprovided, no more is the King 
guilty of their damnation than he was before guilty 
of those impieties for the which they are now 
visited. (Henry V ; IV.i.181-4)
Henry’s arguments are of course valid,^3 and his solil­
oquy (IV.i.247ff)— an ironic appraisal of the citizen’s 
point of view and to some extent, acceptance of it— does 
not in any way invalidate the earlier argument but rather 
helps to portray the king as being sensitive to those 
responsibilities which have been laid upon his shoulders. 
Thus while it is Shakespeare’s villains who most often 
wear the language of logic, creating for themselves an 
image of rationality, one notices that logic is also 
used by basically virtuous types such as Henry V.
Professor Baldwin’s perceptive reading of 
Shakespeare’s clowns as parodying prescriptive classical 
rhetoric^ tempts one to imagine the playwright’s school­
boy recitations as surely betraying the genius of their 
young author and to wonder, as well, if these included 
exercises in false logic (an area in which Iago may be
13
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particularly adept). Defining terras, deliberating alter­
natives, establishing causal relationships, making use 
of syllogisms and enthymemes— these are a few of the 
signposts indicating, at least theoretically, the presence 
of logical thought development. Since devices relating to 
argument and debate additionally serve the more general 
purposes of exposition, the problem of villain rationality 
may at times seem complicated by simple dramatic necessity. 
For this reason, it would be well to suspend discussion 
of the villain’s rhetorical patterns until we have 
examined his debt to the medieval Vice, or the historical 
circumstances which linked him to the art of persuasion. 
This subject is treated in the following section. For 
the present, it will suffice to note that Greco-Roman 
writers had joined logic and rhetoric to ethics in a way 
that perpetuated a system of thought based upon a theory 
of right reason.
Among followers of the Orphic tradition there is 
perhaps even stronger insistence upon a coalescent view 
of knowledge and virtue. The Orphic product usually 
emerges via the doors of dialectic, a mode of thought 
coincident with its author’s fundamental belief that 
reason is the source of his knowledge. Thus the Socratic 
method is sometimes to cast an aura of logic before the 
veil of mysticism that surrounds Platonic doctrine, 
particularly that of Reminiscence. If the soul once
knew the good, beautiful, and true argues Socrates in 
the Phaedo. then man must seek to recollect the a priori 
knowledge contained within the soul; and if that knowledge 
is knowledge of the Good, then reason must align itself 
with virtue or it will not be able to recognize what it 
has not been conditioned to understand. Plotinus argues 
similarly, the Enneads abounding in mystical revelations 
akin to Plato’s *’Myth of Er." Aristotle, in recognizing 
the validity of the intuitive processes, likewise attrib­
utes to reason the mind’s alogical perceptions of higher 
knowledge:
If then (a) it be granted that scientific 
knowledge, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom and 
intuitive reason are the intellectual states whereby 
we possess truth and are never deceived as regards 
the contingent and even the invariable, and if (b) 
none of the first three grasps the first principles, 
this can only be the work of intuitive reason.15
It is interesting to note that early thinkers identified
both the syllogistic and intuitive processes with reason,
a phenomenon that accounts in large measure for the
inherent strain of mysticism within rational philosophy.
In tracing the indebtedness of Cambridge Platonists
to men of the Italian Renaissance (Ficino and Mirandola
especially), who had greatly admired Plato and Plotinus,
Professor Cassirer has helped to explain further why the
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Rationalism of the English group must be placed in the 
tradition which recognizes the intuition, or alogical 
means of obtaining higher knowledge, as "supra-rational" 
but never ,ranti-rational." Suggesting a similar attitude 
on the part of Shakespeare, "The Phoenix and the Turtle" 
proposes allegorically a type of truth which, undeciph­
erable to the ordinary intelligence, makes heavenly sense 
to the higher reason. Confounded by the paradoxical union 
of two birds of different species, Reason yields to the 
transcendent understanding whereby "love hath reason, 
reason none." It then pays its respect to the dead pair 
of lovers by composing a threnos in praise of Beauty and 
Truth, the qualities represented by the two birds. The 
paradoxical method adopted by Reason in the threnos is 
itself a fitting tribute, not only to the phoenix and 
the turtledove but also to that intellection which, in 
grasping such mysteries, exceeds the reach of common 
reason.
Renaissance understanding of right reason owed 
something to the influence of various schools, or systems, 
which viewed the moral universe from different perspectives 
and which in so doing accorded the term special connota- 
tive values. Aristotle, for instance, believed right 
reason to be a rational faculty that led man to embrace
^Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in 
England. trans. James P. Pettegrove (Edinburgh: Nelson,
1953), pp. 30, 39-
the mean (Virtue) and to avoid the extreme (Vice). 
Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics he stresses the need 
for balance and harmony within the individual, characteriz­
ing the great-souled or reasonable man as one who operates 
within the framework of temperance. Although "right 
reason" always refers, in essence, to that which is both 
rational and moral, the Aristotelian interpretation pos- 
esses a degree of individuality. This view of reason, 
quite familiar to the Renaissance, more than likely 
served as the inspiration for Menenius and Kent; for the 
restraint of these characters offers a dramatic contrast 
to the excessiveness of those whom they admire and wish to 
help. Whereas Coriolanus scorns the citizens as a matter 
of general principle, Menenius has succeeded in estab­
lishing some rapport with them. Lear's overreaction to 
the reply of Cordelia separates him from reason, as 
does the extremity of Coriolanus1 words and actions, but 
the king's admonition to Kent suggests the latter's link 
with the mean, or reasoned temperance: "Come not between
the dragon and his wrath" (I.i.124). If Aristotelian 
virtue (temperance) seemed terrestrial in comparison to 
the Platonic virtues (Beauty and Truth), it was no less 
admired by Renaissance humanists. Moreover, Aristotelian 
conceptions had found support within other areas of 
philosophy. Stoic attitudes toward pleasure and pain 
tended to reinforce Aristotelian thought not only by focus­
ing attention on man but also by stressing the importance
of daily conduct. In both Stoicism and Aristotelianism, 
therefore, right reason becomes something of an ethical 
guideline by which man seeks to act in accordance with a 
prescribed mean.
Classical belief in the perfectibility of man 
helped to foster Renaissance idealization of him. The 
Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) expresses 
this attitude very well in Fabula de homine. which 
describes the gods’ delight in seeing the reflection 
of their own image, and their hope of having man dine at 
their eternal banquet. Mirandola’s ’’Oration on the Dignity 
of Man" further illustrates the Renaissance view. Mirandola 
begins the piece by recalling the words of Abdala the 
Saracen, "There is nothing to be seen more wonderful than 
man," as well as those of Hermes Trismegistus, "A great 
miracle, Asclepius, is man."-*-?
From their classical forebears Christian humanists
1$had acquired besides faith in man, faith in Nature..
Insofar as Nature belonged to the World of Matter, it 
was regarded as an outward manifestation of order and
17
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"What a piece of work is a man!"— Hamlet, II.ii.315.
1$Hoopes, pp. 120ff. Hoopes names as the first 
Christian humanist Lactantius (ca. 300), who cited as 
Cicero’s definition of natural law— "right reason in 
agreement with Nature."
harmony in the universe; more importantly, it was thought
to have real existence in the World of Ideas and as such
to hold moral implications for man. "To follow Nature"
meant to live in accordance with the eternal principles
or Order and Degree. Shakespeare’s most famous treatment
of this idea is found in Ulysses’ speech (Troilus and
Cressida I.iii.75-137) from which the following passage
is taken:
...Oh, when degree is shaked,
Which is the ladder to all high designs,
The enterprise is sick! How could communities, 
Degrees in schools and brotherhoods in cities, 
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
The primogenitive of age, crowns, scepters, laurels, 
But by degree, stand in authentic place?
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark, what discord follows! (I.iii.101-10)
As an address to the leader of the Greek forces ("Great 
Agamemnon," 1.124), the argumentum ad hominem perhaps 
gives more indication of the hero’s cleverness than of 
his sincerity, after the tradition of classical opinion. 
Although the entire speech seems to be a tour de force 
on the, part of Shakespeare, it is no less a faithful 
rendition of the Elizabethan attitude.
The Renaissance "chain of being" expresses metaphor­
ically a belief in universally-ordered existence on a 
physical-spiritual plane. But it does not contradict the 
idea of human perfectibility in according man a middle 
position thereon. The place itself was thought to be
metamorphically attuned to man’s moral possibilities. 
Belief in a supreme Logos. though incompatible with 
Calvinism, also forms the basis for Christian humanism 
to the extent that an ordered cosmos suggested to clas­
sical and Renaissance minds alike, divine Rationality.
A brief excerpt from Ficino’s Epistolae helps to il­
lustrate the humanistic line of reasoning on the matter:
In this common order of the whole, all things, no 
matter how diverse, are brought back to unity ac­
cording to a single determined harmony and rational 
plan. Therefore, we conclude that all things are 
led by one certain orderer who is most full of 
reason.19
The implications of Renaissance cosmology will to a cer­
tain degree entail the problem of relating Elizabethan
20interest in astrology to Shakespeare’s dramas. Villain 
rationalists, finding astrology inimical to their self- 
assertive instincts, openly express skepticism toward it; 
however, such attitudes are not to be equated with the 
concept of Free Will. In a way, astrology serves as a 
mythic projection of the Renaissance belief that an 
orderly creation betokened not only a Rational God but 
one whose interest in man was personal. Rejecting it
^Marsilio Ficino, "Five Questions Concerning the 
Mind," in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. p. 195*
^For fuller discussion of this subject, see Hardin 
Craig, The Enchanted Glass. pp. 30-43* (Craig observes 
that the English had more faith in astrology than in 
astrologers.)
meant either denying Elizabethan cosmology or defying univer­
sal principles; moreover, it was an act that audiences 
of the period most probably associated with atheism. In 
treating the supernatural, for instance, Sir Thomas Browne 
offers the following opinion:
...how so many learned heads should so farre forget 
their Metaphysicks, and destroy the Ladder and scale 
of creatures, as to question the existence of Spirits; 
for my part, I have ever believed, and doe now know, 
that there are Witches; they that doubt of these, doe 
not onely deny them, but Spirits; and are obliquely 
and upon consequence a sort, not of Infidels, but 
Atheists.21
Likewise, the doctor links human events to those of Nature:
The Jewes that can beleeve the supernaturall solstice 
of the Sunne in the days of Joshua, have yet the 
impudence to deny the Eclipse, which even Pagans 
confessed at his death....22
But neither is he unaware of the dangers of overinterpre­
tation. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, Browne writes in the 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica:
To behold a Rainbow in the night, is no prodigy 
unto a Philosopher. Then Eclipses of Sun or Moon, 
nothing is more natural. Yet, with what superstition 
they have been beheld since the Tragedy of Nicias 
and his Army, many examples declare. (Book I, Ch.XI)
Classical and especially stoic conceptions of Nature
manifest fatalistic strains that Christian humanists had
difficulty in reconciling to the doctrine of Free Will.
21
Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici and Other 
Works.ed. L.C.Martin (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), 
p.29.
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Renaissance neo-Stoics, however, came to grips with the
problem by making distinctions between foreknowledge and
predestination and by insisting upon the beneficence of the
Being who had ordered all things. Lipsius, in keeping with
the manner of neo-Stoicism, describes destiny as "AN ETERr
NAL DECREE OF GODS PROVIDENCE"; but he admonishes:
And let not any man cauill with mee about the name, 
because I say there is not in Latine an other proper 
word to expresse that thing, but FATVM.23
Providence, according to Lipsius, is a faculty or power
of an omniscient God who governs all things. Even Browne
observes: "That fatall necessitie of the Stoickes, is
pi
nothing but the immutable Law of his will." In Lipsius'
praise of obedience, illustrated by his analogy, one finds
traces of stoic acceptance:
We may laugh at him who hauing tyed his boat to a 
rock: afterwards halleth the rope as though the
rocke shoulde come to him, when himselfe goeth neerer 
to,it: But our foolishnesse is farre greater, who
being fast bounde to the rocke of Gods eternall 
prouidence, by our hailing and pulling would haue the 
same to obey vs, and not we it.25
It is evident that a reading of Shakespeare's plays should
take into account the attitude of Christian humanists on
the matter of Providence. Holloway, for instance, seeing
^Lipsius, p. 117.
24
Browne, p . 20.
Lipsius, p. 105.
Hamlet in relation to England’s humanistic background makes 
the following comment: "Randomness simply does not exist.
All that exists is the operation sometimes abrupt and
26
direct, sometimes devious and slow, of Divine Justice."
Holloway also notes that the Elizabethan tendency to relate
natural phenomena (such as earthquakes and eclipses) to
27
augury is not without Biblical precedent.
As a result of its Renaissance baptism, the classical 
conception of Fate became an aspect of Providence. But 
Christian humanists of the period still had to contend : 
with another problem— the Fall of Man— which not only 
contradicted the optimism of the ancients but also 
proposed the corruption of human reason. Christian 
Platonists of the period came to terms with the problem, 
however, by placing emphasis upon the Redemption and by 
focusing attention upon man’s potential for spiritual 
perfection. Despite their Puritan affinities, the 
Cambridge Platonists liked neither the idea of pre­
destination nor that of man’s degeneracy. As humanists, 
they inclined toward the classical God of Reason instead 
of the Calvinist God of Will. It was largely through the
26
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efforts of neo-Platonists and neo-Stoics, therefore, that 
the cherished doctrines of classical philosophy became 
reconciled to those of Christian theology. Moreover, 
right reason during the Renaissance remained faithful 
to both.
In examining the villain of reason we shall need to 
bear in mind that his faith in the Self and his expres­
sions of skepticism toward the supernatural, or incipient 
philosophy of scientific materialism, clearly characterize 
him as belonging to continental humanism. In addition, 
it will be necessary to recall that the beliefs of 
English humanists, in matters that many people today 
would dismiss as superstition, operate within the frame­
work of right reason either by indicating reverence for 
the supernatural (and despite Ciceronian precedent for 
doubt) or by acknowledging an ordered universe. The 
doctrine of right reason suggests, too, that early 
Rationalists may have been able to visualize the 
consequences of unbridled reason, or reason gone awry.
For the expulsion of "rational” villainy from orthodox 
humanism is both complete and final. An antithesis of 
the best-known traditions in Western philosophy, the 
villain of reason becomes more than an artistic phenom­
enon of the Renaissance stage. To view him solely as 
either a Machiavellian or an Elizabethan characteretype 
is to miss not only the implications he carried for his 
times but also those he holds for our own.
Ill. EMERGENCE OF THE VILLAIN OF REASON
Because the English stage villain epitomizes the 
"new” man, recently liberated from the Middle Ages, he 
serves in a sense as spokesman for the Renaissance. The 
villain’s amplified: individualism repudiates the communal 
past while his self-assertive instincts betoken a form of 
moral solipsism, lying rooted within the human will. It 
is in this respect that the Elizabethan villain finally 
emerges as something of a caricature-criticism of the 
times. Envisioning the moral consequences of a fully 
emancipated self, English playwrights projected onto the 
stage a figure bedecked in trappings of the Renaissance. 
But, as we have already observed, the medieval mind 
continued to preside over European thinking in the 
sixteenth century. Within England’s new ecclesiastical 
superstructure, headed by the crown, the Christian 
subjects of Queen Elizabeth I received the spiritual 
legacies of the medieval church. English audiences could 
not totally reject the past; nor did they seem especially 
anxious to do so. This attitude is reflected, moreover, 
in works by Shakespeare and his contemporaries. Dramatists 
of the period applauded the Renaissance, yet they displayed 
a remarkable ability to evaluate the Age during which they 
lived. The English stage villain stands as testimony to 
their recognition of its limitations.
While attitudes of the Elizabethan villain signify a
break with the past, the role itself shows signs of having
been visibly affected by dramatic art of the Middle Ages,
particularly by the Vice of English moralities and
interludes. Not unlike the villain, the Vice possesses
notable rationalistic tendencies to which various critics
have alluded. Farnham, for instance, observes that the
following occurs in Inough Is As Good As a Feast:
But he /Worldly Man/ is soon assailed by Covetous­
ness, the peculiarly insinuating leader of a band 
of Vices, and he is soon conquered. Particularly 
is he impressed by the specious argument that if 
he had more wealth he could better give alms ac­
cording to his Christian duty.l
A more explicit treatment of the Vice’s use of logic is
given by Professor Roy J. Pearcy in the paper entitled,
"Devil and Vice as Sophists in the Early English Drama."2
Pearcy’s valuable study, which focuses upon medieval
backgrounds in logic and rhetoric, presents careful
illustrations of the devil’s perverted dialectic and the
Vice’s spurious rationality.
If the very nature of the Vice's allegorical task of
winning man way from virtue identifies him with the art
of persuasion, and especially with sophistry and false
1
Willard Farnham, The Medieval Heritage of Elizabethan 
Tragedy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963J, P • 239.
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logic, other methods of deception and fraud also link the 
Vice to rationalism— tricks, schemes, and scenes of 
conspiracy among vices being conventional ways of 
dramatizing the role as being one of appearances. Since 
these and similar instances of duplicity imply that a 
species of mental gymnastics has taken place, or is 
taking place, in the mind of the practitioner, the human 
reasoning is thereby implicated. In his rationality, 
the medieval Vice prefigures the Renaissance villain.
The Vice, however, is ordinarily a comic figure whereas 
Shakespeare1s villains (who are not entirely without 
humor) function in a manner more indicative of their 
potential for causing tragic situations.
As though on a stage, vices and villains tend to 
create for themselves parts to play before unsuspecting 
persons who serve as imaginary audiences and who, if 
deceived, have helped to make the imaginary performance
3
a success.' Medieval and Renaissance playwrights alike
3
Cf. Richard Austin Donovan, Shakespeare and the 
Game of Evil: A Study of Role-Playing Villains (Ann 
Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1968). though a
number of Shakespeare's characters are conscious role- 
players, among them the role-playing king, Donovan stres­
ses this facet of villain behavior as being the chief 
means by which we perceive the villain's creativity. It 
is this creativity, argues Donovan, that distinguishes 
the villain from the common criminal. In his study of 
Shakespeare's villains, Donovan treats Richard III, 
Claudius, Macbeth, Shylock, Angelo, Edmund, and Iago.
followed the practice of allowing the real audience to 
have information that had been withheld from the imag­
inary one. Since the role of the Vice and that of the 
villain ordinarily focus audience attention upon problems 
in appearance and reality, the audience— if it is to 
understand the dramatic proceedings— must be granted a 
point of vantage from which to view the inner workings 
of deceit and treachery. The Vice's comic function aids 
in clarifying for audiences the spurious nature of his 
rationalism whereas the villain's indebtedness to 
Machiavellian thought only increases the difficulty of 
defining the limits of his rationality. Before examining 
several plays in which the Vice appears, I should first 
like to consider the chief characteristics of rational 
villainy.
The villain of reason may be defined as an individual 
who uses deceit and treachery in order to gratify either 
a conscious or an unconscious wish for personal aggrandize­
ment. As rationalist he exhibits strong premeditative 
instincts masked by hypocrisy— an attribute which has 
frequently been linked to the human reason, particularly 
by Restoration and eighteenth-century satirists. In 
dealing with other characters, the rational villain 
sometimes allows personal ambition to rise to the 
surface; but envy and pride, the passions governing it, 
more often remain below, rankling in his heart until they 
burst upon the world he inhabits with all of the
destructiveness that such feelings can generate. Thus at 
times the rational villain may seem "full of passionate 
intensity." And yet, the rational villain has no capac­
ity for love— an inability that contributes to the image 
of rationality, if only by placing the villain outside 
the realm of a strong human emotion. Roger Burbridge has 
described the villain’s main handicap as being "the thing 
on which he prides himself the most: his repression of
feeling," for "this is what denies him a tragic experience 
and limits his journey to the constricting path of evil."^ 
(The inability of Lear’s daughters, Goneril and Regan, to 
love their father may indicate that their "love" for 
Edmund is to be regarded either as a rather curious 
phenomenon or as a delusion on the part of the sisters.)
As though his victim were merely an obstacle to be 
removed or an object to be disposed of, the rational 
villain often refrains from indulging in personalities; 
still, his exaggerated view of self-worth may easily 
infect him, as it does lago, with a diseased sense of 
injured pride. In such instances, the victim unknow­
ingly participates in a life or death ego-struggle that 
is being waged within the villain’s imagination.
Rational villainy in its English historical setting
4
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reveals significant development and growth of artistic 
awareness in confronting audiences with the eternal 
problem of appearance and reality. Since it was tradi­
tional for art of the Middle Ages to view the human 
condition in terms of religious morality, medieval drama 
must necessarily begin with the proposition that the 
only reality is the next life and that anything which 
diverts man’s attention from it must fall into the 
category of appearances. Notwithstanding the villain's 
inclination toward Machiavellianism, his hypocrisy and 
verbal dependence upon elements of logic and persuasion 
are a natural development from the medieval Vice. By 
inviting others to participate in the pleasure that he 
represents or by disguising himself as good instead of 
evil, the allegorical Vice attempts to deceive his 
victim (man) into accepting false reality (the World).
As Willard Farnham indicates, the medieval lack of 
concern for this life was not especially conducive to 
tragedy:
It /medieval otherworldliness/ sought to realize 
Heaven without realizing earth, and its approach 
to the misfortunes of mortality was the opposite 
of poetic. For the business of the poet is to 
realize life here and now...; it is the special 
business of the tragic poet to realize the meaning 
of suffering in terms given by earthly life.5
5
Farnham, p. 64.
But when dramatists started to turn their attention 
toward the Passion, continues Farnham's argument, art 
and religion began to reconcile themselves to one 
another.^ Interestingly enough, the absorption of 
Corpus Christi plays into the mainstream of medieval 
drama roughly coincided with the entrance of villainy 
onto the English stage. As he traces the early litur­
gical plays through to the later moralities, Hardin 
Craig pauses to consider the circumstances under which 
playwrights must have regarded the human potential for 
villainy:
Another feature of these more highly developed, 
yet still liturgical, plays is the appearance of 
the first antagonistic role, that of Pilate, the 
first villain in the religious drama. He appears 
with soldiers whom he sets to guard the tomb in 
order to prevent the disciples from removing 
Christ's body.... This episode of Pilate and the 
Setting of the Watch was widely disseminated...and 
showed from the first in the speeches of Pilate 
a suggestion of secularity in the use of a sort of 
classical metre instead of the ordinary accentual
kind.7
The depiction of villains as individuals rather than 
as abstractions would have been a natural step for 
native playwrights to take. The moralities, which exis­
ted side by side with Elizabethan tragedy, were already
6
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beginning to show a degree of self-consciousness not
present in the earlier dramas, for many of these carried
the names of their authors. It was especially in
portraying the seeds of villainy, however, that native
playwrights tended toward individualization and seculariza
tion. In this respect, Dr. Percy’s commentary upon
Hickscomer. included by Hazlitt in the Preface, seems
worthy of note:
...the piece is of a comic caste and contains a 
humorous display of some of the vices of the age. 
Indeed, the author has generally been so little 
attentive to the allegory, that we need only 
substitute other names to his personages, and we 
have real characters and living manners.8
The Vices who appear in Hickscorner— Freewill, Imagination 
and Hickscorner— delight in bragging about their mis­
chievous deeds; and their allusions to Newgate, by 
suggesting criminality in addition to immorality, provide 
just such an instance of the human element to which Dr. 
Percy refers. ,
As the Vices of Hickscomer are fighting among 
themselves, Pity enters and attempts to put an end to 
the quarrel. The presence of a common foe prompts the 
Vice’s immediate reconciliation, followed by Imagination’s 
instigation of a plot against Pity:
8
Cited by William Carew Hazlitt, ed., Dodslev’s Old 
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I will go to him, and pick a quarrel,
And make him a thief, and say he did steal 
Of mine forty pound in a bag.9
The three make false accusations against Pity and cast
him into irons. Perseverance and Contemplation later
set their companion free and, with relatively little
difficulty, succeed in convincing Freewill to amend his
ways. Imagination offers greater resistance to the
Virtues' efforts, but fear of death eventually proves
stronger than skepticism; thus Imagination forsakes his
life of sin also. In Hickscomer. as in other medieval
plays, the action revolves mainly around the Vices,
although it is the Virtues who preside over the outcome.
R.L. Pearcy has drawn attention to one of the chief
arguments used in the Vice's attempts to corrupt innocence—
namely, that a young man should taste the joys of the world
because his youth affords him plenty of time in which to
repent. Pearcy then notes the type of plot structure
occasioned by this theme:
Such a development allows the dramatist to begin and 
end with scenes of moral exhortation, to include a 
racy picture of the dissolute life in the middle, 
and to have two transition scenes where the Vices, 
triumphant in the first encounter, and the virtues, 
triumphant in the second, confront one another and 
exercise their respective rhetorical and dialectical 
skills.
^Hazlitt's Podslev. I, 170.
^Pearcy, p. 4»
While the Virtues prove to be less interesting, from a
dramatic standpoint, than their more lifelike adversaries,
the presence of Virtues at least encourages one to believe
that good will prevail and that justice will triumph. In
the comic interlude Jack Juggler (ca. 1553)> whose cast
of characters does not include Virtues, such assurance
is found lacking.
Despite the dramatist's acknowledged indebtedness to
Plautus in the Prologue, actual borrowing is slight. Jack
Juggler is of special interest here because the play
provides one of the purest treatments of the Vice's
characteristic duplicity. Generalizing Plautus' basic
machinery into a plot hinging upon confused identities,
the English playwright uses the Vice for purposes of
illustrating the ineptness of man's reason whenever he
is confronted by duplicity. Jack Juggler, the Vice in
the play, reveals himself almost at once to be a schemer:
But I shall set little by my wit
If I do not Jenkin this night requite
Ere I sleep, Jenkin shall be met
And I trust to come partly out of his debt....
Whereas the Vice ordinarily requires no motive beyond that
of his own innate affinity for evil, Juggler's actions
apparently stem from personal feelings of animosity toward
11
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Jenkin Careaway, a ne'er-do-well page in the service of
his master Bongrace. Juggler's scheme, to make .Jenkin
think that he is not himself but another man, serves the
dual purpose of getting the page into trouble with his
master (certain to bring a beating) and of causing him
12the mental anguish of being without an identity. To
prevent Careaway from carrying out Bongrace's orders,
Juggler disguises himself as the page, accuses Jenkin of
being an impostor, and bars him from his master's door.
By the end of the play Careaway, harassed by both his
master and his irate mistress, has been reduced to a
state of mental confusion. Juggler has read his victim
well, and the outcome fulfills the predictions given in
the Vice's opening speech:
For except he hath better luck than he had 
He woll come hither stark staring mad.
When he 3hall come, I woll handle my captive so, 
That he shall not well wot whither to go.
His mistress, I know, she woll him blame 
And his master also will do the same....^
12
Cf. Burbridge's definition of villainy as "the 
wilful destruction of man's identity" (p. 57). Quite 
naturally, the critic's insight calls for a less literal 
application than the one given here. In treating the 
destructive powers of the villain, Burbridge emphasizes 
the process of dehumanization which occurs.
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Like Haphazard, the Vice in Appius and Virginia (ca. 
1563), Juggler is a punster, quick to recognize the verbal 
possibilities of a word— in this instance Jenkin's 
surname:
Jack Juggler: How now, art thou Careaway or not?
Careaway: By the Lord, I doubt, but sayest thou
nay to that?
Jack Juggler: Yea, marry, I tell thee, Care-away
is my name.14
Juggler’s ability to verbalize is typical of the Vice as 
depicted by early English dramatists. Inclination, who 
appears in The Trial of Treasure (1567), provides us with 
a similar example, even though his glibness fails to 
fool the Virtues, who penetrate the deception. Inclina­
tion has tried to evade Just and Sapience by resorting 
to the use of foreign language:
Inc. Non point parle fran9ois, non, par ma foy.
Sap. To deceive us now himself he doth prepare.
Inc. Ick en can ghene english spreken von waer.1*
Here, and elsewhere, the Vice's garbled learning may be
taken as evidence of his spurious rationality. Still, the
Vice's verbal patterns help to portray him as being
mentally inclined.
Asides and aliases— by no means limited to vices,
villains, or otherwise unworthy personages— lend added
14
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weight to the seeming rationality of the Vice by placing 
him in a position of awareness while others in the play 
remain unaware. This effect of rationality is perhaps 
best described as being "psychological”; for besides 
serving as a vehicle for comic commentary, the Aside may 
also function as a means of providing audiences with 
necessary exposition of the Vice’s plans or schemes.
Roger Burbridge has observed that in the mouths of 
Shakespeare’s villains, particularly Richard III, the 
Aside may serve as a means of persuasion. In such 
instances, the villain attempts to draw the audience 
into his satiric view of the world, hoping to make other
1 fit
characters in the play seem ludicrous and contemptible. 
While the Vice’s penchant for aliases aids in defining 
his duplicitous nature, the motives of Shakespearean 
characters offer a greater range of moral intent. 
Individuals appearing in Shakespeare’s comedies, for 
instance, sometimes resort to use of an alias or a 
disguise in order to forward honorable aims. Their 
actions may be prompted by love (Julia, in Two Gent. of 
Verona) or dictated by practical necessity (Rosalind, in 
As You Like It). In Measure for Measure, the Duke of 
Vienna dons a disguise with the hope of gaining easier
16
Burbridge, pp. 59-61.
access to truth. Conversely, when the medieval Vice 
assumes an alias he does so in order to insinuate himself 
into the good graces of his intended victim, fearing that 
his real name will bring immediate reprisal or instant 
rejection.
One of the most successful scenes in Respublica 
(ca. 1554) centers upon the comic attempts of the Vices 
to find suitable aliases for themselves in order that 
they might seduce the state (Respublica) into granting 
them positions of authority. The play outlines the 
evil effects of the Vices’ governmental policies and of 
Respublica?s inability to penetrate their guises.
Avarice, the chief Vice, has presented himself to her as 
Policy, while his three cohorts— Insolence, Oppression, 
and Adulation— have assumed the names of Authority, 
Reformation, and Honesty, respectively. Although 
Respublica is basically a good individual, she chooses to 
believe her advisers rather than People, who for five 
years has been silenced. The pleas of People are 
ineffectual and it takes the intercession of four ladies—  
Misericordia, Veritas, Justicia, and Pax— before the Vices
17This use of an assumed identity is termed the ’’spy 
in disguise” by Victor Freeburg, whp notes that it is 
utilized "not only to observe but to shape events as well." 
Victor 0. Freeburg, Disguise Plots in Elizabethan Drama 
(1925; rpt. Hew York: Columbia University Press, 19o5),
p. 7-
are exposed. Adulation is given the chance to repent, 
but the goddess Nemesis deals more harshly with the 
others.
Interestingly enough, it is the Virtues1 a priori
knowledge which seems to grant them special immunity from
the Vice’s fraudulent tactics. In this respect, they
differ considerably from the humans in the plays, whose
undermined goodness often stems from an inability to
confront duplicity by means of the lower reason. The
Virtues’ perceptions suggest instead that the best
defenses of goodness reside in the higher reason. Since
the ability of the mind to detect foul play depends to
a large extent upon its being given correct information
with which proper conclusions can be reached, it is the
business of the Vice to see that such information is
withheld or that the facts are misrepresented. Although
man’s distrust of reason had begun during the Middle
Ages, audiences of the day did not doubt the efficacy of
man’s reason in helping to establish a pattern of
virtuous living. Reason, in fact, appears in numerous
plays of the period. As a representative of goodness,
Reason sometimes acts as guardian of the mind, while at
18other times serving as guardian of the soul.
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The Vice’s bag of tricks includes a device which 
calls to mind the tactics employed by Edmund and Cassius—  
use of the forged letter. Iago's theft of Desdemona’s 
hankerchief likewise echoes the stage behavior of the 
medieval Vice. While Vices may congregate in bands, they 
are seldom loyal to one another once they are exposed.
They brawl or fight among themselves, sometimes allowing 
the sins which govern them to undermine their common 
purpose. Medwall’s Nature. a late morality, offers a 
prime illustration of this type of behavior on the part 
of Vices. As Pride arrives near the scene of battle,
Envy catches sight of his extravagant array and promptly, 
tells his cohort that the battle is over and that their 
master has lost. Quite naturally, Pride slinks away in 
shame. Envy’s act of disloyalty reflects not only the 
involuntary nature of the Vice’s evil but also his 
commitment to the expression of self. Throughout the 
play man's lower elements struggle to gain supremacy over 
his reason, and it is Sensuality’s dissatisfaction with 
the subordinate role alloted to him which sets the tone 
of the play’s action. Nor does Nature provide an 
isolated instance of such self-assertive instincts on the 
part of the Vice. In Hickscomer Freewill manifests a 
similar attitude when he exclaims to Perseverance: ”Avaunt,
caitiff, dost thou thou me!”1^
^Hazlitt*s Podslev. I, ISO.
If the Vice seems sensitive to implications of his
inferiority, he is not altogether unlike the rational
villain, whose ego blinds him to the worth of other human
beings— that is, to the extent that he willfully sets
about to cause their downfall. Iago, for instance, is
cognizant of both Othello’s and Cassio’s good qualities
but refuses to be swayed from his course of self-projection.
Weston Babcock maintains that lago’s bitterness stems from
feelings of social inferiority and supports this contention
(using Furness’ Variorum Edition) by pointing out the
”thou”-”you” distinctions within the play. At first
Roderigo refers to Iago as "thou" (used for persons of
lesser station) while Iago addresses him as "you." After
Iago gains feelings of superiority over Desdemona’s would-
be suitor, however, he addresses Roderigo as "thou" and
continues to do so throughout the play. Babcock further
notes that whereas Iago is referred to by use of ”thy”
and "thine” fifty-five times in the play, Cassio is
referred to as "thee" only once. As further substantiation
of his point, Babcock argues that the word honest as
applied to Iago was understood by Elizabethans to be a
20
term of condescension. lago’s motives do, in fact,
20Weston Babcock, "Iago— An Extraordinary Honest Man," 
Shakespeare Quarterly. 16(Autumn 1965), 297-301. Earlier 
uses of the word honest in the play may function in the 
manner that Babcock suggests, but Shakespeare endows the 
term with increasing irony so that when Othello uses it 
in the last act the meaning of "condescension" must be 
rejected. Iago is also referred to as "honest" because 
of his bluntness probably.
rest within the Adlerian-Jungian framework of rational 
villainy, and it is the presence of these same motives 
which finally dissociate Iago from his medieval coun­
terpart, the Vice. An allegorical interpretation of 
Iago as the Vice that cannot act otherwise would seriously 
distort the playwright’s vision of the world in which he 
lived. Even though in the last act, Othello implies that 
Iago is not really a person but the devil incarnate, we 
have lago’s own word for his use of free will. This 
statement as well as his early admission that he is not 
what he appears to be are two of the few statements made 
by Iago that can be taken, at face Value. Nor will an 
allegorical interpretation of Edmund yield a satisfactory 
reading of King Lear, though in point of fact Goneril, 
Regan, and Oswald do operate in much the same way as a 
band of vices. Lear’s daughters become representative of 
the ’’wicked stepsisters” archetype in an almost fairytale 
characterization, while their ’’love” for Edmund suggests 
an involuntary attraction of evil to evil— comparable in a 
sense to the extraordinary scene of recognition between the 
Prospector and the President in Giraudoux’s Madwoman of 
Chaillot.
The Vice’s use of aliases as well as his dependence 
upon tricks, schemes, and outright lies, manifests a 
type of rationalism which early playwrights clearly 
defined as being spurious. The comic stage behavior of
the Vice, for instance, served as one means of ennabling 
audiences to dismiss his claims to reason. As we have 
already observed, the Vice either deliberately or inadver­
tently identifies himself with false learning when he 
adopts the pretext of speaking in a foreign tongue.
Mischief’s Latin— "Corn serveth breadibus, chaff horsibus,
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straw firibusque" (Mankind. ca. 1475)— provides us with 
one of many such illustrations. The Virtues’ superior 
rhetorical abilities constituted another signpost by 
which audiences could read the rationalism of the Vice.
And since the medieval mind viewed evil as being irrational, 
the Vice’s allegorical equation with sin would from the 
first have prevented audiences from being taken in by any 
sort of sleazy rationality. Conversely, the English stage 
villain is neither allegorical nor essentially comic; and 
his strongest opponents are merely men, not Virtues. 
Machiavellian influences, or perhaps Renaissance influences 
in general, endowed the rational villain with a more 
sophisticated rhetoric than that of the Vice; but he 
differs from his predecessor not so much in the degree of 
his rationality as in the more subtle qualifications of it 
on the part of Elizabethan playwrights.
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The cold logic of Machiavelli's The Prince re­
surfaces in the stage villain's rationalistic approach 
to life. But whereas Machiavelli himself acknowledges 
the existence of Fortune (Ch. XXV), the villain ordinarily 
evinces skepticism, preferring to invest all of his faith 
in his own abilities. Cassius' advice to Brutus typifies 
this expression of faith in the self— "The fault, dear 
Brutus, is not in our stars/But in ourselves, that we 
are underlings." As a logician, the Machiavel adheres 
first and foremost to the basic assumption governing his 
reasoning: namely, that the end justifies the means.
Elizabethan dramatists sometimes assigned him a revenge 
motive, but the Machiavel is actually better characterized 
by personal ambition, a motive more in keeping with the 
Italian writer's political beliefs and ideas. Artistic 
depictions of rational villainy reflect the Renaissance's 
interest in Machiavellian thought, and it was largely 
through Italian influences that the modus ooerandi of the 
rational villain became clearly defined. In the plays of 
Shakespeare, for example, the villain of reason is an 
individual of great intellectual and psychological depth.
Neither the Vice nor the Machiavel provides us with 
an explanation of the power achieved by Shakespeare in 
the creation of his villains; but each contributes to 
our understanding of the way in which reason became so 
vital a part of the villain's stage image. Devoting his 
energies to expressions of self-interest, the villain
antithesizes the virtue of Christian love; and it is his 
pride in being a thinking rather than a feeling individual 
which underscores his moral turpitude. Particularly in 
the history plays of Shakespeare do we come to recognize 
the full force and scope of the human ego in prompting 
the rational villain’s actions. Given an English political 
setting, the villain’s Machiavellian rationale fails to 
bring order to the state. In Shakespeare's history plays, 
the villain of reason functions as an agent of chaos.
IV. THE HISTORIES
The ten chronicle plays of Shakespeare comprise a body 
of literature that covers, intermittently, the period of 
English history extending from the reign of King John 
to include that of Henry VIII. As a group, they chronicle 
England’s failures and successes as it struggled to a- 
chieve national unity and to free itself of French and 
Roman influences. Hemminge and Condell, Shakespeare’s 
friends and his first editors, arranged the histories 
according to the dates of the kings represented in the 
titles rather than according to their actual dates of 
composition. In the 1623 folio edition King John appears 
first, followed by Richard II. the two parts of Henry IV. 
the three parts of Henry VI. Richard III, and Henry VIII. 
Since attempts to distinguish between the terras history 
and chronicle as these apply to Shakespeare’s plays 
ultimately prove futile, I shall follow Irving Ribner in 
using the terms interchangeably. Nor is there reason to 
accord tragedy a stricter meaning since the present 
chapter treats the chronicles as a historical continuity 
and examines the villains in their relationship to it.
This is not to deny the possibility of viewing Richard III 
as a tragedy, Julius Caesar as a history, or Macbeth as 
a chronicle of Scottish history; it is, however, to 
say that here and in the following chapters, grouping of 
the plays into comedies, histories, or tragedies is
based not so much upon formal definitions of these terms as 
upon the places assigned to the plays in the first folio.
Although Shakespeare's histories contain chronolog­
ical inaccuracies, character improvisations, and such 
similar artistic liberties, audiences of the day thought 
the plays to be faithful renditions of English history 
as they knew it (barring such exceptions as Henry Brooke, 
whose feelings of personal injury led Shakespeare to 
change the name of Oldcastle to Falstaff). From first to 
last, the plays are true to Elizabethan conceptions of 
historical events and personages leading to the corona­
tion of Queen Elizabeth I and culminating in the splendid 
era of her reign. With an abundance of scenes that are 
largely episodic as well as patriotic, the plays produce 
much the same effect as a national epic. Additional 
epic flourishes prevail in the characters' quite under­
standable genealogical concerns. Then too, there are the 
prophecies of Henry VI and Margaret of Anjou, reminding 
us of what has passed and what will come. The sanctity of 
oaths and pledges is never doubted, for we easily perceive 
the evil consequences of Henry Vi's refusal to keep his 
pledge to marry Armagnac's daughter and of Henry IV's 
failure to prevent the death of Richard II. As whole 
armies clash, Shakespeare like the poet Homer draws our 
attention away from the general clamor and focuses it 
upon two combatants such as York and Clifford, who ex­
change compliments prior to exchanging blows. Studied
as a unit the plays testify to the assurance given by 
E.M.W. Tillyard that "the superiority of the epic over 
every other literary form was axiomatic in the Renaissance 
in spite of Aristotle’s opinion.”*-
As dramas without heroes, the history plays yield 
a satisfactory reading when interpreted in the manner 
suggested by Irving Ribner— namely, that England is the
morality hero who errs, suffers, is pitied by God, and
2
finally redeemed. The influence of medieval tradition
is further suggested by characters such as Falstaff and
Richard III, who possess vestiges of the stage Vice, as
well as by the abstract figure Rumour, who introduces the
second part of Henry IV. A situation of kingship that
involves good and evil counselors likewise indicates the
3
presence of morality influences. To his discredit,
Henry VI fails to heed the advice of Duke Humphrey his 
good counsel while it is to the credit of Prince Hal that 
he finally chooses the Lord Chief Justice rather than 
Falstaff to advise him. A good king, like a morality 
hero, is sometimes misled by those around him, but it is
*E.M.W. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 242.
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his responsibility to listen to the promptings of Virtue 
and turn his attentions away from Vice. Fusion of clas­
sical and medieval influences is likewise apparent in 
Renaissance attitudes toward order and degree. The 
Renaissance could well understand why the chorus in 
Agamemnon abhorred the killing of kings or why the gods 
themselves exacted retribution for King Laius1 death in 
Oedipus Rex. The sanctity of kingship was taught in 
Homilies of the English Church at a time when regular 
church attendance was compulsory and willful disobedience 
viewed as the gravest of political and moral evils.
Thus Faulconbridge reminds Salisbury that only God has the 
right to sit in judgment of a king, not the king's nobles 
nor any of his other subjects. Shakespeare expresses the 
same view in the speech of Carlisle— "What subject can 
give sentence on his king?"— and indeed throughout the 
whole of Richard II.
The histories of Shakespeare are explicit in treating 
the themes of sin and retribution and owe much to the 
chroniclers who had exhibited in their works a tendency 
to moralize history. The Tudors, moreover, had success­
fully perpetuated the idea that the history of England from 
Richard II to Henry VIII revealed the working out of 
Divine Providence and that the eventual union of the 
houses of York and Lancaster through royal marriage
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represented "the providential and happy ending of an organ­
d­ie piece of history." But even if "heaven hath a hand"
in the events of the plays, Shakespeare is too good a 
dramatist to allow his characters to become helpless 
pawns in a fatalistic world. Rather, he accounts for 
happenings through portrayals of his characters’ strengths 
and weaknesses. Within the plays are found the psycholog­
ical causes underlying the actions of great men and of 
weak men called to perform great tasks.
Shakespeare’s chronicles do not represent total 
historical continuity for King John and Henrv VIII are 
isolated from the others which, together, comprise two 
tetralogies. Shakespeare began the series with the three 
parts of Henrv VI followed by Richard III. Next, he seems 
to have written either Richard II or King John. But 
whether or not Richard II was written before or after 
King John, it bears an undisputed relationship to the' 
rest of the plays in the second tetralogy. This tetralogy, 
then, consists of Richard II. the two parts of Henry IV. 
and Henrv V . The last of the chronicle plays Henrv VIII 
was written by Shakespeare and someone else, probably 
John Fletcher, and though it apparently stages well
4
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Henrv VIII has remained a black sheep among critics, no
5
doubt because of its dual authorship.
Professor Tillyard has attempted to account for the
order of the plays by suggesting a possibility that
Shakespeare may have written early versions of the plays
in the second tetralogy, recasting and revising them .
6
later. To Tillyard the plays indicate a single artistic
conception, and so the critic recognizes another possible
explanation for their order of composition:
Perhaps, like others, he /Shakespeare/ thought 
that vice was easier to picture than virtue, hell 
than paradise, and that it would be safer to spend 
his present energies on pictures of chaos and a 
great villain, leaving the more difficult picture 
of princely perfection to his maturity.'
Tillyard’s argument is of course tenable and offers the
most plausible explanation for Richard Ill’s appearance
in the middle of the plays instead of at the end, where
one might expect to find him both chronologically and
artistically— artistically because he represents a great
character achievement on the part of Shakespeare. The
playwright’s plan to unify the chronicles, however, could
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as easily have occurred after the fact as before. Recogni 
tion of the possibilities afforded by a once-established 
framework might have been prompted by aesthetic considera­
tions such as those that must have occurred to William 
Faulkner or Honore de Balzac. A limited project could 
evolve naturally into a panoramic view that surrounds the 
finished opus with an epic aura and that capitalizes upon 
an audience’s interest in characters and themes already 
popularized.
Because each of the histories belongs to a whole 
greater than itself, a villain character may seem more 
complicated than if his appearance were limited to a 
single play. This factor, however, constitutes the least 
of our worries. Of much greater concern are the political 
motives which figure strongly into the morality or immoral 
ity of characters’ actions. Outside of Richard III there 
are no villains in the histories to equal the great 
villains of the tragedies; and caught as these are in the 
web of English political history, they serve their dramat­
ic function as incipient or embryonic villains. Their 
importance lies not so much in their revelations about 
Shakespeare’s maturing artistic powers as in their revela­
tions about his view of complex public morality. As the 
motives and methods of rational villainy blend with the 
political backdrop of the plays, one finds it increas­
ingly difficult to distinguish partisan politics from the 
egocentric forces that propel the rational villain toward
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his goals. Hotspur's uncle, Worcester, is just such a 
figure, and there are others. Greater attention to 
character development, if Shakespeare had so chosen, would 
have alleviated some of these difficulties; but it could 
not have better described the blending of personal and 
political aims to the point at which villainy becomes 
obscured by chauvinism. Pandtilph, the cynical and worldly 
papal legate in King John, instigates a French attack upon 
England by appealing to Lewis' baser motives. In every 
way but one Pandulph bears all of the traces of rational 
villainy, and the exception is his dogged loyalty to 
Rome— with which Elizabethan audiences would not have 
sympathized in any case. Pandulph would have been, and 
so he must remain, a villainous cleric using villainous 
methods to further a bad cause. But the question, actually, 
is whether the rational villain can be committed to any 
cause at all and represent the type of villain in whom we 
are interested. The monk who rids his church of an enemy 
by poisoning both the king and himself (KJ, V.v.23-30) 
belongs to an entirely different category of villainy.
Yet, Shakespeare conceived of situations in which man's 
subtler secret wishes for self-aggrandizement attach 
themselves to outside causes, feeding the ego with chau­
vinistic impulses. Herein lies the problem of rational 
villainy as it occurs in the histories.
As a group, the histories follow the tradition of
ye
Christian humanism. This moral historical perspective is 
found in Shakespeare's sources as well as in popularly 
held opinions of his day. Briefly, it denounces factious 
rebellion as an affront to heaven's decree of order and 
harmony; it views the king as God's representative on 
earth corresponding to the sun in the heavens; and it 
asserts a system of retribution whereby both individuals 
and the state are held liable for wrongs committed. The 
Providential factor literally presides over the history 
“ plays, an<r perhaps at this point it might help to remind 
the reader that in the minds of Elizabethans the Christian 
concepts of free will and divine Providence did not con­
tradict one another. Henry IV and his son Henry V, for 
instance, by being worthy persons and good kings are able 
to postpone the retribution that heaven will inevitably 
exact as payment for the slaying of Richard II, its 
minister on earth. It should not seem at all strange 
that Christian humanist ideology pervaded the works of 
Renaissance chroniclers, for it was found in many other 
places besides.
Exemplifying the moral historical approach to English 
history were Polydore Vergil's Historia Angliae. which 
portrayed Henry V as the ideal of kingly virtue, and 
Edward Halle's The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre 
Families of Lancaster and York, which denounced rebellion 
and emphasized the Providential aspect of England's 
political past. Though A Mirror for Magistrates is more
literary than historical, it covers the same period of 
history as Shakespeare’s plays. The work expresses its 
authors’ opinions on government and politics through a 
series of monologues delivered by historical figures such 
as Jack Cade, who also makes an appearance in 2Henry VI. 
Other widely known works included Lord Berner’s transla­
tion of Froissart and Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicles of 
England. Scotland. and Ireland. the work that served as 
the principal source for Shakespeare’s second tetralogy. 
Moral philosophy and Tudor politics do not dominate 
Renaissance historiography in every case, but both fairly 
well represent English thinking in areas of history and 
government. Permeating the histories of Shakespeare, in 
fact, are several major Renaissance conceptions that hold 
moral-political implications. Since these not only 
contribute to the worldview of the plays but also help 
to shape audience attitudes toward Shakespeare’s political 
villains, I should like to review them briefly before 
proceeding any further. The rights of kingly title and 
possession, the role of Providence in history, and the 
doctrines of order and degree provide an index which 
guides our judgment of Shakespeare’s historical figures.
Though it was published long after Shakespeare had 
written his plays, Browne’s The Case of Allegiance to a 
King in Possession (1690) puts into clearcut argumentative 
terms the moral questions that must have confronted
audiences each time they witnessed performances of the 
histories. Browne's piece attacks the belief that a 
subject's allegiance is due only to the de facto king, 
for it claims that the king's right to the allegiance of 
his subjects is antecedent not subsequent to possession. 
While Browne grants that subjects should lawfully submit 
to acts of government for their own safety and for the 
good of the state, he insists that the loyalties of 
subjects
are due to the lawful King only, by the law of 
Nature: and therefore no Human Law, can take the
whole Allegiance of the Subjects, or the indispensable 
parts of it, away from him and transfer them to the 
Usurper.®
Browne laments the large number of usurpations attending 
the history of English kings and the numbers of "traitors" 
who stood in behalf of their rightful king. In Richard II 
Shakespeare raises something of the same question by 
allowing the Bishop of Carlisle to express such high- 
minded sentiments that had he been executed along with the 
Abbot of Winchester and other followers of Richard, we 
should probably have viewed him as either a patriot or 
a political martyr— despite his conspiracy against the 
de facto, king. York's loyalty to Henry and Aumerle's
g
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penitence help to win our sympathies away from the 
conspirators, but we do not really give them over to 
Henry IV until he mercifully commends Carlisle to a 
monastery instead of to the gallows. With Henry IV1s 
promise of atonement for the unfortunate death of 
Richard II, we yield up our sympathies entirely to the 
de facto king. Clearly then, treason and villainy do 
not necessarily mean the same thing, though it is 
sometimes so implied in the histories.
The Case of Allegiance to a King in Possession 
presents an absolutist ethical position that is espec­
ially clear in censuring Lord Bacon's praise of a 
statute, as being pious and just, which exempted 
subjects from charges of treason when the king compelled 
them to bear arms against a lawful heir:
The Cunning and State Policy of it /the statute/ 
does easily appear, but it is not so easie to 
discover any piety or Justice in a Law that makes 
evil good and good evil.9
Yet, Shakespeare's history plays tend to favor the de
facto king (except of course Richard III). This is not
to say that Shakespeare's feelings were exceedingly
different from Browne's; it is to say, however, that
the playwright directs our sympathies more toward the
9
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practical necessities of civil order and national unity. 
Prince Hal’s stalwart defense of the rights of possession 
as he attempts to allay his father’s fears about the 
crown is perhaps the best argument found in the plays:
My gracious liege 
You won it, wore it, kept it, gave it me 
Then plain and right must ray possession be....
(2Hen. VI IV.v.222-3)
Still, the statement is an oversimplification which 
banishes from its premises any recognition of prior 
titular claims— claims that Hal himself will later 
revive in making a bid for the French throne. If the 
argument is indeed the best he can make, then the prince 
would obviously do well to ’’busy giddy minds with foreign 
quarrels." Shakespeare’s commoners view the problem of 
lawful kingship in a manner akin to callousness. "For 
we were subjects but while you were King," remark the 
keepers who arrest Henry VI; and in King John the 
citizens of Angiers promise their loyalties to the one 
who "proves the King" by winning the war. The cheap 
behavior of the keepers and the citizens suggests that 
Shakespeare may have had little regard for the rights 
of possession but that he sympathized nevertheless with 
the subject’s dilemma.
Secondly, we should consider the place that Prov­
idence occupies in the histories. Briefly, Providence 
involves a series of crimes followed by penance and 
forgiveness or by retribution. If the latter, payment
is exacted from either the offender or his heirs, often at 
a high rate of interest. By refusing to stop the plot 
against Humphrey, York becomes accomplice to the crime 
and thereby seals not only his own fate but also his 
son's and England's. The death of the good duke, England's 
Protector, demands both private and public retribution, 
the latter occurring in the reign of Richard III. (Retribu­
tion is private when it involves individuals or" families 
and public when it implicates an entire nation.) Margaret 
of Anjou's revengeful speech in Richard III provides a 
veritable catalogue of privately paid accounts:
Thy Edward he is dead that stabbed my Edward;
Thy other Edward dead, to quit my Edward.
Young York he is but boot, because both they 
Match not the high perfection of my loss.
Thy Clarence he is dead that killed my Edward;
And the beholders of this tragic play,
The adulterate Hastings, Rivers, Vaughan, Grey,
Untimely smothered in their dusky graves. (IV.iv.63-70)
On the other hand, Richard II proposes a theory of public
retribution:
Yet know my master, God Omnipotent,
Is mustering in His clouds on our behalf 
Armies of pestilence; and they shall strike 
Your children yet unborn and unbegot,
That lift your vassal hands against my head 
And threat the glory of my precious crown.
(III.iii.85-90)
Renaissance conceptions of Divine Providence included 
the idea that bad kings as well as good were sent from God, 
that the bad kings served as a Providential means for 
scourging the people of their sins, and that the good kings 
were signs of God's forgiveness. The belief that God
selected certain people as His instruments is expressed 
in Henry VIf s words to Warwick:
And chiefly therefore I thank God and thee.
He was the author, thou the instrument.
(3Hen. VI IV.vi.17-B)
Although such divergent personalities as Henry of Richmond 
and Richard III serve equally to carry out the decrees 
of divine Will, neither character surrenders his own will 
in the process; and whatever validity such distinctions 
hold for modern times, Christian humanism recognized free
Will and divine Providence. The foreknowledge of God did
not mean the same thing as predestination, nor was any 
man trapped in a web of divine intent. If a theory of 
Providence pervades the histories, it does not absolve 
Shakespeare’s characters of moral responsibilities.
Equally clear, moreover, are the limits of kingly command. 
A subject does not have to obey when the king orders him 
to perform an immoral action. By sparing Arthur’s life, 
for instance, Hubert disobeys King John; and when the 
king comments that Hubert’s physical demeanor would seem 
to make him capable of almost any terrible crime, Hubert 
replies:
And you have slandered nature in my form,
Which, howsoever rude exteriorly,
Is yet the cover of a fairer mind
Than to be butcher of an innocent child.
(KJ IV.ii.256-9)
Shakespeare’s historical figures belong to a world in 
which people and events seem specifically chosen. Some
are unwilling sacrificial victims whose reward, it is
assumed, will come in another life. Others are rebels
sent to punish the state for crimes requiring public
retribution. Professor Tillyard has summarized the
Providential aspect of the histories accordingly:
What were the sins God sought to punish? There 
had been a number, but the pre-eminent one was 
the murder of Richard II, the shedding of the blood 
of God’s deputy on earth. Henry IV had been punished 
by an uneasy reign but had not fully expiated the 
crimej Henry V, for his piety, had been allowed a 
brilliant reign. But the curse was there; and 
first England suffers through Henry V ’s early death ,0 
and secondly she is tried by the witchcraft of Joan.
Since the doctrine of order and degree has already 
been treated in the section on humanism (Ch.2), we need 
only consider its special application to Shakespeare’s 
chronicles. Indeed, the doctrine holds a more significant 
place in the histories than in either the tragedies or 
comedies. Order and harmony within the kingdom were to 
minds of the Renaissance more than just an obvious political 
good; they were the heavenly decrees of the divine Orderer 
Himself. Thus, those who aligned themselves with rebellion 
and insurrection belonged either to the time before creation 
or with Cain after the Fall. The plays, moreover, affirm 
the Renaissance doctrine of cosmic and natural correspon­
dences. Throughout the plays the king is metaphorically 
represented by the sun, especially in Richard II. and
10
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there are numerous references to the correspondences of 
planetary motions with natural events as well. A rational­
ly ordered universe had its correspondence in an ordered 
state, free of misrule and rebellion. To represent the 
way that a state should function, Shakespeare chose 
metaphors of "time,” "gardening," and "music." Well, then, 
might Richard II lament:
Ha, ha! Keep time. How sour sweet music is 
When time is broke and no proportion kept!
So is it in the music of men’s lives.
And here have I the daintiness of ear 
To check time broke in a disordered string,
But for the concord of my state and time
Had not an ear to hear my true time broke. (V.v.42-S)
If the histories identify order with political and moral
good, they represent the opposite condition as being both
politically and morally evil. The Cade episodes in
2Henrv VI. for example, parody the disorder then rampant
in the kingdom. Cade is an embodiment of the unreason
that prevails. He condemns Lord Say for having erected a
grammar school and for having fostered the use of printing;
and he finally orders Say’s execution on grounds that the
latter has pleaded too well for his life. The outburst of
Northumberland, though uttered in strained circumstances,
proclaims those principles of disorder which in the plays
of Shakespeare are represented by the leaders of rebellion:
Let Heaven kiss earth! Now let not Nature’s hand 
Keep the wild flood confined! Let order die!
(2Hen. IV I.i.153-4)
On the somewhat lighter side is Falstaffian disorder.
Hal's assessment of Falstaff early in lHenrv IV helps
to prepare us for the princefs later rejection of his 
companion:
What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the 
day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes 
capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials 
the signs of leaping houses.... I see no reason 
why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the 
time of the day. (I.ii.6-13)
Because "time" is used in the history plays to signify
order, Falstaff’s question is indeed superfluous. At the
end of 2Henry IV the new king renounces his former friend
but grants him a pension that will eliminate any necessity
for crime. Thus Henry chooses order (symbolized by the
Lord Chief Justice) over disorder (symbolized by Falstaff).
Our deep-felt sympathy for Falstaff at the end of the play
provides an effective means by which the absolute value
of Henry’s final choice can be measured.
Shakespeare’s political figures include the rebels
and conspirators who in their own way helped to make
English history. Whether or not they merit a badge of
villainy depends largely upon their motives as well as
their actions. Unfortunately, the breadth of subject
matter in the plays denies some of them a just hearing.
To what extent have they practiced deceit and treachery?
Are their motives high-minded or petty and self-seeking?
In the foregoing paragraphs I have attempted to indicate
several perspectives for viewing Shakespeare’s historical
villains. One other item remains, and that is repentance.
Contrite villains appear in the histories, but these are
few when compared to those in the comedies. A penitent 
villain, such as Cardinal Wolsey in Henrv VIII. is one 
who leaves the play a better man than when he entered it; 
but since his conversion usually occurs at the end or1 
after he has been found out, he nevertheless functions as 
the play’s villain.
The first tetralogy contains only several small-sized 
portraits of rational villainy in addition to the well- 
drawn figure of Richard III. Serving as the main villain 
in lHenry VI is Joan of Arc, who brings about the fall 
of the heroic Talbot and causes great losses to England.
But Joan develops in the play as a villain of the non- 
rational type. Relying upon witchcraft rather than self, 
she emerges as a figure of great physical prowess and 
energetic will. Her bumbling, contradictory arguments 
while facing execution lack the touch of the true rational­
ist who, even if illogical, argues in sophistry’s subtler 
tongue. Two additional strains of villainy in lHenrv VI—  
Suffolk’s and Winchester’s— help to prepare the way for the 
murder of Duke Humphrey in 2Henrv VI. Suffolk’s words at 
the end of the first part suggest that his ambitions and 
schemes may inspire further character development in the 
second part:
Margaret shall now be Queen and rule the King;
But I will rule both her, the King, and realm.
(lHen. VI V.v .107-3)
But Suffolk never really blooms as a rational villain for
his personal involvement with Margaret, Shakespeare’s own
addition to history, weakens the force of his rationalism 
and corroborates an earlier scene in which the earl, upon 
beholding Margaret for the first time, is suddenly and 
passionately attracted to her (V.iii). Suffolk’s plans 
do materialize, but mainly because of the jealousies and 
hatreds of Gloucester’s enemies and not because of his 
own cunning. Through the efforts of Warwick and the 
populace, Suffolk is banished following the murder of 
Duke Humphrey of Gloucester, and a patriotic sea captain 
later captures and executes him.
The Bishop of Winchester is drawn with greater 
certainty than either Suffolk or Joan of Arc. Winchester 
is ambitious:
But long I will not be Jack out of office.
The King from Eltham I intend to steal
And sit at chiefest stern of public weal.
(lHen. VI I.i.175-7)
He envies the duke and, ironically enough, despises the
duchess for her pride. Recognizing Winchester’s motives
for what they are, Gloucester openly defies the bishop.
Comments made by the Mayor and Exeter, as well as by the
bishop himself, verify the duke’s assessment of Winchester’
character and justify Humphrey’s criticism of the prelate.
By means of bribes, he rises to the position of cardinal.
The Bishop of Winchester, now Cardinal Beaufort, uses an
aside to express the motives and intentions that will
join him to the action of the next play:
Now Winchester will not submit, I trow,
Or be inferior to the proudest peer.
Humphrey of Gloucester, thou shalt well perceive 
That neither in birth or for authority 
The Bishop will be overborne by thee.
I ’ll either make thee stoop and bend thy knee,
Or sack this country with a mutiny. (V.i.56-62)
Winchester’s egotism carries him to the limits of personal
revenge, and he finally dies of a guilty conscience. In
a number of ways he foreshadows Cardinal Wolsey, another
of Shakespeare’s rational villains. Unlike those who
aspire to be kings, Shakespeare’s ambitious churchmen aim
for the papacy so that they may rule sovereigns.
The second part of Henrv VI revolves mainly around
Gloucester’s tragic downfall and the subsequent rise in
York’s political fortunes. Dominating much of the action
in the second and third parts of Henrv VI is Margaret of
Anjou, a cruel villainess who gloats in the destruction
of Gloucester and later York. In describing the theme
of "feminine supremacy" in lHenrv VI. David Bevington
categorizes Margaret with Joan of Arc and the Countess of
Auvergne, pointing out that Margaret only seems to possess
more femininity in the first play because she uses' it
consciously to her own advantage and not naturally as one
might otherwise suppose. To Bevington, the Amazonian theme
of the play relates to the broader one of disorder and
discord.^ Bevington’s interpretation of Margaret in
■^David M. Bevington, "The Domineering Female in 
lHenrv VI." Shakespeare Studies. 2(1966), 51-8.
lHenrv VI thus helps to explain the seemingly radical 
change in her character in the second and third parts of 
the Henry the Sixth plays. Like Winchester and Wolsey, 
Margaret possesses an easily offended ego and the will to 
revenge the real or imagined offense by means of deceit 
and treachery. Unfortunately for the Duchess of Gloucester, 
Margaret lacks neither the means nor the will to outright 
villainy. The duchess is herself guilty of pride and ambi­
tion; but meeting with reproofs from her husband, the 
duchess contents herself with petty displays of her wealth 
and position in court, thereby arousing the envious wrath 
of Margaret and Winchester. Thus Hume, a hired villain 
motivated by the gold of Beaufort and Suffolk, leads the 
duchess into a trap whereby charges of witchcraft may be 
brought against her. Wot long after the duchess’ disgrace, 
her husband is murdered while awaiting trial on the false 
charges made against him.
Without the weakness of Henry VI, the tragedy of the 
duke could not have occurred. (Henry VIII, for example:, 
perceives the jealous enmity in his court and literally 
dares his Council to convict Cranmer, whom he believes to 
be innocent.) Then too, York has also refused to act in 
Humphrey’s behalf. Unlike Henry, York is aware of the 
conspiracy and permits it because he realizes that the 
conspirators will ultimately destroy themselves along with 
Humphrey. Henry VI and York together represent a type of 
negative evil, though the king is basically virtuous and
York basically noble. The positive evil of Margaret, 
Cardinal Beaufort, Suffolk, and Buckingham, opens the way 
for another conspiracy— this time against the crown. As
Salisbury and Warwick become increasingly disgusted with 
the reign of Henry and Margaret, they begin to question 
the past and to consider the titular claims of York. A
sense of duty to the kingdom motivates both men, who 
swear allegiance to York; and thus the second part of 
Henry VI ends with the flight of Henry and Margaret and with 
the victory of York’s forces.
The presence of warring factions in 3Henry VI might 
cause the crimes of Margaret and Clifford to seem like 
those of political necessity if Shakespeare had not shown 
otherwise. Through the presence of the tutor (I.iii), 
Shakespeare treats Clifford’s slaying of Rutland, York’s 
young son, as being an immoral act. Margaret’s cruelty 
toward York in the last scene of the first act likewise 
violates all the standards of private morality. Although 
Clifford remains undeveloped, Margaret is fully portrayed 
as a villain. Like Joan of Arc, however, she is a villain 
of will rather than one of reason. The manner in which 
Shakespeare has depicted the two villainesses suggests 
the playwright’s interest in non-rational villainy. By 
outwardly giving in to feelings of emotion and passion, 
the character-villain separates himself from the rational­
istic method. As the artistic powers of Shakespeare began
to mature, however, the playwright showed a decided 
dramatic preference for the rational villain.
Besides Margaret and Clifford, Shakespeare introduces 
another villain into the third part of Henry VI— Yorkfs 
son Richard. Though Richard does not become a full-fledged 
villain until Richard III, the playwright has carefully 
established all the traits which later characterize him 
as a rational villain. As long as York is alive, and short­
ly thereafter, Richard tends to act nobly in battle and 
in the filial affections he holds for his father. But as 
early as Act One of 3Henry VI. we witness something of 
the turn that his mind will take. Edward has advised his 
father to break his oath to Henry on the grounds that a 
kingdom is worth more than an oath, but York remains 
unconvinced until Richard’s offer to "prove?f that the 
oath should be broken:
An oath is of no moment, being not took 
Before a true and lawful magistrate 
That hath authority over him that swears.
Henry had none, but did usurp the place.
Then, seeing ’twas he that made you to depose,
Your oath, my lord, is vain and frivolous. (I.ii.22-7)
By hedging upon a legalism, Richard substitutes a theory
of mental reservation in the place of honorable intent.
Urged by Richard's sophistry and no doubt by his own
inclinations, York relents.
After York’s death his sons with the aid of Warwick
succeed in putting Edward on the throne. But Edward’s
lechery as well as his dishonorable treatment of Warwick
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causes the latter to quit the sons of York and transfer his
allegiance back to Henry. Meanwhile, Richard’s true
character is beginning to reveal itself more clearly. In
Act III, Gloucester soliloquizes:
Why, I can smile and murder whiles I smile,
And cry ’’Content" to that which grieves my heart,
And wet my cheeks with artificial tears,
And frame my face to all occasions....
I can add colors to the chameleon,
Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
And set the murderous Machiavel to school.
Can I do this, and cannot get a crown?
Tut, were it farther off, I ’ll pluck it down.
(III.ii.182-195)
Thus, Richard of Gloucester promises to cover his thoughts
and actions with the cloak of appearances, a decision
which foreshadows Edmund and Iago, Shakespeare’s later
triumphs in rational villainy. Like Edmund and Iago,
Richard also possesses a warped sense of having been
cheated by the world. Iago blames Othello for his lack
of promotion, but Edmund and Richard view their conditions
in terms of nature’s peevishness. Edmund takes Nature
for his guide while Richard uses Nature to justify his
villainy. It is to be noted, moreover, that both Richard
and Edmund have twisted the humanist view of Nature to
their own conceits. In the soliloquy just cited, Richard
also takes the opportunity to blame Nature for his own
diseased psychology:
Why, love forswore me in my mother’s womb 
And, for I should not deal in her soft laws,
She did corrupt frail nature with some bribe 
To shrink mine arm up like a withered shrub,
To make an ;envious mountain on my back,
yj
Where sits deformity to mock my body,
To shape my legs of an unequal size,
To disproportion me in every part,
Like to a chaos, or an unlicked bear whelp 
That carries no impression like the dam.
(III.ii.153-62)
After York’s victory, Richard rushes to the tower and
stabs Henry VI, for whom our sympathies have increased a
great deal. The words of the victim ("Oh, God forgive my
sins and pardon thee!") offer a sharp contrast to those of
his executioner ("Down, down to Hell, and say I sent thee
thither..."). Before exiting with Henry's body, Richard
makes a seemingly logical statement though like a great
many of his enthymemes it carries a false conclusion:
Then, since the Heavens have shaped my body so,
Let Hell make crooked my mind to answer it. (V.vi.73-9)
Richard follows the foregoing piece of logic with an
expression of his attitude toward love:
I have no brother, I am like no brother;
And this word ’love,’ which greybeards call divine,
Be resident in men like one another,
And not in me. I am myself alone.
Clarence, beware.... (V.vi.BO-4)
In the third of the Henry VI plays, then, Richard reveals
all of the traits necessary to the rational villain. His
inability to love merely underscores the twisted logic
of his rationalism while his damaged ego propels a forceful,
energetic will.
The last play of the first tetralogy, Richard III.
describes the terror of Richard's reign after he becomes
king. Technically speaking, Richard is rightful king both
by title and possession and if Shakespeare could not devise
the means of making RichardTs downfall seem politically 
right, the playwright outdid himself in showing it to be 
morally so. Through the sheer emotional impact of the 
ghost scene near the end of the play (V.iii), Shakespeare 
causes his audience to envision a type of moral order 
that transcends the human understanding. In Plato’s 
Crito. it will be remembered, Socrates refuses to forsake 
the laws of his city. But Socrates is urged by his friends 
whereas Henry of Richmond, we are led to believe, has been 
commissioned by the Lord Himself.
Three generations had established precedent for 
Lancastrian rule, but this rulership did not achieve 
heavenly sanction until Richard III made his titular 
claims to the throne. When fighting broke out between 
Yorkist and Lancastrian forces Henry Vi’s nephew, the 
promising young Earl of Richmond, fled to France. While 
awaiting outcome of the war young Henry Tudor prepared 
to claim the crown through his rights as the Lancastrian 
heir. Thus as Richard eliminates each of his rivals at 
home, Henry is growing stronger abroad. And by the time 
that he is ready to make his re-entry into England, the 
country’s discontented nobles will eagerly flock to his 
side.
Richard III opens with a soliloquy delivered by 
Richard, Duke of Gloucester. The purpose of the speech 
is to confirm immediately the character we have witnessed 
in 3Henry VI and to provide Richard III with some of the
materials necessary to its functioning as a well-made 
play. Again, Richard refers to his physical appearance.
In his mind he has been "cheated of feature" and the 
culprit is of course "nature." Richard’s later success 
with the foolish Lady Anne refutes the premise of one 
of his enthymemes— "And therefore, since I cannot prove a 
lover"— as well as the informal conclusion to it: "I am
determined to prove a villain" (I.i.30). The premise, 
itself a conclusion derived from Richard’s contemplation 
of his form, might seem reasonable enough were it not 
for Richard’s later rendering of its disproof. By lament­
ing his banishment from love’s kingdom, both in 3Henrv VI 
and Richard III. Richard hopes to gain the audience's 
sympathy. But his self-pitying argument is at best a 
rationalization used to compensate for, or to cover up, 
his inability to care for anyone but himself. Devoid of 
such feelings within himself, Richard nonetheless pretends 
to love his brother Clarence and sends murderers instead 
of the help that Clarence eagerly awaits. The crime 
seems even more heinous in light of earlier events, for 
Clarence's desertion of Warwick seems to have been 
predicated upon a last-minute decision that "blood is 
thicker than water."
Richard resembles the Vice of medieval drama. He 
delights in concluding a murderous resolution on the note 
of humorous blasphemy: "Simple, plain Clarence I I do
love thee so/That I will shortly send thy soul to heaven”
(I.i.ll&-9). Though at times Richard takes his rationalism
seriously, at other times he enjoys applying the rule of
comic logic— as, for instance, to his marriage intentions:
For then I ’ll marry Warwick’s youngest daughter.
What though I killed her husband and her father?
The readiest way to make the wench amends
Is to become her husband and her father—  (I.i.153—6)
Richard’s sardonic humor invites comparisons with that 
of Edmund and Iago, but it is to be noted that Richard’s 
humor diminishes and that his rationality deteriorates 
near the end of the play. This change is dramatically 
correct, for Richard’s sense of humor and the zest he 
displays while pursuing victims evoke the sort of admira­
tion that could otherwise inhibit an audience’s satisfac­
tion in his death. Again, as he had in 3Henrv VI. Richard
creates for himself a role of appearances:
And thus I clothe my naked villainy 
With old odd ends stolen out of Holy Writ,
And seem a saint when most I play the devil.
(I.iii.336-9)
Richard views with contempt the ’’gulls” he has won to his 
side and coolly plans the deaths of those he has not.
Aiding him in his schemes is Buckingham. Together, they 
use Catesby to spy on Hastings whom they hope to enlist 
in their plot. But Hastings nobly upholds the rightful 
heir, never dreaming that Richard (now Protector) will 
order his death. When Buckingham later balks at the 
prospect of killing the two princes in the Tower, Richard
turns fiercely against his former cohort, first by break­
ing his promise to reward him and then by capturing and 
executing Buckingham.
To win support for himself Richard even resorts to 
vilifying his own mother. He has instructed Buckingham 
thus:
Tell them, when that my mother went with child 
Of that unsatiate Edward, noble York,
My princely father, then had wars in France;
And, by just computation of the time,
Found that the issue was not his begot....
(III.v.86-90)
While Richard’s conclusion to the speech perhaps indicates
a softening attitude, it more than likely offers but
another instance of his hypocritical piety or stems from
a genuine fear of contradiction from his mother: "But
touch this sparingly, as ’twere far off/Because you know,
my lord, my mother lives." In Richard’s confrontation
with his mother (IV.iv), we detect noticeable signs of
his weakening. Bravado replaces his former confidence.
Furthermore, we learn that Richard’s rriother apparently
never could bear the sight of him and that Richard has
borne this real or imagined memory of his childhood with
bitterness. When the duchess asks Richard if his company
ever gave her a comfortable hour, he replies:
Faith, none but Humphrey Hour, that called your Grace 
To breakfast once forth of my company. (IV.iv.175-6)
Richard’s mother, his wife Queen Anne, and the former
Queen Elizabeth are all unhappy women who recognize
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Richardfs evil and suffer because of it. Unlike the 
Amazonian women in lHenrv VI. these women appear to be 
helpless. Elizabeth differs from the former Lady Anne in 
one respect, however. She refuses to believe Richard’s 
lies or to compromise her virtue by allowing him to marry 
her daughter, whom Henry of Richmond also seeks to wed.
The scene between Richard and Elizabeth is a difficult 
one, for she leads Richard to believe that she has reconsid­
ered, and so he afterwards contemptously refers to her as 
a "shallow changing woman." The scene is perhaps less 
clear than Mr. Reese has indicated:
She promises to inform him later of her decision: 
the phrase that unmistakably means ’no’ to any 
pedlar that still has his wits about him.^2
Professor Tillyard, on the other hand, responds in the
following manner to the question of whether or not
Elizabeth consciously deceived Richard:
This is so contrary to the simple, almost negative 
character of Elizabeth and so heavily ironical at 
Richard’s expense that I cannot believe it.1^
Actually, Reese’s interpretation seems more satisfactory
than Tillyard’s because Shakespeare left no doubt as to
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either her uncompromising virtue or her wit in 
3Henry VI. But that is to go outside of the play.
By forcing Richard to change the nature of his oaths 
several times, Elizabeth seems to have placed him 
on the defensive. From the beginning we realize that 
she fears for her daughter's life and that she prob­
ably dares not oppose Richard with an emphatic "no” 
to his request. Elizabeth’s words— "Write to me very 
shortly/And you shall understand from me her mind"—  
nevertheless remain ambiguous and constitute the play's 
main weakness. In the absence of Shakespeare's 
directions for the delivery of .her last few lines, we 
can only surmise that Shakespeare intended the scene to 
contrast rather than parallel the one between Richard 
and Lady Anne.
The disintegration of Richard's character, only 
hinted at in Act IV, manifests itself more clearly in 
Act V. The last act begins with the execution of 
Buckingham who in moralizing his fate reminds the 
audience of the workings of divine Justice. The 
action then quickly shifts to the battlefield, and we 
learn that the English nobles have united in a common 
cause to purge the kingdom of RicKard's evil. In this 
way they offer a sharp contrast to the lords in 
lHenrv VI. whose squabbling leads to the death 
of Talbot and causes the loss of English territories.
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As Richard begins to lose confidence, his character 
changes accordingly. Richard’s fears, it seems, are 
more justified than they would have been in some ear­
lier portion of the play. Likewise, his encounters 
with the duchess and later Queen Elizabeth in Act IV 
have no doubt contributed to his feelings of uncertainty, 
even though Richard may labor under the mistaken notion 
that Elizabeth will give her daughter in marriage to 
him. As his fears mount, Richard even plays the eaves­
dropper in order to learn if his followers will stay 
loyal to him. In the address to his troops, however, 
Richard displays his former strength.
Shakespeare makes it clear that God is on Henry's 
side. The Earl of Richmond sleeps well, and his dreams 
are propitious. Moreover, he has received communion 
and has expressly placed his trust in God. Richard, 
on the other hand, has spent a restless night. The 
orations that the two men deliver to their soldiers 
offer a marked contrast that confirms the differences 
in their characters. Urging his men that their cause 
is just, Henry advises the troops that God and the saints 
are on his side. In contrast to the abstractness of 
H e m p ’s arguments, Richard appeals to his troops on a 
more concrete basis. He advises his nobles that 
"Conscience is but a word that cowards use/Devised at 
first to keep the strong in awe," or in other words,
that might is right. Thus, he speaks to the men remind­
ing them that they are fighting to keep their lands and 
to save their wives and daughters from being ravished 
by enemy soldiers. Though Richard has little to say 
about God, he does later call upon St. George for 
courage, asking to be inspired with the "spleen of 
fiery dragons" (a satanic image) in the remarks that 
follow the address proper.
Richard’s oration to his army (V.iii.314-41) is 
his last important speech. In it, he appeals to 
patriotism and to feelings of English prejudice against 
the French. Though it is an emotional piece, it shows 
a cunning appraisal of men and the interests closest 
to them. When Shakespeare constructed the orations of 
Henry of Richmond and Richard III, he carefully 
considered their content. Henry’s is God-centered 
while Richard’s is man-centered. One appeals to man’s 
interest in the welfare of his soul while the other 
appeals to man's interest in the welfare of his earthly 
possessions. If Henry’s speech reflects the principles 
of right reason, then Richard’s exemplifies the dead-end 
materialism to which reason by itself leads. By 
including the oration of Henry, Shakespeare offers a 
means by which the rationalism of Richard may be 
measured. Through Shakespeare’s symbolic depiction of 
Margaret as Fury, prophesying blood revenge for
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Richard's crimes, the play assumes a phantasmagorical 
bloodiness. The playwright's picture of the three 
disconsolate women wronged by Richard's murders, his 
inclusion of the ghosts of Richard's victims who appear 
to torment him the night before battle, and finally his 
portrayal of Henry as God’s emissary, prepare the audience 
to utter a sigh of relief when Henry of Richmond announces 
that "the bloody dog is dead."
King John, though it stands apart from the plays 
of the two tetralogies, expresses many of the same ideas 
and explores virtually the same themes as the other 
plays; yet its characters and events are confined to a 
single play. The king, himself something of a villain, 
orders the death of young Arthur, rightful heir to the 
crown. John's plans miscarry when Hubert backs out of 
the murder; but John later regrets having given the 
order and truly repents for it. His words to Hubert 
(IV.ii.231-48) clearly indicate, it seems to me, that 
his change of heart has arisen from his conscience more 
so than from his fears that the English nobles will 
desert him. News of his mother's death may have 
contributed to the king's "conversion." The play 
contains two other noteworthy characters besides John, 
that are related to villainy. One of these is Pandulph, 
the papal legate whom John opposes. Like others of 
Shakespeare's high Roman clerics, Pandulph is a subtle
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reasoner who destroys the French and English peace at 
Angiers and causes the French to attack England by 
appealing to Lewis’ ambitions. His appraisals of English 
disunity and his shrewd assessment of John (III.iv.131-40) 
bespeak the rationalist. Though John was a bad king, the 
English would have viewed his opposition to Rome with 
admiration, as indicated in an earlier play of the same 
period. Pandulph’s villainy thus partially depends upon 
his link with Rome. Yet, his pride and egotism are 
readily apparent. Admitting to John that he stirred up 
the trouble with France, Pandulph boastfully promises 
to stop it. But the prelate has overestimated his 
powers, for Lewis will not back down, and it remains 
for Faulconbridge to save England from a messy situation.
Though a hero rather than a villain, the bastard 
Faulconbridge possesses traits that foreshadow Edmund, 
Shakespeare’s great villain to come. Both are illegit­
imate, the difference being that Faulconbridge does not 
permit his social condition to turn inward and feed upon 
his soul. Faulconbridge’s cynical humor links him to 
several of Shakespeare’s villains who affect superiority 
in a world whose foibles they perceive. By studying the 
opportunism of the Age, Faulconbridge hopes to gain 
practical experience so that he can deal effectively 
with the machiavels that he is sure to encounter:
Which, though I will not practice to deceive,
Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn,
For it shall strew the footsteps of my rising.
(I.i. 214-16)
When Angiers declares neutrality and refuses to admit 
either the French or the English, Faulconbridge suggests 
that both armies declare a truce and march upon the 
town. Delighted with his own sardonic turn of mind, 
Faulconbridge may intend the comment as a general 
criticism of the age or he may have in mind Machiavelli’ 
contempt for neutrality. The author of The Prince 
advises that it is better to be either a true friend or 
a bitter enemy, but not a neutral.
By the time that Faulconbridge reaches the end of 
his soliloquy on Commodity (II.i.561-598), he seems 
headed directly toward a course of villainy. This 
speech, more than anything else* links Faulconbridge to 
villains such as Richard III and Edmund. But if we ex­
pect him to turn villain, the bastard disappoints us by 
acquitting himself nobly throughout the rest of the play 
Always the practical man, Faulconbridge refuses to blame 
John for Arthur’s death without sufficient evidence, 
whereas the English lords hastily jump to conclusions 
and then desert John. Fortunately, Faulconbridge does 
not depend upon Pandulph alone to end the French 
threat. He raises an army and has it waiting, just 
in case; meanwhile, the lords who had gone over to the
French side seem both surprised and ashamed to see John 
so well-prepared for battle and eagerly return to his 
side after learning from Melun of French treachery. 
Faulconbridge has obviously learned his lessons well. 
Fortunately for England, he has proved a "sweet poison 
for the age’s tooth."
The second tetralogy, though more satisfactory 
than the first in its broader treatment of English life 
and manners, contains little to interest us in the way 
of rational villainy. We witness the actions of trai­
tors, rebels, and conspirators, but learn little of 
the thought processes that have led to these actions.
From the characters’ political convictions, however, 
we may infer more than Shakespeare really needs to make 
explicit. Thus the playwright includes the conspirators 
who plot against Henry IV in Richard II. but he tells 
us little about them, except in the cases of Aumerle 
and Carlisle, both of whom escape punishment through the 
mercy of the king. Worcester, who appears in lHenry IV. 
is rationalistic as well as proud. His association with 
the rebels, moreover, apparently stems from bitter 
resentment at the king’s failure to cater to his feelings 
of self-importance. Worcester’s refusal to deliver the 
king’s message to Hotspur shows his deceitful nature, 
but Worcester’s reasoning— namely, that the rebels will
always be hated and suspected after having once acted 
against the king— seems sensible enough; that is, if we 
may judge b^ the behavior of Prince John and Westmoreland 
toward the leaders of rebellion in 2Henrv IV.
In the second part of Henry IV, the Archbishop of 
York replaces Worcester. Realizing that people would 
rather fight in the name of a religious cause than 
participate in an out and out rebellion, the Archbishop 
uses the murder of Richard II in order to win supporters. 
The selfish, unpatriotic Archbishop cares little about 
the foreign threats to England's welfare except insofar 
as they keep the king and his army too busy to deal 
effectively with rebellion at home. Thus Shakespeare 
shows the churchman to be an enemy to order. Mowbray 
echoes Worcester in his objections to a peaceful set­
tlement, but the rational arguments of the Archbishop 
and Hastings convince him to the contrary. The prelate 
desires peace, provided of course that his articles of 
redress are accepted; and he feels that the king will 
buckle under the pressures of a readied rebel force and 
grant the terms he desires. After Prince John promises 
redress of the grievances and agrees to peace, the rebel 
leaders dismiss their army. Westmoreland and Prince John, 
their army still standing, now arrest Mowbray, Hastings, 
and York on charges of treason and order their execution. 
The manner in which Prince John hedges on a point of
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semantics amounts to little tnore than one’s crossing his 
fingers while telling a lie. The Archbishop’s treason 
and villainy are thus modified to an extent by his 
willingness to arbitrate in the face of Mowbray’s 
objections and to another extent by the scurvy doings 
of Lancaster and Westmoreland in handling the grievances.
In the second act of Henry V . the chorus names 
three conspirators who have accepted money from France 
to kill the king— Richard the Earl of Cambridge, Lord 
Scroop of Masham, and Sir Thomas Grey, knight of 
Northumberland. Henry finds out about the plot, however, 
and sentences the conspirators to death. The king’s 
impassioned expression of disillusionment over the 
villainy of Scroop is in character and appropriate, 
notes Robert L. Kelly, for ’’Lord Scroop was no mere 
traitor, but a trusted friend of long acquaintance.’’^  
Kelly has further noted that the Scroops who appear in 
the tetralogy, including Stephen and William in Richard II 
and the Archbishop of York in l&2Henry IV. have consis­
tently aligned themselves with the party of discord and 
that ’’collectively, they represent the worst kind of 
enemy to civil harmony.”^  The conspirators accept
^Robert L. Kelly, ’’Shakespeare’s Scroops and the 
’Spirit of Cain,”’ Sfi, 20(Winter 1969J, 71.
1^Ibid.. pp. 72-3.
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their sentences in a noble manner, admitting the baseness 
of their actions and asking pardon for their souls. 
Audiences of Shakespeare’s day held little affection for 
the agents of civil disharmony; these were indeed polit­
ical villains who upset the laws of order and harmony in 
the state and who selfishly capitalized on foreign 
threats instead of lending aid to:their country during 
its time of need. Yet, Shakespeare allows several of 
his rebels to escape this harsh judgment. Hotspur in 
lHenrv IV and Bolingbroke in Richard II are two such 
individuals, although Bolingbroke does not come away 
completely unscathed.
The last of the histories, Henry VIII. includes 
another of Shakespeare’s clerical villains. Like 
Beaufort and Pandulph, Cardinal Wolsey is a rationalist 
who no doubt received a great deal of training in 
theological disputation. Queen Katharine realizes that 
he is a subtle logician and refuses to appear in court 
because of it: ”1 am a simple woman, much too weak/To
oppose your cunning” (II.iv.106-7). Wolsey’s involvement 
in the early stages of the divorce trial suggests a 
legalistic type of mind, of just the sort that Henry VIII 
admired in the men about him. Though the king entrusts 
the affairs of his state to the Cardinal, the playwrights 
portray Henry as being a rather strong individual himself.
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Upon learning of the taxation levied by Wolsey, for which 
there existed no precedent, the king orders it removed. 
Undaunted, Wolsey simply instructs his subordinates to 
tell the people that he, Wolsey, has interceded in their 
behalf. Possessed by an overwhelming sense of pride, 
Wolsey has little qualms about destroying anyone who 
offends his ego or competes with him for the king’s af­
fection. He successfully plots the death of Buckingham, 
and he indirectly causes the insanity of Dr. Pace. 
Grafting money from the state in order to bribe his way 
to the papacy, Wolsey entertains his friends in a 
grand manner. Shakespeare conveys to the audience a 
sense of Wolsey’s large-scale character, showing the 
Cardinal to be generous toward friends and villainous 
toward enemies.
In drawing his great rational villains, Shakespeare 
included psychological insights that could possibly help 
to explain an ego gone beserk— i.e., Richard’s physical 
deformity, Edmund’s illegitimacy, and lago's lack of 
advancement. While Wolsey is not one of Shakespeare's 
great l*ational villains, in the histories he is second 
only to Richard III. Wolsey’s superior attitude and 
shows of contempt toward the lords around him might 
easily have been his prideful way of compensating for 
the fact that his father was a butcher. That Shakespeare
has inserted this information in order to make a psycho­
logical comment about Wolsey seems clear when we con­
sider the backhanded compliment that Norfolk gives him:
There’s in him stuff that puts him to these ends;
For, being not propped by ancestry, whose grace 
Chalks successors their way, nor called upon 
For high feats done to the crown, neither allied 
To eminent assistant?? , but* spiderlike,
Out of his self-drawing web he gives us note 
The force of his own merit makes his way—
A gift that Heaven gives for him, which buys 
A place next to the King. (I.i.5o-66)
Wolsey’s downfall occurs when the king learns of the great 
wealth that the Cardinal has amassed and discovers that 
Wolsey has written to the Pope asking him to stay the 
divorce proceedings of Henry and Katharine because he 
has noticed the king’s interest in Anne Bullen. What 
Wolsey does not realize is that the king and Anne have 
been secretly married for quite some time.
Wolsey’s downfall proves to be his spiritual tri­
umph. By his own admission, he could only find him­
self when everything had been taken away. What Griffith 
says to Katharine about Wolsey near the end of the fourth 
act serves as the play’s choric comment:
His overthrow heaped happiness upon him;
For then, and not till then, he felt himself,
And found the blessedness of being little,
And, to add greater honors to his age 
Than man could give him, he died fearing God.
(ii.64-3)
While the syllogisms and enthymemes of Shakespeare’s 
villains seem easy enough to disprove, the playwright
displays little interest in their falseness. Instead, 
he implies that facile logicians like Richard and Wolsey 
can probably prove anything they wish. Unless firmly 
grounded in morality, the logic of Shakespeare’s charac­
ters tends to serve as a vehicle for humor. In the hands 
of his villains it is an instrument to be feared rather 
than admired. Throughout the histories Shakespeare has 
depicted his rational villains in such a way as to arouse 
distrust rather than confidence in their mental abilities. 
The playwright achieves this end in a number of ways but 
mainly by showing that villains such as Richard and 
Wolsey possess some type of flawed psychology which 
colors the thinking process and renders it invalid. In 
the tragedies, Shakespeare uses with even greater success 
this method of portraying his rational villains.
V. THE TRAGEDIES
Shakespeare's earliest surviving tragedy, Titus 
Andronicus, contains a number of weaknesses— the main 
one being its content of scenes so grotesque as to seem 
almost ridiculous. Yet the play, a Roman tragedy pat­
terned after Seneca's Thvestes. reveals its author's 
skillful command of rhetoric and in this way foreshad­
ows Julius Caesar, a Roman tragedy of greater maturity. 
Significantly, Shakespeare's depiction of Titus 
likewise foreshadows his later triumph in drawing 
Lear. Titus looms as a great hero whom the people 
desire for their ruler; but because of his age the 
general declines their offer and unwisely throws his 
support to Saturninus, an ingrate who bitterly resents 
the fact that the people favor Titus. As soon as 
Saturninus gains control, he takes every opportunity to 
heap suffering and humiliation upon the general's head. 
At the beginning of the play, Titus is a victorious 
Roman general of boundless pride and savage instincts, 
who casually orders the death of the Gothic queen's 
eldest son to revenge the deaths of his own sons killed 
in battle. After Tamora becomes Saturninus' empress, 
Titus and his family are made to suffer indignities of 
such magnitude that the grief-stricken Titus becomes 
mentally distracted. In his distraction, however,
signs of Titus’ humanity begin to appear as he becomes
sensitive to the meaning of suffering. He rails at his
brother for killing a fly and later stabs his daughter
Lavinia in an act of merciful intent.
The bloodiness of the play is unfortunate and
Saturninus' choice of Tamora, an aging woman with grown
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sons, instead of Lavinia seems strange. The success 
of Kyd’s Spanish Tragedy led Shakespeare to compose 
Titus Andronicus and to give painstaking attention to 
details that would satisfy any audience’s appetite for 
horror. The play shows Shakespeare to be a dramatist 
ever responsive to the tastes of his audience, and the 
sooner one can forgive the gory plot and a few inr 
consistencies in character, the more readily he can
a
admire the better dramatic portraits contained in Titus. 
One of these is Aaron the Moor, a dedicated villain- 
atheist who at the end of the play repents only for the 
good he has ever done. Aaron and Tamora are both 
rational villains, but Shakespeare draws Aaron with an 
artist’s finer touch. Aaron appears onstage in the 
first act but does not speak; however, his presence 
arouses the audience’s interest.
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The planet Saturn is thought by some to govern age 
(and also wisdom) and to cause those under its influences 
to be attracted to old and ancient things. Aaron the Moor 
later identifies himself with this same planet, though in 
terms of its associations with morbidity and death.
The soliloquy with which Aaron opens Act II at 
once reveals his negative qualities. Whereas Aaron 
greatly admires Tamora, his wanton relationship with her 
apparently serves his pride as much as, or perhaps 
more than, his lust:
Away with slavish weeds and servile thoughts!
I will be bright and shine in pearl and gold,
To wait upon this new made Empress.
To wait, said I? To wanton with this <4ueen.
(II.i. 18-21)
As he hears Tamora’s brutish sons quarreling over who 
should get Lavinia, the newly wed wife of Bassianus, 
Aaron interrupts their argument and cautions them to be 
more discreet. Chiron claims that he "loves" Lavinia 
but agrees to Aaron’s suggestion that both brothers 
have her. Advising the use of "policy" and "stratagem,"; 
Aaron plots the rape of Lavinia so that Chiron and 
Demetrius may each satisfy his lust. Tamora’s sons are 
extremely dense and animalistic but their intentions 
do not seem quite so base until Aaron’s arrival on the 
scene. By mutilating Lavinia instead of murdering her, 
they unconsciously re-enact the hewing of their sacri­
ficed brother. To the ordinary rational villain, lust 
and love are one and the same; thus Aaron and Iago 
share this common attitude. By planting a bag of 
gold under a tree and forging a letter so that the sons 
of Titus will be blamed for the murder of Bassianus,
Aaron echoes the behavior of the medieval vice— reliance
upon trickery and fraud. Aaron and Tamora have even been 
clever enough to have Titus find the letter in the forest. 
In Act III, a change occurs in Titus. He weeps for his 
condemned sons and begs for their lives, later sending 
his severed hand as ransom. The man who refused to 
hear Tamora*s plea for her son’s life now laments that 
’’tribunes with their tongues doom men to death.’’
Marcus, the brother of Titus, and Titus* son Lucius 
represent rational order. ’’But yet let reason govern 
thy lament,” Marcus cautions Titus. Marcus’ reluctance 
to make a hasty judgment concerning the meaning of 
Lavinia*s tears likewise shows the sanity of his rational­
ism. Hearing her brothers accused of murdering her hus­
band could have caused her to weep either because of their 
innocence or because of their guilt. When Saturninus 
and Tamora return the sons* heads and Titus* severed 
hand, Marcus no longer seeks to help Titus control his 
griefs. He does, however, object to Titus' bitterly 
ironic suggestion that Lavinia commit suicide if she can 
find the means to do so. Lucius, too, represents order 
in a morally chaotic world. Following his banishment, 
Lucius raises an army to help him free the state from the 
malignant misrule of Saturninus and Tamora. Whereas 
Tamora and Titus pleaded in vain for their sons* lives, 
the worst person in the play wins the life of his child 
from death's decree— Lucius shows mercy by sparing the
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life of Aaron’s son and in this way differs from those of 
similar positions of authority in the play.
Aaron’s success in plotting a course of villainy 
depends upon his rational abilities. His intelligence is 
also shown when he correctly perceives Titus’ intent in 
sending weapons and a verse from Horace to Tamora’s stupid 
sons:
/Aside7 Now, what a thing it is to be an ass!
Here's no sound jest. The old man hath found their
guilt,
And sends them weapons wrapped about with lines
That wound, beyond their feeling, to the quick.
But were our witty Empress well afoot,
She would applaud Andronicus' conceit,. (IV.ii.25-30)
Tamora at this time is in the last hours of pregnancy 
and as soon as she gives birth to the blackamoor child, 
she sends word to Aaron to kill it. When her sons try to 
murder the child, Aaron snatches it from the nurse’s arms 
declaring: "He dies upon my scimitar’s sharp point/
That touches this my first-born son and heir!" Aaron's 
fatherly instincts contradict the idea that his evil is 
involuntary but they do not violate the nature of his 
villainy. Instead, this behavior reveals Aaron's 
egotism in a stronger light than has yet been shown in 
the play. Proudly he tells the sons of Tamora, "Coal- 
black is better than another hue" and "My mistress is my 
mistress— this myself."
When Chiron and Demetrius realize that they cannot 
brave Aaron's fury, they ask his advice and Aaron good-
JLxy
naturedly complies with their desire to have their 
mother’s adulterous union hushed up. Aaron’s first thought 
is typical of Machiavellian rationalism— dispose of all 
witnesses and/or accomplices to whatever crime has been 
committed. Thus Aaron refers to the murder of the nurse 
as a deed of "policy.” Next, he engineers a plan for a 
baby switch with a countryman who has begotten a fair 
child;but as he is attempting to deliver the baby to its 
destination, a Goth soldier intercepts him and turns 
Aaron and the child over to Lucius, now returning to his 
country at the head of an army. The Goths whom he leads 
dislike Tamora and want revenge. Seeing her child makes 
them even more determined to get even with their former 
queen. When Lucius orders that both Aaron and the child 
shall hang, Aaron begs for the life of his son, agreeing 
to tell all if only the child shall live.
Aaron’s atheism is typical of the skepticism that 
usually characterizes the rational villain. Still he 
recognizes that Lucius’ reverence binds him to an oath 
in a way that can never bind the atheist. Thus when .
Luteius asks, "Who should I swear by? Thou believest no 
god," Aaron replies:
What if I do not? As, indeed, I do not.
Yet, for I know thou art religious,
And hast a thing within thee called conscience,
With twenty popish tricks and ceremonies 
Which I have seen thee careful to observe,
Therefore I urge thy oath. (V.i.73-8)
Though Titus has humiliated the Senate by circulating
petitions to the gods, Shakespeare implies that his son
may be one of the early Christians or at least a
potential monotheist. Aaron accuses Lucius of "popish”
behavior, and the latter gives his promise to spare the
child— "Even by my god I swear to thee I will." Aaron,
on the other hand, serves very nearly as a parody of the
principles of continental humanism. Because he elevates
the individual man above his fellow men as well as
above his Maker, Aaron’s thoughts and actions must all
begin and end in expressions of self-interest. Like
Richard III, Aaron is a paradoxical humanist whose
discovery of self has exaggerated his character to the
point of inhumanity. He delights in rationalism, but
his swollen ego makes it quite impossible for him to
accept the type of reason to which classical humanists
adhered.
When Lucius asks Aaron if he is sorry for the
heinous deeds he committed, the Moor replies in an
incredible outburst of pride:
Aye, that I had not done a thousand more.
Even now I curse the day— and yet, I think,
Few come within the compass of my curse—
Wherein I did not some notorious ill:
As kill a man, or plot the way to do it:
Accuse some innocent, and forswear myself;
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Set deadly enmity between two friends;
Make poor men’s cattle break their necks;
Set fire On barns and haystacks in the night,
And bid the owners quench#them with their tears.
Oft have I digged up dead men from their graves 
And set them upright at their dear friends' doors, 
Even when their sorrows almost were forgot;
And on their skins, as on the bark of trees,
Have with my knife carved in Roman letters,
"Let not your sorrow die, though I am dead.”
Tut, I have done a thousand dreadful things 
As willingly as one would kill a fly,
And nothing grieves me heartily indeed,
But that I cannot do ten thousand more. (V.i.124-44)
When Lucius decrees that Aaron shall starve to death,
the Moor remains steadfastly unrepentant:
I am no baby, I, that with base prayers 
I should repent the evils I have done. (V.iii.l#5-6)
Aaron’s villainy is of such an extent as to suggest
unreality, and some of the actions to which he refers
(V.i.135-44) seem as if they might have been done during
his years of adolescence. Aaron's impassioned defense of
his child (IV.ii.#7-105, 116-27) reveals the paradoxical
tendency to equate his Moorishness with both slavery and
superiority. Intelligent and fiercely proud, Aaron
clearly demonstrates that he will not suffer an indignity
without in some way revenging it. Titus and his family
have provided the most recent outlet for Aaron’s
expression of resentment, but his entire life has served
as a monument to his wounded ego and vyarped intelligence.
In Romeo and Juliet as well as in Antony and
Cleopatra villainy is represented by hostility of
environment. Tragedy lies in the impossibility of
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lovers’ enjoying their love while living in a world they 
must inhabit. For this reason, I have omitted these 
two dramas from discussion along with Troilus and 
Cressida. a play that burlesques the idea of romantic 
love. I have likewise excluded Timon of Athens. a 
parable treating three attitudes toward society: 
Apemantus' is ungrounded in experience and therefore 
unjustified; Timon’s is justified but his reaction 
excessive; Alcibiades’ is justified and his reaction 
sensible.
The tragic hero of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
(1599) is Brutus, a noble Roman with strong republican 
ideals. Julius Caesar, who serves as a symbol for 
rational order, disappears from the play near the 
beginning of the third act although his ghost later 
visits Brutus shortly before the battle of Philippi.
The action of the play, moreover, revolves around 
Caesar's assassination, treating the causes of the 
conspiracy as well as the events following his fall.
The villain of the play at the outset seems to be 
Cassius, and Shakespeare’s depiction of the envious 
Roman is highly complex. After Cassius has successfully 
disposed of Caesar, he apparently becomes infected by 
Brutus' nobility as, in fact, do all who remain in 
Brutus' company. By means of several superbly executed 
parallels, Shakespeare links the personality of Cassius
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to that of Marc Antony thereby reserving all of our 
admiration for Brutus, his tragic hero. Even so, the 
play literally abounds with individuals who utter 
noble sentiments and perform noble acts. As follow­
ers of classical humanism they express ideas and ideals 
with which audiences can either identify or sympathize. 
For instance, Brutus qualifies his attitude toward 
suicide— he believes in suicide not to avoid danger 
but to avoid dishonor. By all normal standards,
Julius Caesar contains an extraordinary number of sui<-;. 
cides, but Shakespeare treats them in a way that causes 
us to respect his characters* beliefs whether or not 
we agree with them.
As Act I of Julius Caesar begins, we learn of the 
tribunes* admiration for Pompey, the Roman general whom 
they had sent to encounter Caesar, and of their sorrow 
over his defeat. Thus the play opens on a note of 
discord, and the tribunes we first meet are soon 
arrested and silenced for pulling scarfs off Caesar's 
images. Cassius resembles the unfortunate tribunes 'in 
also wishing Caesar dead, but Cassius' motives spring
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I am indebted to Professor William John Olive for 
this observation as well as for my entire approach 
to the character of Marc Antony.
from personal feelings of envy and hatred rather than 
from any political sentiments he might possess. To 
assassinate Caesar and to do so with impunity— these 
are Cassius’ aims. Though Cassius knows others who 
will gladly join his conspiracy, he realizes that the 
citizens will never permit the murder of Caesar to go 
unpunished— that is, unless he can enlist the aid of 
Marcus Brutus, a man greatly admired and respected 
by the people. Brutus is noble, however, and so 
Cassius must discover a means of seducing him to the 
cause of the conspirators.
Untutored in the ways of the world and uncorrupted 
by its practices, Brutus is an idealistic intellectual 
whose republicanism stems from his own political 
reflections as well as from his family tradition.
One of his ancestors had helped to expel the last 
of the Tarquins from Rome. Portia's stoicism (she has 
voluntarily wounded herself in the thigh to signify 
her wifely devotion to Brutus) and political family 
background match her husband's. Her father was Cato, 
a man of noble sentiments, who committed suicide 
rather than live under Caesar's dictatorship. At 
first unwilling to reveal his secret to Portia, Brutus 
later tells her about the conspiracy, if we may judge 
from his promise— "Portia, go in a while,/And by and by 
thy bosom shall partake/The secrets of my heart”_
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and from Portia’s later realization of how difficult 
it is for a woman to keep counsel (II.iv.6-10). To­
gether, Brutus and Portia represent a couple that is 
politically aware and virtuous. By alluding to the 
family backgrounds of both, Shakespeare offers a plaus­
ible explanation for Brutus’ fear of Caesar’s power and 
prejudgment of the Roman dictator’s intentions. Brutus 
himself admits:
...and to speak truth of Caesar,
I have not known when his affections swayed 
More than his reason. (Il.i. 19-21)
Brutus does not quarrel with what Caesar is but with
what he might become (II.i.26-31). Though Caesar is
identified with rational order and stability, Shakespeare
leaves open the possibility of Brutus’ having been right.
At the senate Caesar boasts that he never wavers, but
the audience has just witnessed his see-saw decision to
attend the meeting. And when Caesar first refuses to
appear he speaks of the senators as though they are
servants to whom he owes no excuse. In no uncertain
terms, Shakespeare condemns the assassination as an ,
act of political disorder. Caesar has not done anything
to deserve it, and Shakespeare lets the matter drop
there.
A discussion of Cassius should probably begin with 
Caesar's brilliant assessment:
Would he were fatter! But I fear him not.
Yet if my name were liable to fear,
I do not know the man I should avoid
So soon as that spare Cassius. He reads much,
He is a great observer, and he looks
Quite through the deeds of men. He loves no plays
As thou dost, Antony; he hears no music.
Such men as he be never at heart's ease 
While they behold a greater than themselves,
And therefore are they very dangerous.
(I.ii.198-210)
As Caesar suggests, Cassius is an egotist who once
saved Caesar from drowning and now bitterly resents 
the honors that his former companion has achieved.
Too, Cassius is "a great observer," and Shakespeare 
permits us to view him in action in scenes two and three 
of the first act as he skillfully reads Brutus' virtue 
and later Casca's cowardice. Interestingly, Marc Antony 
echoes Cassius' shrewd assessment of these same in­
dividuals while practicing deceit and hypocrisy upon 
them shortly after Caesar's fall. As Cassius attempts 
to sound out Brutus' feelings toward Caesar, he de­
livers two conversational speeches that are especially 
noteworthy. In the first of these (I.ii.90-131), Cassius 
refers to Caesar's fits of physical weakness (epilepsy), 
ostensibly for the purpose of showing that the mighty 
Caesar is but mortal and unworthy to be treated as an 
immortal. But the tenor of Cassius' argument changes 
after he tells of having once saved Caesar's life,
revealing Cassius’ deep-felt belief that he is superior 
to Rome’s mighty ruler. Erroneously, Cassius derives 
his conclusion from physical comparisons only, and so 
it is a wonder that he does not also expostulate upon 
Caesar's faulty hearing. Because this speech so clearly 
reveals the true nature of Cassius' complaint (’’and this 
man/is now become a god, and Cassius is/A wretched 
creature”), it should not seem surprising that his 
next (I.ii.135-161) appeals directly to any similar 
feelings in Brutus— "Why should that name be sounded 
more than yours?" But the speech misses its mark, for 
Brutus would rather be a "villager" just so long as he 
remains free. After Brutus leaves, Cassius muses:
Well, Brutus, thou art noble. let I see
Thy honorable mettle may be wrought
From that it is disposed. (I.ii.311-13)
Though Cassius has not yet elicited Brutus' positive 
support, he has learned enough to insure his later 
obtaining it. Like Edmund and Aaron, Cassius is a 
rational villian who resorts to the use of forgery.
By sending Brutus letters that supposedly have come 
from concerned citizens, Cassius hopes to appeal to 
Brutus' strong sense of civic duty.
In the third scene of the first act, Cassius directs 
his attention to Casca. Though he later deserts the 
teachings of Epicurus (V.i.77-79), Cassius is neverthe­
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less a skeptic who like Edmund, takes pains to play upon 
the credulity of others— in this instance, Casca’s . 
Realizing Casca’s fear of what the night’s omens might 
presage, Cassius feigns a similar belief in portents 
and then deliberately misconstrues their purpose 
(I.iii. 62-78). Unknowingly, Casca has provided 
Cassius with the correct psychological appeal— the de­
sire to think of himself as brave. Thus Cassius em­
phasizes the dangerousness of their plan and the honor 
to be achieved through its daring accomplishment. As 
Marc Antony later takes the hand of each of the con­
spirators he says "and, my valiant Casca, yours," 
endowing the word valiant with the same ironic conno­
tations he gives to the word honorable in his funeral 
oration. Antony states his real feelings about Casca 
when he meets Brutus and Cassius at Philippi— "Whilst 
damned Casca, like a cur, behind/Struck Caesar on the 
neck" (V.i.43-4). Antony reads Brutus and Casca as 
shrewdly as Cassius has done, and so the ending to his 
critical remark— "0 you flatterersi”— might just as 
easily be applied to himself. Antony’s apparent 
willingness to betray Lepidus (IV.i.12-14), should 
Octavius countenance such a deed, likewise makes the 
question of his character seem dubious. Actually, 
Cassius and Antony are both practical men with a streak 
of Machiavellianism running through their veins. Thus
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they understand one another.
As the conspiracy gets under way, Cassius wisely 
suggests that Marc Antony be killed along with Caesar.
But Cassius has mistakenly turned his leadership over 
to Brutus who argues that they are not butchers. (Cf. 
the mass executions ordered by the new regime, among them 
Cicero's death.) Cassius warns Brutus not to let 
Antony speak, but again Brutus refuses to listen and 
Antony turns the people against the conspirators.
Antony has approached Brutus through the latter's virtue, 
in much the same way as Cassius has done— and every bit 
as deviously— but Antony has aligned himself with the 
forces of political order; and nowhere- does he dem­
onstrate the pettiness and enviousness shown by Cassius 
in the first two acts of the play.
After the conspirators have been driven out of 
Rome, a change seems to occur within Cassius. Though 
Brutus is unable to procure money to pay his armies, 
Cassius uses whatever means is available; and next to 
the ineptness of Brutus the "itching palm" of Cassius 
is not made to seem so terrible after all. Against 
his better judgment Cassius consistently defers to the 
wishes of Brutus, his deference apparently stemming 
from genuine feelings of love and devotion. Cassius 
advises that they remain where they are and allow the
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armies of Antony and Octavius to come to them. It is a 
good plan, one that Antony himself believes they will 
use. But Brutus unwisely refuses to listen, and so 
they march to Philippi. When they arrive, Brutus 
signals his army too early, placing Cassius at a 
disadvantage. Brutus' mistakes arise out of his lack 
of experience, and Cassius' patience in these circum­
stances can be viewed only as commendable. Of the 
suicides that occur in the play, however, Cassius’ is 
the least sympathetically drawn. Though he partially 
forsakes his Epicureanism, the melancholy mood of its 
philosophical doctrines sits heavily upon his brow. 
Being unable to tell whether Titinius has been welcomed 
by friends or captured by enemies, Cassius wrongly 
assumes the worst and commits a pointless suicide. 
Primarily because of this, Cassius' suicide arouses 
little sympathy from the audience. But Pindarus’ 
desire to remain Cassius’ servant rather than to be 
freed by his death and Titinius’ subsequent act of 
suicide must surely remind the audience of Cassius’ 
better qualities. The final note, however, is one of 
censure as Antony contrasts Brutus’ nobility to the 
envious motives of the other conspirators. Thus we 
remember Cassius not as the devoted friend of Brutus 
and Titinius but as the rational villain who appears 
in the first half of Julius Caesar.
Claudius, the villain in Hamlet. departs from 
rational villainy by holding seemingly genuine affec­
tions toward Gertrude his wife and also by expressing 
strong belief in God. The methods of Claudius, however, 
are those of the rational villain. Likewise, he exhibits 
pride and ambition, traits common to all rational 
villains. With the murder of the elder Hamlet already 
out of the way when the play begins, Claudius plots the 
death of the younger Hamlet his step-son and nephew.
The latter*s pretense of insanity has awakened rather 
than allayed the king's fear of discovery and so Claudius 
schemes to rid himself of the Queen’s son, first by 
means of secret orders sent to England and later by 
seducing Laertes to his cause. Through the murder of 
his brother, Claudius has re-enacted the sin of Cain; 
and consciousness of the "primal eldest curse" upon his. 
crime makes Claudius unlike any of Shakespeare’s other 
major villains. The nature of the king’s crime as well 
as his linking it to the Biblical story of Cain and Abel 
suggests the presence of an ego that became damaged at 
some earlier time in life, whereby the childhood phases 
of sibling rivalry continued into adulthood and led, 
finally, to the murder of the brother who was envied.
Claudius has no illusions about the effect of his 
prayers ("Words without thoughts never to Heaven go"), 
for he realizes that in order to receive forgiveness he
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must confess his crime of murder and return the stolen 
goods he still possesses— namely, his title and his 
queen. The position in which Claudius places his 
priorities ("My crown, mine own ambition, and my Queen") 
and the restraint he exercises in allowing Gertrude to 
ignore his warning and drink from the poisoned cup 
place heavy emphasis upon Claudius’ pride and ambition. 
Even before he has seen the play that Hamlet causes to 
be performed, Claudius decides to send his nephew to 
England. Would it have mattered greatly to Claudius if 
love for Ophelia had proved the cause of Hamlet’s 
distraction? Perhaps not. Hamlet’s mother loves him 
and so do the Danish people— Claudius gives good reasons 
for delegating the death of Hamlet to the authority of 
others. By the nature of their practicality, these 
same reasons tend to obscure the fact that they could 
easily have rekindled the envy in Claudius. Because of 
their love for Hamlet the people are as "distracted" 
as the prince, at least to Claudius’ way of thinking:
Yet must not we put the strong law on him;
He's loved of the distracted multitude,
Who like not in their judgment 1 ‘ ‘ * ’ es.
The above passage may be interpreted in several ways, 
and I am suggesting here that it holds one meaning for 
those attending Claudius and an entirely different one 
for the king. Resolved that England shall perform the
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deed for him, Claudius soliloquizes:
...Do it, England,
For like the hectic in my blood he rages,
And thou must cure me. Till I know 'tis done 
Howe’er my haps, my joys were ne’er begun.
(IV.iii.67-70)
When the plans of Claudius miscarry, he turns to Laertes 
and by playing upon the young man’s emotions compounds 
the crimes he has already committed.
After speaking with the ghost of his father, Hamlet 
has learned that "one may smile, and smile, and be a 
villain." The hypocrisy of Claudius is typical of 
rational villainy as practiced by characters such as 
Richard III and Iago. Taking advantage of Laertes’ 
distress over the arrangements of his father’s funeral, 
Claudius advises the young man to choose an unbated 
sword when he engages Hamlet in a proposed fencing 
match. Laertes states his intention of using a sword 
dipped in poison and..Claudius, true to the manner of 
the rationalist, insures that the project will have a 
"back or second" in the event that anything goes wrong 
with the first plan— Claudius will therefore have a 
poisoned drink ready and waiting for Hamlet. News of 
Ophelia’s untimely death concludes the interview with 
Laertes, and the king confides to Gertrude: "How much
I had to do to calm his rage I" Claudius’ hypocrisy 
and pride, the way in which he uses Laertes, and the 
manner in which he plots the death of Hamlet characterize
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his villainy as rational. In a sense Claudius’ lack of 
skepticism makes him more lamentable than the average 
stage villain, for Claudius knowingly sends his soul to 
hell.
The responsibility of Hamlet for the deaths of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern presents the play’s great­
est difficulty; at the very least, it mildly raises the 
question of whether or not Hamlet should also be viewed 
as a villain. Actually, T.S. Eliot's complaint that 
Hamlet’s insanity is less than real and "more than 
feigned"'* provides the key to the play's greatness and 
perhaps to the needless deaths of Hamlet’s former
schoolmates as well. A.C. Bradley refers to Hamlet's
4mental state as being one of "profound melancholy."
By Hamlet’s own admission he suffers from "excitements"
of his "reason" and his "blood." Likewise, he prefaces
the story of his undoing of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
with the following remark:
Being thus benetted round with villainies—
Ere I could make a prologue to my brains,
They had begun the play— I sat me down,
Devised a new commission,, wrote it fair.
(V.ii.29-32)
3t .S. Eliot, "Hamlet and His Problems," in Selected 
Essays: 1917-1932 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 1932), p. 125.
^A.C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1949), p . 10tt.
But Horatio’s mild reproof— "So Guildenstern and 
Rosencrantz go to't"— triggers Hamlet's defensiveness 
and evokes from him a response that differs markedly 
from his former Freudian manifestations of grief and 
doubt:
Why, man, they did make love to this employment. 
They are not near my conscience, their defeat 
Does by their own insinuation grow.
'Tis dangerous when the baser nature comes 
Between the pass and fell incensed points 
Of mighty opposites. (V.ii.57-62)
To the last portion of Hamlet's Adlerian outburst
Horatio can only reply, "Why, what a King is this I"
Hamlet does sincerely regret his behavior toward
Laertes (V.ii.75-9) although, ironically enough, he
accuses the latter of having displayed excessive grief.
Of the play's three young avengers— Fortinbras,
Laertes, and Hamlet— only Fortinbras in unconditionally
identified with honor. Hamlet has failed to heed the
advice of the ghost ("Taint not thy mind") while
Laertes has plotted with Claudius. Though Hamlet
criticizes the undemocratic practices of war, he
nonetheless deems Fortinbras' struggle over the rights
to a little piece of Polish ground as being a case
involving honor. And before Hamlet dies he says,
But I do prophesy the election lights 
On Fortinbras. He has my dying voice.
(V.ii.366-7)
In Hamlet both Fortinbras and Horatio serve as symbols
of order. Though rebellious at first, Fortinbras 
nevertheless obeys his uncle's command to discontinue 
his acts of military hostility against Denmark. This 
show of restraint and his evaluation of Hamlet at the 
end of the play suggest a rather promising individual. 
Horatio is at first a skeptic, but his confrontation 
with the ghost probably helps to convince him of the 
wisdom of Hamlet's words— "There are more things in 
Heaven and earth, Horatio,/Than are dreamt of in your 
philosophy." Shakespeare implies that Horatio, though 
not a follower of Christian humanism, has committed 
himself to the doctrines of classical stoicism and not 
to the Machiavellian rationalism of the age. Hamlet 
himself wishes to believe in a rationally ordered 
universe, but the premature marriage of his mother has 
had disillusioning effects, leaving Hamlet uncertain 
as to whether man's reason causes him to be any different 
from the beasts after all. At the end of the play 
Horatio, following the request of Hamlet, tells the 
story of what has brought about the four dead onstage 
as well as four other deaths besides, and he conveys 
Hamlet's words of support to Fortinbras who, we assume, 
restores order to the realm. Still, when Horatio 
attempts to explain the "deaths put on by cunning and 
forced cause," that is, the fates of Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, he will probably encounter some difficulty
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in reporting the cause of his friend ’’aright•"
Shakespeare’s most interesting villain is found in 
Othello. Iago, in fact, dominates the first three acts of 
the play while acts four and especially five belong to 
Othello, the tragic hero. Though Iago’s part is actually a 
little larger than Othello's, Shakespeare gives his hero 
such stature that one can'easily overlook this fact. Yet, 
the play revolves around Iago, a villain who studies his 
victims carefully and then uses their weaknesses and even their 
virtues to destroy them. Ironically, at some time or other 
during the drama each of Iago's victims--Roderigo, Cassio, 
Othello, and Desdemona— turns to him for advice. Iago's 
self-appointed role as guidance counselor enables him to 
achieve feelings of mastery with which to feed his egotism.
But despite his astute observations about others in the 
play, Iago remains virtually ignorant of the motives that 
have awakened his maliciousness. Iago is proud of his 
intelligence and soldiering— too proud to accept the fact 
that others are better than he. Iago despises the virtue 
of Cassio and Desdemona for basically the same reason; it 
is something that he cannot understand, much less possess 
himself.
Iago's real motives are revealed shortly after the 
play begins and as G.B. Harrison has observed:
"Shakespeare’s audiences were well trained. No modern
dramatist would dare to give such essential information
5
in the first thirty-five l i n e s . I n  the opening scene
of Othello. Iago reveals that he has tried to pressure
Othello into naming him as his Lieutenant by having
several important people of the city speak for him and
that the position has instead gone to Cassio, a man of
much book learning but with little practical skill in
warfare (I.i.8-33). Failing to see the inconsistency
of his argument, Iago complains that
Preferment goes by letter and affection,
And not by old gradation, where each second 
Stood heir to the first. (I.i.36-8)
Iago’s version of what has happened is extremely signif­
icant, for nowhere in the play is there evidence that 
supports his claims. As a matter of fact, Shakespeare 
shows Cassio to be a gentleman of learning whose worth 
is recognized not only by Othello but also by the 
Venetian leaders who specifically request that Cassio 
be left to govern Cyprus while Othello returns home. 
Iago’s ungentlemanly lack of courtesy, on the other 
hand, serves as the type of contrast which suggests that 
he could never fill the social responsibilities of a
5
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high post. Iago’s clever vulgarity could make him a 
favorite among soldierly comrades, but also a social 
embarrassment in the parlor. By adding to this the fact 
that Iago’s formal education has been less than Cassio's 
we can easily understand why no one besides Iago and 
the three persons who interceded for him feels that 
Iago deserves the post. Othello's years of soldiering 
have made him self-conscious— ’’Rude am I in my speech" 
(I.iii.81)— and unnecessarily apologetic, as we may 
judge from this and later speeches. Othello realizes 
that civilian society operates under a set of conditions 
differing from those of military life. Moreover, his 
careful willingness to make the necessary adjustments 
suggests that Othello places great value upon a man who 
can successfully operate in both worlds. Despite Iago’s 
pretense of sophistication, and this regarding the 
extra-marital practices of Venetian ladies, the Moor’s 
ancient shows up miserably alongside the courteous 
Cassio. At first, Iago hates Cassio for having received 
the lieutenantship, but when he later comes to recognize 
Cassio's nobility of spirit Iago must at the same time 
confront his own inferiority. At this point, he can no 
longer complain that Cassio has unjustly received the 
lieutenantship or that Cassio has slept with Emilia, 
Iago's wife:
... If Cassio do remain 
He hath a daily beauty in his life 
That makes me ugly...." (V.i.16-20)
Thus, Iago decides that Cassio must die.
Iago's egotism serves as the basis for his rational­
ism and reflects the views of continental humanism.
Though Iago gives lip service to currently-held opinions 
about Order, Reason, and Nature, his understanding of 
these humanistic ideas is easily seen to be defective. 
Iago's rationalism takes the form of self-reliance—
"'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus" (I.iii.322-3) 
— and self-interest. He in fact defines humanity in 
terms of the self, admonishing the suicidal Roderigo:
...I have looked upon the world for four times 
seven years, and since I could distinguish betwixt 
a benefit and an injury I never found man that knew 
how to love himself. Ere I would say I would drown 
myself for the love of a guinea hen* I would change 
my humanity with a baboon. (I.iii.312-16)
Whenever Iago refers to the love of Othello and Desdemona,
he speaks of it in physical terms. Because their love
represents higher reason, Iago cannot conceive of it in
any way other than in the lewd remarks he makes to
Brabantio, Roderigo, and even Cassio. Othello's comment,
"And when I love thee not/Chaos is come again"
(III.iii.91-2), verifies what the audience has already
learned in Act One— namely, that the love of Othello and
Desdemona represents a meeting of souls and that such a
spiritual attraction transcends all physical barriers
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in much the same way as the love between the phoenix and 
turtledove in the poem attributed to Shakespeare. Where­
as Iago displays the rational method by creating a role 
of appearances as well as by planning and scheming to 
hurt others, it is the egocentric basis of his rational­
ist philosophy that Shakespeare lays open to criticism. 
"Where does glorification of the self lead?" the play­
wright seems to be asking. His answer to the question 
is found in figures such as Richard III and Iago.
In the opening scene of the play Iago tells Roderigo 
that he hates Othello but pretends to love him. Iago’s 
words— "I am not what I am"— thus identify him with 
hypocrisy as well as with a role of appearances while 
Iago’s studied use of deceit also reveals him to be 
mentally oriented. In the soliloquy at the end of 
Act One, Iago- reveals his plan to make Othello suspicious 
of Cassio’s being too familiar with Desdemona and he 
attempts to rationalize this malice by questioning 
Othello’s relationship to Emilia. It is an accusation 
that Iago himself does not really believe, for in the same 
speech he refers to Othello’s "free and open nature"; 
nonetheless, Iago wants to believe this of Othello and 
later seems to have succeeded in convincing himself of 
its truth. The beginning of the soliloquy reveals that 
Iago has used Roderigo for "sport and profit" and that he 
feels vastly superior to him:
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Thus do I ever make my fool my purse,
For I mine own gained knowledge should profane 
If I would time expend with such a snipe 
But for my sport and profit.(iii.389-92)
This reference to Roderigo, though delivered just after 
the latter’s exit, bears special significance to the 
speech as a whole— Iago likewise hopes to lead Othello 
"by the nose." By using the Moor as he has used Roderigo, 
Iago can gratify his feelings of superiority and revenge 
his insulted ego for the indignity it received when ; 
Othello chose Cassio for his second in command.
In Act II of Othello the action shifts to Cyprus 
where after some delay all of the major characters arrive 
safely. Threats, from the Turkish fleet have diminished 
due to violent weather at sea, and the action of the play 
now focuses completely upon the theme of lago’s villainy. 
Shakespeare, in fact, devotes the first and third scenes 
of this Act to the development of his villain. In a par­
ley with Emilia and Desdemona, Iago reveals his cynical 
attitude toward women, and perhaps it is not stretching 
the point too far to suggest that lago’s manifestations 
of male chauvinism, in this scene and elsewhere, reinforce 
his feelings of self-importance and, therefore, figure 
significantly into a reading of his character. As Iago 
becomes confident of his power to manipulate those 
individuals who seek his advice, he begins to use language
that betrays his visions of superiority. He has already 
reached the point at which he can say to Roderigo, ’’But, 
sir, be you ruled by me”; later, he will tell Othello, 
"Would you would bear your fortune like a man!" In his 
soliloquy (II.i.295-321)> Iago divulges the secret of his 
own lust for Desdemona (ii.300-302), a detail fashioned 
from the playwright's source, and he rationalizes his 
enmity toward Cassio in the same way that he has rational­
ized his hatred of Othello— "For I fear Cassio with my 
nightcap too" (1.316).
In the third scene the audience learns that Cassio 
cannot hold his liquor. Cassio realizes his weakness and 
tries to avoid drinking any more than he has already con­
sumed. But the observant Iago seizes his opportunity and 
before long Cassio is drunk. Little does Iago realize how 
appropriate are the words to his second drinking song:
He was a wight of high renown,
And thou art but of low degree.
'Tis pride that pulls the country down.
Then take thine auld cloak about thee.
(II.iii.96-99)
And little does Cassio realize how costly will be his
indiscretion. "Iago begins by making untrue, snide remarks
to Montano about Cassiofs drinking. As psychological
realists, Iago and Edmund are both adept at the practice of
seemingly praising a person while actually damning him.
Thus Iago speaks of Cassio in the following manner:
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He is a soldier fit to stand by Caesar
And give direction. And do but see his vice.
’Tis to his virtue a just equinox,
The one as long as the other. ’Tis pity of him.
I fear the trust Othello puts him in 
On some odd time of his infirmity 
Will shake this island. (II.iii.126-133)
Iago gets Roderigo to start a fight with the drunken 
Cassio and to raise a riot in the uneasy town. The result 
of all this is that Cassio loses his commission. When 
Othello arrives Iago affects reticence to speak about 
what has happened. Again, this action shows him to be 
a psychological realist, or careful reader of the be­
havior of men. lago’s pretense of "protecting" Cassio 
merely intensifies Othello’s belief that his second 
lieutenant is responsible for the disturbance that has 
occurred. In his disgrace, Cassio turns to Iago for 
help.
The ambivalence in Iago's character shows him to
deviate from Nature, and his attempt to convince
Roderigo that Desdemona loves Cassio discloses lago’s
garbled understanding of this Renaissance concept:
When the blood is made dull with the act ’Of 
sport, there should be, again to inflame it and to 
give satiety a fresh appetite, lovliness in 
favor, sympathy in years, manners, and beauties, 
all which the Moor is defective in. Now, for want 
of these required conveniences, her delicate 
tenderness will find itself abused; begin to 
heave the gorge, disrelish and abhor the Moor.
Very nature will instruct her in it and compel 
her to some second choice.
(II.i.229-238)
At various times in the play, Iago makes facile 
reference to nature, reason, order and degree; but 
he distorts each of these views to suit his own pur­
pose. Discrepancies in appearance and reality, more­
over, tend to undermine Iagb’s philosophic utterances 
as do the numerous contradictions in his speech. For 
instance, he describes reputation as ”an idle and most 
false imposition” but later presents an eloquent case 
for maintaining one’s reputation. Most significant 
perhaps is Shakespeare’s use of dramatic irony to build 
upon the term honest as applied to Iago. Cassio, 
Desdemona, and Othello all praise lago’s honesty. 
Realizing from the beginning that Iago is anything but 
honest, the audience can only see irony in the other 
characters’ thinking him to be so. In the last act, 
Shakespeare uses the device of repetition to bring the 
irony almost to fever pitch. Othello, attempting to 
justify the murder of Desdemona, credits Iago with 
being the source of his suspicions. Thus he says to 
Emilia: ”My friend, thy husband— honest, honest
Iago” (V.ii.154)*
lago’s perverted rationalism soon begins to cor­
rupt the mind of Othello, as we witness in Act III. 
Again, he uses the psychological device of feigned 
reticence to vocalize his real feelings and again
Othello takes the bait, starting to suspect Cassio with
his wife. As if echoing the warning of Brabantio
(I.iii.293-4), Iago resorts to the inductive method of
reasoning. Since he has already acknowledged Desdemona’s
goodness and virtue (II.iii.366-S)> Iago uses an argument
that he himself knows to be false:
She did deceive her father, marrying you,
And when she seemed to shake and fear your looks,
She loved them most. (III.iii.206-S)
Desdemona did in fact deceive her father, and the poor
girl pays heavily for this offense. To reinforce his
arguments Iago likewise appeals to Nature. But this
time he alters his words to suit Othello instead of
Roderigo:
Not to affect many proposed matches 
Of her own clime, complexion, and degree,
Whereto we see in all things nature tends—
Fohl One may smell in such a will most rank,
Foul disproportion, thoughts unnatural.
(III.iii.229-33)
Perhaps lago’s arguments sound too plausible— whatever
the reason, Shakespeare has in fact established a
Rationalistic background for the play, one that is
based upon ideas found in the doctrines of Christian
humanism. More will be said of this in a comparative
study of Iago and Edmund following discussion of King
Lear, for striking similarity in the two villains makes
such a consideration indeed worthwhile.
As the seeds of jealousy begin to ripen and grow
within Othello, the Moor becomes vehement—
Villain, be sure thou prove my love a whore...
Or by the worth of man’s eternal soul,
Thou hadst been better have been born a dog 
Than answer my waked wrath! (III.iii.359-o3)
Now, Iago must prove and not simply insinutate that
Desdemona is unfaithful! More importantly, this gives
Iago the opportunity to rationalize his evil into a
situation of self-protection, from the anger of Othello
and from Cassiofs certain defense of his honor should
either man learn of lago’s deceit— ’’There stand I in
much peril.” lago’s planting the handkerchief in
Cassio’s quarters recalls Aaron’s trick of planting the
bag of gold under a nearby tree for Saturninus to find.
Emilia conceals from Desdemona the fact that she has
given the hankerchief to Iago even though the situation
seems to warrant her telling Desdemona about it—
Othello’s consternation over his wife’s inability to
produce the former gift. But Emilia is right after all,
for Othello forgets about the handkerchief and even
fails to notice it in Cassio*s hand when he gives it
to Bianca to copy— that is,Othello forgets until Iago
reminds him by making a big thing of the episode.
Wishing to humiliate Othello, Iago claims that
Cassio has "blabbed" about the favors Desdemona has
supposedly given him. The purpose of Act IV, in fact,
is to show the humiliation and degradation of Othello
at the hands of Iago. This treatment of Othello serves
to gratify the egotism of Iago and clarify further the
nature of his rational villainy. Thus Iago makes
Othello believe that Cassio scorns Desdemona because
she is not good enough for him. This story contradicts
lago’s account of Cassio’s "dreams” about Desdemona,
but Othello does not notice— he has already sunk to the
inferior level envisioned by Iago in Act I. Othello’s
epileptic attack causes Iago to feel vastly superior
to the Moor, and he begins to patronize Othello:
...Marry patience,
Or shall I say you are all in all in apleen,
And nothing of a man. (IV.i.66-90)
lago’s persistent reference to Othello’s manhood (Cf.
IV.i.63) may signify his own sexual inadequacies, or
6
his contempt for the alleged sexual prowess of Moors.
But even if lago’s motives seem Freudian, Shakespeare’s 
hint of sexual inadequacy merely helps to define with 
certainty the real basis for lago’s villainy— involvement 
with his ego.
In the first scene of Act V, Iago delivers a 
soliloquy in which he reasons out that both Roderigo and 
Cassio must die. By weighing alternatives and causes, 
Iago displays the rational method in his line of thought:
6
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...Live Roderigo,
He calls me to a restitution large 
Of gold and jewels that I bobbed from him 
As gifts to Desdemona.
It must not be. If Cassio do remain,
He hath a daily beauty in his life
That makes me ugly, and besides, the Moor
May unfold me to him. There stand I in much peril.
No, he must die. (V.i.14-22)
The cowardice Iago displays in his manner of wounding
Cassio as well as in his attempt to lay the blame on
Bianca, an innocent woman, suggests that Iago may not
have been a valiant soldier on the field. He may, in
fact, have already overachieved since there is nothing
to indicate anything particularly outstanding in his
military capabilities. It is the mistaken belief that
Iagd has faithfully served him by killing Cassio, which
finally spurs the Moor on in his resolve to murder
Desdemona. Shakespeare brilliantly allows the audience
to feel satisfaction that Iago will be punished for
what he has done to Othello and Desdemona; but without
the murders of Roderigo and Emilia, this punishment
might seem excessive rather than just. The horror of
Iago is that he successfully gets Othello to destroy
himself.
Unlike Iago, Othello does not credit the self with 
being able to determine its own fate. Othello acknowl­
edges a rationally ordered universe by expressing the 
idea that eclipses should follow, his murder of 
Desdemona (V.ii.98-101). Later learning of the monstrous
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error he has committed, Othello asks, ''Who can control 
his fate?" And yet, Othello accepts responsibility 
for his actions, as does Oedipus, except that the Moor 
does not work out his redemption as Oedipus finally 
does. Othello's recognition of higher supernatural 
powers differs from Iago's recognition of only the self. 
Iago’s rationalism is thus man-centered, and it leads 
him to the same fatal evil as that of Richard III. 
Othello, on the other hand, commits a heinous crime 
of passion which contradicts the nature of his Christian 
beliefs and attitudes.
In Kin/; Lear Shakespeare utilizes a subplot that 
echoes, thematically and dramatically, the story of 
Lear and his three daughters. Paralleling the main plot 
is the action that revolves around Gloucester and his two 
sons, Edgar and Villainous Edmund. Both sons serve to 
link the stories together while the noble Kent functions 
as the symbol of rational order in the play. Edgar and 
Albany represent innocence, or goodness without know­
ledge, but gain in stature and significance as they come 
to recognize and understand the meaning of evil. 
Shakespeare identifies Kent with temperance, an 
Aristotelian virtue: Lear warns, "Come not between
the dragon and his wrath," and he later upbraids Kent 
for daring "To come between our sentence and our power."
But Kent stands firmly on the grounds of his moral 
principles:
Revoke thy doom 
Or whilst I can vent clamor from my throat 
I ’ll tell thee thou dost evil. (I.i.167-9)
When Lear swears by Apollo, Kent interrupts him: "Thou
swear*st thy gods in vain.” This retort not only refers
to the king’s inability to keep Kent from expressing
his feelings but also suggests the gods’ displeasure
over Lear’s actions, while the audience probably intuits
a connection between Lear’s oath and God’s commandment:
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain (Exodus. 20:7)» Kent believes in the higher
supernatural powers and lives in accordance with his
belief, but the sight of so much suffering eventually
causes him to wonder if the gods might be indifferent
to man. At this point in the play, however, Edgar
becomes the one to argue their benevolent intent.
Although Shakespeare provides the play with a non-
Christian framework, the poet explores the themes of
T,sin,” ’’repentance," and ’’forgiveness,” in an attitude
of Christian humanism. The villains who appear in King
Lear are Edmund, Goneril, Regan, Cornwall, and Oswald;
but discussion focuses upon Edmund the main villain.
In the opening scene of King Lear we learn that
Gloucester, once ashamed of acknowledging Edmund his
illegitimate offspring (11.10-1), now proudly proclaims
his fatherhood of Edmund and his impartial love for both
sons. In the second scene, we discover that Edmund does
not share Gloucester’s feelings of love. Echoing the
merry villainy of Richard III, Edmund begins the scene
with a soliloquy that discloses his treacherous intent:
Thou, Nature, art my goddess, to thy law 
My services are bound. Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me,
Por that I am dome twelve or fourteen moonshines 
Lag of a brother? Why bastard? Wherefore base? 
When my dimensions are as well compact,
My mind as generous and my shape as true,
As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us
With base? With baseness? Bastardy? Base,.base?
Who in the lusty stealth of nature take
More composition and fierce quality
Than doth, within a dull, stale, tired bed,
Go to the creating a whole tribe of fops 
Got’tween asleep and wake? Well then,
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land.
Our father’s love is to the bastard Edmund 
As to the'legitimate— fine word, ’legitimate’!
Well, my legitimate, if this letter speed 
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base 
Shall top the legitimate. I grow, I prosper 
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! (I.ii.1-22)
In thus taking Nature for his goddess, Edmund becomes a
figure of anti-humanism. His views as expressed do not
represent the concept of Nature known to humanists of
the period; rather, they suggest an incipient theory of
Darwinism. Like villains such as Cassius and Aaron,
Edmund uses the device of forgery. When Gloucester
sees Edmund supposedly trying to "hide" the contents of
the letter, he naturally asks what the paper is; and
Edmund replies, "Nothing, my lord." Gloucester’s
subsequent discourse upon the word nothing parallels Lear’s 
remark to Cordelia, "Nothing will come of nothing” (I.i.92)» 
needless to say, Edmund’s pretenses of defending his brother 
Edgar produce the effect desired— reducing suspicion of 
himself and intensifying Gloucester’s suspicion of Edgaro 
The letter, addressed to Edmund from Edgar, proposes that 
the brothers conspire against their aged father so as to 
reap the benefits of his wealth at once, since the-title, 
lands, and property cannot revert to Edgar until Gloucester’s 
death. If he aids his brother, Edmund is to receive half 
of everything. Like Iago, Edmund is an adept at using human 
psychology as illustrated by the way in which he manipulates 
his father. He pretends to believe that Edgar is "trying" 
him and tells Gloucester that he may eavesdrop upon their 
conversation in order to have proof of Edgar’s innocence. 
Instead, Edmund convinces his brother that Gloucester is 
violently angry and that he should keep out of their father's 
sight; thus by frustrating his father's hopes of having 
ooncrete proof of his son's innocence, Edmund creates a 
psychological proof of Edgar's guilt in the mind of Gloucester.
Gloucester’s belief in astrology symbolizes his 
faith in a rationally ordered universe* Certain of his 
belief that the eclipses forebode evil happenings, Gloucester 
cites as an example the banishment of Kent from Lear's 
kingdom. Although he misinterprets the meaning of 
such planetary disturbances as they apply to himself,
Gloucester nonetheless verifies their general meaning 
by foolishly banishing his good son Edgar from his side. 
Edmund, on the other hand, is a skeptic who believes 
his father to be a credulous old fool; moreover, he 
plays upon this "credulity" by feigning similar belief 
in earthly and planetary correspondences. But as 
rationalist and skeptic, Edmund asserts the freedom of 
man’s will:
i
This is the excellent foppery of the world, 
that when we are sick-in fortune— often the 
surfeit of our own behavior— we make guilty 
of our disasters the sun, the moon, and the 
stars, as if we were villains by necessity, 
fools by heavenly compulsion.... My father 
compounded with my mother under the dragon’s 
tail, and my nativity was under Ursa Major, 
so that it follows I am rough and lecherous.
Tut, I should have been that I am had the 
maidenliest star in the firmament twinkled 
on my bastardizing. (I.ii.l2S-45)
Edmund’s complaint seems easily justified on the basis 
of modern scientific thought and also because popular 
astrology in its most corrupted form offers a view of 
easy fatalism. In the Republic Plato advises parents to 
conceive their children at a time of benefic planetary 
influence, and Edmund’s astrological references to him­
self suggest Shakespeare’s familiarity with the Platonic 
attitude toward heavenly motions. Naturally, Edmund’s 
villainy tends to verify the malefic aspects of his 
planetary configurations. In Shakespearefs day,
Edmund's skepticism would have been viewed as a form of
atheism. Thus, his belief in free will is not to be 
identified with the Christian concept but with a form 
of paradoxical humanism instead. Edmund's rationalism, 
like that of Aaron, Iago, and Richard III, hinges upon 
the assertion of self.
Edmund’s ambitions, in addition to his skepticism,
reveal the egotistical basis for his rational villainy.
First, he ruins his brother. Next, Edmund betrays his
father, who intends to remain loyal to the king, and thus
becomes the new Earl of Gloucester. The final step,
of course, will be the crown. Edmund has advanced
himself by means of a forged letter and a stolen letter.
As Waldo McNeir observes, ’’Ironically, a third letter,
addressed to him but never delivered, is instrumental
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in his own downfall.’’ The third letter reveals a plot 
upon the life of Albany, who has become thoroughly 
disgusted with the practices of his wife Goneril.
Deeming her husband a coward, Goneril falls madly in 
love with Edmund (as does Regan) and sends to him so 
that they may rid themselves of Albany, whose death 
will enable them to wed one another. She entrusts the 
letter to Oswald, and her servd&t’s dying request is that 
it be delivered to Edmund. But Edgar delivers it to
?Waldo F. McNeir, ’’The Role of Edmund in King Lear,” 
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Albany instead, thereby sealing Edmund’s doom, for 
Albany has wisely maintained his authority over the troops 
gathered in the field.
After Gloucester has lost his eyes because of his 
faithfulness to the king, Regan discloses that it was 
Edmund who betrayed him. At this point Gloucester 
recognizes the error of his hasty judgment and begs 
forgiveness from the gods. "I stumbled when I saw," 
he tells the old man who tries to help him. Even though 
he has retained his faith in the gods, Gloucester sinks 
to such despair that he wishes to end his life. Dis­
guised as a mad beggar, Edgar performs the same service 
for his father that the fool does for Lear. Gloucester 
and Lear commit sin, undergo terrible suffering, and 
achieve awareness. But it is Edgar and the fool who 
prepare them to experience forgiveness and reconcilia­
tion before dying.
With both Regan and Goneril;competing for his 
affections, Edmund faces a dilemma. And he reasons it 
thus:
To both these sisters have I sworn my love,
Each jealous of the other, as the stung
Are of the adder. Which of them shall I take?
Both? One? Or neither? Neither can be enjoyed 
If both remain alive. To take the widow 
Exasperates, makes mad her sister Goneril,
And hardly shall I carry out my side,
Her husband being alive. Now then we'll use 
His countenance for the battle, which being done,
Let her who would be rid of him devise 
His speedy taking off. As for the mercy 
Which he intends to Lear and to Cordelia,
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The battle done, and they within our power,
Shall never see his pardon, for my state
Stands on me to defend, not to debate. (V.i.55-69)
By choosing Goneril over Regan, Edmund hopes to eliminate
the threat of Albany's merciful intentions. His dilemma
is resolved, however, for Goneril poisons Regan and
commits suicide following disclosure of the intercepted
letter. After his victory Albany arrests Edmund on
charges of treason, and Edgar comes forth to charge him
with crimes against "thy gods, thy brother, and thy
father.” In the trial by combat that ensues, Edmund
falls— the implication being that divine justice is on
Edgar's side. Edmund forgives his adversary, not knowing
at the time that it is his brother, and before he dies
attempts to save the lives of Cordelia and Lear by
revealing that he has secretly ordered their deaths.
His effort proves unsuccessful, for Cordelia is hanged
and Lear dies of a broken heart.
Often, the term rational when applied to Iago and
Edmund merely acts as a synonym for logical. To be sure,
each appears to be the most logical character in his
respective play. (Goneril and Regan might perhaps vie
with Edmund for the title of most logical except that
they fall in "love.") The audience sees both Iago
and Edmund weighing alternatives before deciding to act.
Iago's dilemma involving Cassio and Roderigo is not
unlike Edmund's decision involving Goneril and Regan;
but while Iago must permit neither to live, Edmund is 
happy to settle Tor one of the sisters out of the way, 
namely Regan, so that Goneril would then have to dispose 
of Albany. Edmund makes the audience aware of his logical 
mode of thinking through a series of systematic thought 
processes, the end of which reveals to him the better of 
the alternatives. lago’s tendency to ennumerate ("Two 
things must be done") also cloaks him in the appearance 
of logic. In deceiving others into taking false attitudes 
Iago and Edmund use the pretense of protecting the in­
nocent party. This "protection" is of course damning; 
but their penetrating insight into human nature marks 
them as psychological realists and serves to elevate 
their mentality above that of the other characters. For 
instance, Iago's pretense of protecting Cassio from 
Othello’s inquiries causes Othello to become even more 
suspicious of Cassio and to admire Iago for his "loyalty" 
to a friend. lago’s apparent hesitancy to speak on the 
subject of Cassio’s drunkenness or on the subject of 
Desdemona and Cassio makes him appear to Othello as 
sincere and honest. Similarly, Edmund’s apparent defense 
of his brother has the desired effect— the opposite of 
what he seems to intend.
Moreover, Iago and Edmund are characterized by a 
kind of sardonic humor which makes them satirical and 
contemptuous of their society so that they seem to be
above it. Edmund’s humor seems flippant, while lago’s 
cynical attitude toward sex serves to identify him with 
malcontents such as Hamlet and Flamineo. Three factors, 
then, combine to characterize Iago and Edmund as thinking 
men who have divorced reason from emotion: 1) the expe­
dient methods by which they reach their desired ends;
2) the psychological realism which enables them to read 
the weaknesses of others and to play upon those weaknesses 
and, 3) the satirical humor by which they stand apart from 
society by appearing to be above it. Both, in fact, claim 
reason for a guide. Iago says,
If the balance of our lives had not one scale of 
reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood 
and baseness of our natures would conduct us to 
most preposterous conclusions. But we have reason 
to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings....
(I.iii.329-34)
Edmund’s concept of reason is less elaborate— ’’Let me, 
if not by birth, have lands by wit" (I.ii.199)*
With his first entrance into the play, each character 
expresses unhappiness over his station in life. The 
question immediately involved is that of order and degree 
and is complicated by the fact that Shakespeare leaves 
the matter both open and shut within each of the tragedies 
If society deems Edmund base and if Iago lost his appoint­
ment through Cassio’s political connections we might 
perhaps sympathize with each character’s plight. To 
argue that the case of each is destroyed through vil­
lainous action is to ignore the question or to rationalize
the problem, however. What Shakespeare implies is. that 
for better or worse, each must accept his station unless 
the circumstances of beneficent Providence or nobility 
of character should cause conditions to become altered.
The marriage of Othello and Desdemona, for instance, 
transcends considerations of degree. That we are to 
accept it as such is evidenced through the Duke’s 
sanction of the marriage: "I think this tale would win
my daughter too" (I.iii.171) and "Your son-in-law is 
far more fair than black" (I.iii.291). It is Iago, 
discontented with his station in life, who reminds us of 
the Elizabethan view. His arguments, however, weaken 
his own case rather than Othello's for the Duke's attitude 
toward Othello has already served to verify the early 
suggestion of the Moor's deserving whatever good comes 
to him. While the audience, like the Duke, approves 
Othello's transgression of Degree, it cannot approve 
similar desires on the part of Iago in whose mouth the 
argument becomes a vile hypocrisy. Such dualities 
likewise occur in King Lear. Edmund's opening speech 
shows his dissatisfaction with his position. But again, 
we see a break that transcends the existing order when 
Cornwall's servant who served him since childhood tries 
to stop him from putting out Gloucester's eyes. The 
servant loses his life as a result while Regan exclaims,
"A peasant stand up thus!" Again, the action is
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sanctioned by higher authority, this time in the way 
Albany responds to the story as he hears it from a 
messenger (IV.ii.78-80). In each case of the transgres­
sion there is sanction from a higher political authority 
whose character in the play is not blemished, and in 
each case there is also an implication of divine or 
cosmic sanction of the deed.
The skepticism of Iago and Edmund toward the exist­
ing social order parallels their attitudes toward 
Elizabethan cosmology. Each character asserts free will 
by expressing disbelief in fate, while the attitudes of 
believers— Othello and Kent, for instance— display the 
idea of fate reconciled to free will. Disregard of the 
supernatural tends to place Iago and Edmund in the camp 
of atheism, a further deviation from right reason and 
from the English humanism present in the worldview of 
Shakespeare’s plays. And yet, in his pretense of 
defending Cassio, Iago affects belief in astrology—
"As if some planet had unwitted men" (II.iii.182).
Edmund also uses a pretext of belief when he lies to his 
father about Edgar:
Here stood he in the dark...
Mumbling of wicked charms, conjuring the moon.
(II.i.41)
That Iago's rationalism exists apart from right reason 
is evidenced by his stated intention to corrupt goodness. 
Similarly, Edmund describes his brother as noble and
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good, "on whose foolish honesty/My practices ride easy!" 
lago’s logic also deviates in method from right reason 
for neither is the end good nor the means "proper."
There may even be a question as to whether Iago follows 
reason at all. For one thing, lago’s desperate search 
for a motive becomes a form of rationalizing— a state of 
mental confusion— as he seeks to convince himself that 
there is reason behind his ungrounded actions. Edmund 
at least expects to gain wealth, but Iago does not even 
expect to profit by his actions. We know that he is 
stealing jewels from Roderigo, but Shakespeare barely 
touches upon this motive.
Edmund's reasoning likewise exists apart from virtue 
and deviates from the methodology of right reason in 
the end and means of his action. He too rationalizes 
but to a much lesser extent than does Iago— as when he 
satisfies himself that the deaths of Goneril and Regan 
prove that he was loved. But Edmund deserves to be 
treated more in the light of Nature than Reason, for he 
calls upon Nature as his guide. Moreover, Shakespeare 
devotes much of the play to an exploration of the meanings 
of natural and unnatural. As the playwright builds 
added meanings into the term honest as applied to Iago, 
so he imbues the word natural with more and more meaning 
as it comes to be associated with Edmund. The latter's 
illegitimacy does not cause his moral corruption, for
Goneril and Regan who are legitimate are equally corrupt, 
so that within the context of the play Edmund’s illegit­
imacy merely symbolizes his perverse nature. Shakespeare 
employs dramatic irony by having Gloucester remark that 
Edmund is a "loyal and natural boy." But the audience 
knows that Edmund is neither loyal nor natural, for in 
the context of this scene the interplay of "unnatural" 
and "natural" causes their meanings to become juxtaposed. 
Throughout the play Shakespeare develops the parent- 
child relationship until it finally becomes representative 
of the law of Nature. For example, Lear foolishly tells 
Regan: "...thou better know’st/The offices of nature,
bond of childhood." But Albany tells Goneril:
That nature which contemns its origin 
Cannot be bordered certain in itself;
She that herself will sliver and disbranch 
From her material sap perforce must wither 
And come to deadly use. (IV.ii.32-36)
When Gloucester remarks to Edmund concerning Lear’s
daughters, "I like not this unnatural dealing," Edmund
replies, "Most savage and unnatural!" As an added irony,
the scene ends with Edmund’s resolution to tell the Duke
of his father’s decision to remain loyal to Lear.
Returning to Edmund’s lines in which he takes Nature for
his goddess, we find that the rest of the play provides
an ironic commentary upon these same lines. Likewise,
Edmund asserts the freedom of his will, but at the end of
the play he seems less certain: "Some good I mean to
do,/Despite of mine own nature” (V.iii.243-4)• Edmund’s 
attempt to save Cordelia and Lear may or may not make him 
less villainous than Iago, but it does serve to refute 
his own implication that his is a naturally depraved 
human personality.
Macbeth, the last of Shakespeare’s great villains, 
marks a departure from rational villainy. Whereas Lady 
Macbeth is a rationalist, and remains so until she loses 
her mind, Macbeth is essentially non-rational. While 
displaying many of the qualities of rational villainy, 
Macbeth exhibits at the same time characteristics that 
do more than simply qualify his rational villainy— they 
entirely alter it. The extenuating circumstances of 
Macbeth’s rationalism lie, of course, in his psychic 
experiences. Though like Claudius he feels genuine 
affection for his wife and professes faith in the 
supernatural, it is the hallucinogenic quality of Macbeth' 
mind which actually characterizes his villainy as non- 
rational. (This interpretation of Macbeth differs from 
that of Terrence Hawkes who views Shakespeare’s hero as 
rationalistic. ) Professor Hawkes has described the 
witches as being reasoners to excess,^ and the weird
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sisters are just that— equivocators whose speech abounds 
in paradoxes. Yet, prophecy is a phenomenon associated 
with the imagination and Banquo's words, as well as the 
women’s beards, suggest anti-rationalism:
Were such things here as We do speak about?
Or have we eaten on the insane root
That takes the reason prisoner? (I.iii.tf3-5)
In a sense, the witches represent perversion of higher 
reason, the intuitive faculty, while the poetic quality 
of Macbeth’s mind could easily invite a similar criti­
cal approach. For purposes of clarification, however,
I shall use the term rationalism in the way that it applies 
to Shakespeare's other villains, thereby treating the 
modus operandi of Macbeth's mind as non-rational rather 
than supra-rational.
As the character of Richard III changes to that 
of a man whose rationalism bows before the forces of his 
imagination, so the mental state of Macbeth begins 
where that of Richard III ends. Richard’s fail from 
rationalism occurs when, stirred by the enormity of his 
guilt, he loses confidence in himself and yields to 
feelings of fear and terror. However, Shakespeare 
depicts Macbeth as being one who from the beginning 
possesses the uncanny ability to visualize his greatest 
hopes and fears and even to project them externally 
before him. His early weakness is simply that of the 
partially committed will, but Lady Macbeth provides
the "emotional power"that enables him to translate his
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thoughts into action.
The first appearance of Lady Macbeth (I.v) carries 
an impression of forceful emotionlessness. Complaining 
that her husband is "too full o ’ the milk of human kind­
ness," she resolves to urge his ambitions with "the valor 
of my tongue." Lady Macbeth lacks the far-sightedness 
of her husband and neglects to consider the legal and 
moral consequences of capital crime. Thus she seeks to 
shame Macbeth into murdering the king by strenuously 
questioning his courage. Following her diatribe Macbeth 
asks, "If we should fail?" And Lady Macbeth responds by 
advising him of her plan:
We faili
But screw your courage to the sticking-place 
And we'll not fail. When Duncan is asleep—
Whereto the rather shall his day's hard journey 
Soundly invite him— his two chamberlains 
Will I with wine and wassail so convince 
That memory, the warder of the brain,
Shall be a fume, and the receipt of reason 
A limbec only. When in swinish sleep 
Their drenched natures lie as in a death,
What cannot you and I perform upon 
The unguarded Duncan? What not put upon 
His spongy officers, who snail bear the guilt 
Of our great quell? (I.vii. 59-72)
It is Lady Macbeth who works out the details of the mur­
der, and the recognition she gives to a role of hypo-
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crisy further complements the manner of her rational 
villainy— " False face must hide what the false heart 
doth know" (I.vii.&2).
In Act I, sc.vii and Act II, sc.ii, Lady Macbeth 
displays a personality that is much stronger than 
Macbeth’s; in fact, Shakespeare must have had difficulty 
constructing the play so that she did not usurp the 
stage from his hero. Her comment that she could have 
killed Duncan herself had he not resembled her father 
betrays her weakness, however, while her advising 
Macbeth to forget about the crime just committed lest it 
"make us mad" prepares us for the sleepwalking scene. 
Whereas the murder has greatly unnerved Macbeth, his wife 
has:the situation well under control, and it is she who 
must remind him to wash the blood from his hands and 
return the daggers to their rightful places beside the 
grooms. Macbeth's failure to hide the evidence of their 
guilt differs from Lady Macbeth's instant recognition of 
their need to cover it up. Having little patience with : 
her husband’s flights of fancy, she advises him to be 
rational about the matter:
The sleeping1 and the dead 
Are but as pictures. 'Tis the eye of childhood 
That fears a painted devil (II.ii.53-4).
The scene ends with Lady Macbeth’s telling her husband
to don his nightgown "lest occasion call us/And show us
to be watchers."
With discovery of the murder of Duncan comes the 
necessity for Macbeth to maintain a demeanor that will 
not reveal his guilt. To help her husband through this 
difficult period of reactions, conjectures, and expla­
nations following the crime, Lady Macbeth diverts 
attention by pretending to faint. From this point on, 
however, her importance diminishes as Macbeth begins to 
assert himself. Once done, the murderous deed feeds the 
courage of his will. No longer needing the valorous tongue 
of his lady, Macbeth plots the murder of Banquo on his 
own. The manner in which he makes use of the murderers 
exhibits an instance of Macbeth’s rationalism, as do the 
envious rationalizations that lead him to the conclusion 
that Banquo and Fleance must die. But the hero's best 
display of the rational method occurs in the soliloquy 
that begins the seventh scene of Act I— in which he de­
cides not to murder Duncan I When Macbeth is unable to 
maintain calm during the presence of Banquo's ghost, the 
services of Lady Macbeth are again called forth. Per­
haps the role demanded too much from the young actor who 
played the part of Lady Macbeth, perhaps Shakespeare 
recognized that his character's forceful personality 
tended to intimidate his hero— whatever the reason, 
she disappears from the play until Act V, wherein we .. 
learn of her illness. No longer the rationalist, Lady 
Macbeth still retains a powerful hold over the audience.
The Doctor attending her perhaps best explains the root of
her almost hynoptic effect upon those wtaching: "More
needs she the divine than the physician” (V.i.82).
The mental attitudes of Macbeth differ markedly from
those of Iago who, as rationalist, tells Roderigo— ’’Thou
know'st we work by wit and not by witchcraft.” The
witches in Macbeth are real since Banquo sees them too
and since they give such specific information regarding
the birth of Macduff and the uses made of the trees from
Birnam Wood; but the witches also serve as emblems of
Macbeth’s tremendous powers of imagination. The witches’
prophecy startles Macbeth at first because it is almost
as if they have been reading his mind, and the words of
Banquo have little effect upon Macbeth because they
reveal what he already subconsciously knows to be true:
And oftentimes, to win us to our harm,
The instruments of darkness tell us truths,
Win us with honest trifles, to betray ’s 
In deepest consequence. (I.iii.123-6)
Preferring not to dwell upon the probability of the 
witches’ evil, Macbeth must contend with the dark, un­
natural yearnings within his own soul:
/Aside/ This supernatural soliciting 
Cannot be ill, cannot be good. ...
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs,
Against the use of nature? (I.iii.130-7)
The doctor who first introduces the subject of the
English king’s remarkable faith-healing and prophetic
powers thus serves an important function. Through the 
comments of Malcolm and the doctor, Shakespeare contrasts 
two individuals, both of whom are kings and both of whom 
are visionaries. One, a mystic attuned to the higher 
laws of Reason and Nature, serves as a symbol of rational 
order based upon Christian neo-Platonism— an unusual norm 
to be sure, but the only possible one if the character of 
Macbeth is considered deeply. The other, also a mystic, 
fails to dedicate himself to either the powers of good 
or the powers of evil. This, in fact, is Hecate’s com­
plaint about Macbeth:
And, -'which is worse, all you have done 
Hath been but for a wayward son,
Spiteful and wrathful, who, as others do,
Loves for his own ends, not for you. (Illvv.10-13)
Neither saint nor black magician, Macbeth lacks the 
discipline to keep his powers from suppressing his reason 
Macbeth possesses a tremendously creative imagina­
tion, and he demonstrates the range of his powers in a 
soliloquy (II.i.33-64) that verifies his lack of rational 
control:
Is this a dagger which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee 
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible 
To feeling as to sight? Or art thou but 
A dagger of the mind, a. false creation.
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
I see thee yet, in form as palpable 
As this which now I draw.
Thou marshalfst me the way that I was going,
And such an instrument I was to use. (II«i*33-43)
Well might he have said to the witches, "Thou marshal'st 
me the way that I was going.” The three apparitions in 
the witches’ scene (IV.i)— the armed head, the bloody 
child, and the crowned child— reveal the hero’s conscious 
fear of Macduff, who did not appear at the banquet, his 
unconscious plan to revenge himself upon Macduff’s chil­
dren, and his despair over the fact that he has no heirs 
himself. Macbeth allows himself to be deceived by the 
words of the apparitions, but their visual meaning is 
nonetheless clear. Finally, Macbeth torments himself 
by asking to see that which he has probably already 
intuited— the royal line of succession stemming from 
Banquo. The third and fourth apparitions thus reveal 
the workings of an ego obsessed with the idea of perpet­
uating itself (Cf. Aaron).
Macbeth’s psychic experiences likewise reveal the 
rebellious throbbings of his repressed conscience.
After murdering Duncan, Macbeth hears a voice calling 
"Sleep no more!” throughout all the house, but Lady 
Macbeth tells him not to think "So brainsickly of things." 
The ghost of Banquo evokes from Macbeth an outburst that 
differs considerably from Brutus’ cool retort to the 
ghost of Caesar: "Why, I will see thee at Philippi
then." However, Brutus does unnecessarily awaken those 
in his tent, apparently for purposes of satisfying 
himself that the ghost was not a figment of his
imagination. In contrast to Brutus, Macbeth behaves 
almost hysterically when he sees the ghost of Banquo 
occupying his chair at the banquet table. The ghost does 
not speak to Macbeth but since Macbeth has already heard 
voices and seen incorporeal substances, the ghost could 
easily be another of Macbeth’s psychological hallucina­
tions. However, to view all of his psychic experiences 
as being products of a guilty conscience is, I feel, to 
miss something very essential about Shakespeare's villain- 
hero. Macbeth's conscious and unconscious are so closely 
attuned as to suggest the possibility of unusual poetic- 
prophetic gifts, if his thoughts had turned in some other 
direction.
As the villainy of Macbeth offers a contrast to that 
of Lady Macbeth, so too it differs from that of 
Aufidius, the rational villain who appears in 
Coriolanus. The hero, Caius Marcius Coriolanus, is an 
aristocratic military leader who scorns the common 
people. As a man of extraordinary courage and immense 
pride, Coriolanus refuses to cater to those whom he 
considers lowly, despite Rome's republican politics. 
Coriolanus' attitude thus proves unfortunate and 
eventually leads to his banishment from Rome— the 
people hate him for his pride. Menenius, anielderly 
temperate nobleman, serves as one of the persons 
representing rational order in the play. He himself
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has good rapport with the common people, but he tells
Coriolanus' mother:
Before he should thus stoop to the herd, but that 
The violent fit o T the time craves it as physic 
For the whole state, I would put mine armor on, 
Which I can scarcely bear. (III.ii.32-5)
Everything that Coriolanus says about the commoners
Shakespeare shows in the play to be true: They are
cowardly, self-seeking, and easily swayed. Victims of
their own insupportable pride, they resent Coriolanus*
ability to let his exploits speak for themselves.
Instead, they demand that he humble himself before their
voting power. The democratic principles of modern
society make it difficult to accept a hero such as
Coriolanus; and despite our society*s worship of
athletic superstars, we generally prefer to think of
heroes, especially tragic heroes, as having something
more than physical prowess to admire. Whatever the
social conditioning that might color our views,
Menenius * assessment of Coriolanus holds true in the
context of Shakespeare’s play:
His nature is too noble for the world.
He would not flatter Neptune for his trident,
Or Jove for *s power to thunder. His heart’s
his mouth—
What his breast forges, that his tongue must vent, 
And being angry, does forget that ever 
He heard the name of death. (III.i.255-60)
Coriolanus’ shortcomings enable Aufidius, the
envious Volscian leader, to arrange the death of ';
the Roman hero so that it appears to be a rash action 
brought on by Coriolanus’ contemptuous braggadocio rather 
than the premeditated murder that it is. Recalling the 
psychological ploys used by Shakespeare's other rational 
villains, Aufidius decides to goad Coriolanus into the 
anger that will trigger his pride, arouse the hostility 
of commoners who are with him, and give the conspir­
ators their chance to strike him down. Aufidius 
achieves this end by taunting Coriolanus about the in­
fluence of Virgilia his wife and Volumnia his mother 
in getting him to drop his plan of attacking Rome, his 
former home. When Aufidius addresses Coriolanus as 
"thou boy of tears," he hits the right psychological key; 
for Coriolanus is the product of his strong-willed 
mother, Volumnia, who in trying to keep her son from 
becoming a sissy, created a military hero of extraordi­
nary physical capabilities, immense pride, and little 
charity. Censure of the murder by the lords who praise 
Coriolanus' qualities and lament his death no doubt 
contributes to Aufidius' feelings of self-reproach and 
superficial repentance after having successfully 
plotted the downfall of the hero. As a villain,
Aufidius bears resemblance to Cassius; but Coriolanus 
is as much a victim of his own tragic flaw as he is a 
victim of Aufidius* conspiracy against him.
Although Cvmbeline appears in the first folio among
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the tragedies, it is actually a tragi-comedy whose heroes 
lack greatness of proportion and whose villains lack 
power. In the worlds of Shakespearean comedy, tragi­
comedy, and dramatic romance, rational villainy functions 
in a way that differs from its role in tragedy. Thus, 
in the following chapter I have treated all of these 
types as comedies, and I have included Cymbeline within 
this group. The comedies are characterized by happy 
endings that show clarification of misunderstandings, 
forgiveness of wrongs, reuniting of loved ones, and other 
such outcomes to situations that were formerly unsatisfac­
tory. These plays also contain a large number of surprises 
as well as an inordinate number of coincidences. Good 
characters and bad alike resort to uses of disguise and 
deception. In a world of seeming moral relativity, as 
for example when the king forces an unwilling Bertram to 
marry Helena (All's Well That Ends Well). the presence 
of a powerful villain-rationalist would necessitate 
Shakespeare's establishing a rational norm for the play, 
similar to those found in the tragedies. Such a rational 
basis does exist in varying degrees from comedy to comedy, 
but it is usually less clearly developed than in the 
tragedies. Either thwarted completely or only partially 
successful, rational villainy nonetheless has a special 
place in the comedies. Although the following chapter 
traces the villains of the early comedies through to
those of the dramatic romances, discussion focuses upon 
five villains: Shylock, Don John, Angelo, Dionyza,
and Iachimo. The plays in which these characters appear 
suggest the existence of a basic compatibility between 
the comic world and the Shakespearean attitude toward 
rational villainy.
V I . THE COMEDIES
Shakespeare wrote mainly comedies and histories while 
he was a member of the Lord Chamberlain’s Company, and to 
this phase of his career belong The Merchant of Venice 
(1595-6) and Much Ado About Nothing (1598). Pericles 
and Cymbeline exhibit the last phase of Shakespeare’s 
dramatic work, which dates from 1608, the year in which 
the King’s Men took over the Blackfriars theater. The 
plays belonging to this last period are generally clas­
sified as dramatic romances or melodramas, but basically 
they are comedies with tragic overtones.
Although villainy has no power in the comic world, 
yet it holds a place of special significance. Despite 
the usual absence of tragic consequences, the comic 
world can mete out proper punishment to its villains, 
whether for Dionyza’s attempted murder of Pericles’ 
daughter or Don John’s petty slander of Hero. Nowhere 
is it clearer than in Shakespeare’s comedies that 
legality and justice are not necessarily one and the same. 
Often, villainy helps to expose the moral weaknesses of 
basically worthwhile individuals such as Claudio (Much 
Ado) and Posthumus and to test the virtuous capacities 
of characters such as Imogen and Isabella. Serving as a 
vehicle through which protagonists can come to know 
themselves, villainy in the comedies does not purchase
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awareness at the price of death, as it most often does in 
the tragedies. Rather, Shakespeare shows villainy in 
the comedies to have regenerative moral effects on 
characters whose spiritual potential is being tried, and 
frequently these effects extend to the villains themselves.
The villains of the comedies are not rationalists in the 
sense that Iago and Edmund are rationalists, but their 
reliance upon tricks, schemes, and other methods of 
duplicity nevertheless classifies them as villains of 
reason.
Because Proteus in The Two Gentlemen of Verona 
displays the methods of the rationalist and the motives 
of the lover, his villainy is somewhat contradictory.
A petty villain who betrays both his friend and his. 
lady, Proteus is as shallow and changing as Claudio in 
Much Ado About Nothing. Proteus’ practiced deceit 
elevates his awareness above that of the other persons 
in the play. By feigning reluctance to undertake the 
task assigned to him by the Duke and Thurio, Proteus 
displays the rationalist’s tendency to use psychology 
upon those whom he wishes to deceive. Thus Proteus 
demonstrates a degree of human understanding, although 
like Claudio and Angelo he hardly knows himself at all. 
Proteus’ emotional immaturity actually makes him incap­
able of love. Still, he has fooled Valentine, Thurio, 
and the Duke into thinking him "Love’s firm votary."
That Proteus* self-awareness has occurred fully at the 
moment he first expresses contrition seems unlikely. In 
all probability, he would have accepted Valentine’s 
offer; but Julia? s. swoon prevents our seeing; what,
Proteus* reaction to the generous gesture of his friend 
will be. At this point in the play, however, Proteus 
can acknowledge with more than common understanding:
"Oh, Heaven, were man/But constant, he were perfect I"
In both the comedies and dramatic romances, one finds 
a worldview in which love has been used to represent 
the ideal of immutability. Proteus is only one in a 
line of such gentlemen to follow and although these 
are not villains, strictly speaking, they nevertheless 
represent the principles of irrationality— infidelity 
and changeability. The villain in Shakespeare’s earliest 
romantic comedy thus sets the stage for such romantic 
heroes as Claudio (Much Ado) and Posthumus. But in 
the later comedies of Shakespeare, the theme of moral 
regeneration has been treated with much greater care 
and ease of handling.
The most well-developed villain to appear in any 
of the comedies is Shylock, and the role may be played 
as an almost fairytale portrait of wickedness or with 
its tragic implications laid bare. While this latter 
interpretation may take too much attention away from 
Antonio the main character, an aura of tragedy nonetheless
hangs about the head of Shylock, an articulate villain
whose words carry strong emotional impact:
...I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a 
Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, 
passions? Fed with the same food, hurt With the 
same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed 
by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same 
winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick 
us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not 
laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if 
you wrong us, shall we not revenge? (III.i.60-9)
As villain, Shylock represents a curious mixture of
emotionalism and rationalism, and it is perhaps more
indicative of his Judaism than his rationalism that he
stands by the letter of the law in claiming the pound
of flesh from Antonio. Despite Shylock1s legalistic
quality of mind, he identifies himself with non-reason:
As there is no firm reason to be rendered 
Why he cannot abide a gaping pig,
Why he, a harmless necessary cat,
Why he, a woolen bagpipe, but of force 
Must yield to such inevitable shame 
As to offend, himself being offended,
So can I give no reason, nor I will not,
More than a lodged hate and a certain loathing 
I bear Antonio, that I follow thus 
A losing suit against him. Are you answered?
(IV.i.53-62)
While the audience realizes that Shylock’s action is 
indeed as irrational as he indicates, the moneylender 
himself does not really believe so. Shylock's admission 
of non-reason merely stresses his cynical certainty that 
no one except perhaps Tubal is capable of understanding 
his motives, even if he were to state them in plain 
words. Shylock, however, has already provided the
audience with the following information in an aside:
I hate him for he is a Christian,
But more for that in low simplicity 
He lends out money gratis and brings down 
The rate of usance here with us in Venice.
If I can catch him once upon the hip,
I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him.
He hates our sacred nation, and he rails 
Even there where merchants most do congregate,
On me, my bargains, and my. well-won thrift,
Which he calls interest. Cursed be my tribe 
If I forgive him! (I.iii.43-53)
Later, as he readies himself to attend the Christians’
dinner, Shylock complains:
...But wherefore should I go?
I am not bid for love, they flatter me.
But yet I'll go in hate, to feed upon 
The prodigal Christian. (II.v.12-15)
Shylock has good reason to feel the way that he does
about the Christians who appear in The Merchant of
Venice, but his views are also exaggerated. After
reminding Antonio of the indignities that the latter
has dealt to the Jewish race, Shylock agrees to lend
the merchant money; and Antonio, foolishly accepting
the terms of the loan, erroneously interprets Shylock's
willingness to lend him the sum as a sign of the Jew's
latent goodness and generosity:
Hie thee, gentle Jew.
The Hebrew will turn Christian. He grows kind.
(I.iii.178-9)
In The Merchant of Venice Shakespeare plays the 
somber usury of Shylock against the adventurous finan­
cial enterprises of Antonio the merchant and Bassanio 
his friend. The basic goodness of Antonio and Bassanio
does not alter the fact that they, too, dream about 
ducats. With Antonio’s fortunes sailing somewhere 
upon the seas and Bassanio’s hopes hinging upon his 
ability to choose the correct casket, Shakespeare 
underscores the worldliness of the Italian port city that 
serves as his setting. Humanity itself, symbolized 
by the pound of flesh, has become a saleable commodity 
in a place where fortunes are suddenly won and lost.
The realism of Venice, however, is offset by Belmont—  
a fairytale world in which suitors for the hand of 
Portia must agree to depart from the castle and never 
to marry if they choose the wrong casket. Though Portia’s 
father has set these conditions upon her marriage, she 
in effect chooses Bassanio for herself. Portia’s use 
of the word hazard (III.ii.2) will probably filter 
back into Bassanio’s unconsciousness when he reads the 
inscription on the leaden casket, "Who chooseth me, must 
give and hazard all he hath.” Portia’s song about 
Fancy is likewise meant to aid Bassanio by warning him, 
indirectly, to stay away from the gold and silver 
caskets.
The villainy of Shylock provides the means by which 
Portia can ransom her husband from the rival affections 
of Antonio. Portia’s love for Bassanio is complicated 
by neither materialistic motives nor by emotional 
commitments to anyone else. Although the same cannot
he said of Bassanio,, Port id nonetheless. re cognises , 
her husband’s worth. The villainy of Shylock thus be­
comes a vehicle through which Portia can demonstrate 
her love for Bassanio as being no less than that of his 
friend, the melancholic Antonio, who seems not only wil­
ling to die but also a little overanxious for Bassanio 
to witness his death: T,Pray God Bassanio come/To see me
pay his debt, and then I care not!" At the trial, 
Antonio tells his friend, "Grieve not that I am fallen 
to this for you"; and later,
Commend me to your honorable wife.
Tell her the process of Antonio’s end...
And when the tale is told, bid her be judge
Whether Bassanio had not once a love. (IV.i.273-77)
There can be little doubt, it seems, that Antonio un­
consciously intends for his death to place even Bassanio’ 
soul in hock to his friendship. Through Shakespeare’s 
portrait of Antonio, the poet implies that Portia’s 
intelligence, like her father’s is almost other worldly 
in its intuitive grasp of human subtleties. At 
Antonio’s insistence, Bassanio parts with his wife's 
ring; but by the end of the play, the audience feels 
distinctly that he will never do so again.
To Elizabethan theatergoers Antonio's melancholia 
signified a particular character-type representing one 
of the four humors, but modern readers are as apt 
to detect a death wish at the core of Antonio's grim
bargain. Shylock for one has no illusions about the
risks involved in Antonio’s fortunes:
He hath an argosy bound to Tripolis, another to 
the Indies. I understand, moreover, upon the 
Rialto, he hath a third at Mexico, a fourth for 
England, and other ventures he hath, squandered 
abroad. But ships are but boards, sailors but 
men. There be land rats and water rats, water 
thieves and land thieves— I mean pirates. .And 
then there is the peril of waters, winds, and 
rocks. (I.iii.lS-25)
And the terms Shylock sets for the bond merely confirm
his faith in the fickleness of fortunes such as those
of Antonio and Bassanio. If Antonio likewise has this
realization, he hides his fears from Bassanio in the
same way that he hides them from his other friends
during the opening scene of the play. Shylock attempts
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to defend his love for monetary increase by retelling 
the Biblical story of Jacob and Laban (Genesis 30:32-43) 
and Antonio’s reply, by stressing discrepancies in ap­
pearance and reality, offers incisive insight into the 
nature of rational villainy:
Mark you this, Bassanio,
The Devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.
An evil soul producing holy witness 
Is like a villain with a smiling cheek.
A goodly apple rotten at the heart.
Oh, what a goodly outside falsehood hath!
(I.iii.97-103)
Unfortunately, Antonio loses his reservations when
Shylock lends him the three thousand ducats. Shylock’s
splenetic hatred implies a host of wretched victims of
his moneylending practices while the defections of
Launcelot and Jessica from Shylock's household also help 
to round out the picture of his villainy. A man without 
love, Shylock misses his ducats more than he misses his 
daughter. Although he leaves Jessica alone in the 
house, Shylock has misgivings:
I am right loath to go.
There is some ill abrewing toward my rest,
For I did dream of moneybags tonight. (II.V.16-S)
After Shylock learns of his daughter's flight with some 
of his money, Salahio cautions : "Let good Antonio look
he keep his day/Or he shall pay for this."
Shylock*s classification as an alien is both 
literal and symbolic pertaining more perhaps to his 
inhumanity than to his Jewishness, at least in context 
of the play. By demanding a pound of human flesh, 
Shylock breaks faith with the common bond that exists 
among all men. Many times he is given the opportunity 
to show mercy, and in every instance he refuses. When 
Shylock sees that he has been defeated' by Christian 
cunning, he offers to accept just the principal of 
the sum he lent. But Portia refuses to quit until she 
has charged Shylock with capital crimes carrying the 
death penalty or, in other words, until she has mer­
cilessly demonstrated the meaning of mercy. Although 
news of the safe arrival of Antonio's ships seems to . 
have been saved rather casually for the finale, the 
playwright probably wishes to stress the fact that
Antonio actually believes himself to be nearly penni­
less when he awards his share of the court settlement to 
Shylock’s heirs.
Even if Antonio’s militant Christianity seems 
distasteful nowadays, The Merchant of Venice neverthe­
less functions as an apology for Christian charity. 
Shakespeare sets the themes of Antonio’s generosity and 
Shylock’s miserliness against the contrapuntal strains of 
Old Testament justice and New Testament mercy, thereby 
producing a comedy of high seriousness and rich tones.
The villain of the piece remains recalcitrant, at least 
to the extent that Shakespeare has given no indication of 
Shylock’s becoming any better as a Christian than he was 
as a Jew. The ending of the play is therefore correct. 
While the Christian characters in The Merchant of 
Venice may believe that their imposition upon Shylock’s 
religious convictions may turn the tide in saving his 
soul, the audience need not accept such an easy solution 
to the moneylender’s moral problems. Yet, from the 
ashes of Shylock’s intended villainy arise the secure 
futures of Jessica and Lorenzo, the love of Portia and 
Bassanio, and the unconditional charity of Antonio.
The main plot of Shakespeare’s Much Ado About 
Nothing revolves around the activities of Don John, a 
minor figure in the play. However, as G.B.Harrison 
has observed in the Introduction to this comedy,
He /Don John7is more important in person than in 
dialogue. He is a man of few words and therefore 
in the reading we are likely to overlook him. But 
when the play is adequately acted, with Don John 
malevolently brooding in the background, con­
spicuous and sinister in his silence, the story 
becomes far more effective.!
The illegitimate brother of Don Pedro the prince,
Don John relishes feelings of hatred without seriously
attempting to justify their cause. One can gather
easily enough, however, that the nature of his complaint
is much like Edmund’s in King Lear. Of his own villainy,
Don John remarks:
I had rather be a canker in a hedge than a rose 
in his grace, and it better fits my blood to be 
disdained of all than to fashion a carriage to rob 
love from any. In this, though I cannot be said 
to be a flattering honest man, it must not be 
denied but I am a plain-dealing villain.(I.iii.27-33)
Actually, Don John can hardly be referred to as "plain- 
dealing." His lie to Claudio that Don Pedro intends to 
court Hero for himself prepares us to view Claudio’s ac­
ceptance of Don John’s slander of Hero as somehow ap­
proaching the inexcusable. What seems even worse, 
Claudio’s vicious gullibility leads him to decide that 
he will accuse Hero during their marriage ceremony, 
before the whole congregation. Although Don John is the
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main villain of the play, it is actually Borachio who 
plans the deceptive love scene at Hero’s chamber window 
for Don Pedro and Claudio to see. Yet, Borachio recognizes 
the subordinate role he plays. As he tells Conrade about 
the money he received from Don John, Borachio comments that 
’’when rich villains have need of poor ones, poor ones may 
make what price they will.” Shakespeare plays his trio of 
villains— Don John, Borachio, and Conrade— against his 
clowns. Ironically, if Leonato had tried harder to un­
derstand Dogberry, he could have stopped the plot at the 
wedding altar. More importantly, the comical efforts of 
Dogberry, Verges, and the Watch help to relieve suspense 
by reassuring us that tragedy is not really so near as 
it seems: Two villains have already been found out, even
if by the wildest of ratiocinative means.
Villainy in Much Ado About Nothing does not go 
undetected, but neither is it apprehended by means of 
the lower reason. In confessing his crimes before Don 
Pedro and Claudio, for instance, Borachio says of the 
clowns : ’’What your wisdoms could not discover, these
shallow fools have brought to light....” It is the 
instinctive honesty of Dogberry, Verges, and the Watch, 
that enables them to root out the evil lurking in the 
streets on the eve of Hero’s wedding. Beatrice likewise 
recognizes her cousin’s innocence, and she commands 
Benedick to kill Claudio for the outrageous indignity he
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committed against her cousin. Whereas Claudio has based 
his love upon physical appearances only, the love of 
Beatrice and Benedick represents a meeting of intellects. 
Benedick is unsure of Claudio’s guilt until Beatrice avows 
that she knows her cousin’s innocence from the depths of 
her own "soul." Thus Benedick submits to her request. 
Benedick’s wonderful parodic references to Beatrice (my 
Lady Disdain, my Lady Tongue) and to Claudio (Monsieur 
Love, my Lord Lack-beard) demonstrate his ability to pen­
etrate appearances as these apply to the conventions of 
love. Beatrice has similar perceptions, and therefore 
she too has become cynical. Fortunately, the intuitions 
of their friends bring Benedick and Beatrice together.
The clowns and Beatrice represent an instinctive goodness 
that prevents their being taken in by the deception al­
though Benedick, Antonio, and Leonato later reach the 
same conclusion. In addition, there is Friar Francis’ 
goodness, which enables him to reason correctly from the 
evidence before him and thereby to conclude that the 
lady has been wronged.
The slanderous tongue of Don John should never have 
found willing ears. But Claudio is no Imogen, and so he 
must be taught a lesson. When conscience-stricken 
Borachio attempts to accept total responsibility for the 
crime, Leonato points the finger at others as well, 
including Claudio and Don Pedro. Claudio agrees to
perform whatever penance Leonato demands but he feels 
that his only sin was in "mistaking." Claudio’s moment 
of recognition does not really occur until he prays 
before the tomb of the supposedly dead Hero. To keep 
alive the remembrance of his complicitous guilt in her 
death, Claudio promises to re-enact a yearly ritual of 
tribute to her memory. Also, he agrees to marry the 
daughter of Leonato1s brother sight unseen. Thus he now 
accepts a bride (Hero in disguise) on grounds other 
than those of mere physical appearances. He insists 
that even if she were an Ethiope, "I’ll hold my mind" —  
a far cry from the changeability that led him to suspect 
Don Pedro first, and later Hero. The moral weaknesses 
of Claudio, however, in no way equal the guilt of Borachio, 
Conrade, and Margaret who surely realized her part in 
the plot, if not before and during her scene with Borachio 
then at least after Hero had been publicly accused. 
Nevertheless, the audience feels satisfied when Benedick 
promises to devise "brave punishments" for Don John.
In Much Ado About Nothing as in The Two Gentlemen of 
Verona, villainy serves as a medium through which individ­
uals can come to know themselves. In the former play it 
is the villain who experiences regeneration and in the 
latter it is the hero. That the playwright would have 
identified his theme of "constancy" with Platonism is 
suggested, moreover, by the manner in which he treated
love in "The Phoenix and the Turtle." Too, the comedies 
bear a thematic resemblance to the sonnets. These works 
imply a degree of sympathy toward Platonism whereas the 
rational basis of the histories and the tragedies seems 
more dependent upon the Aristotelian concept of reason. 
If, however, Shakespeare did in fact incline toward 
Platonic doctrines he would have had difficulty in 
reconciling his views to the idea of villainy. But in 
attempting to deal with this problem as it relates to 
the comedies, one risks the danger of overinterpretation; 
for the comic world itself is ample reason to absolve 
all of its participants, including villains, from 
harsh judgment. Don John is one of few comic villains 
to pay for his crimes. Even so, it might be added that 
Benedick’s resolve to punish the villain is made in such 
joyful tones that one could easily assume the "brave 
punishments" to mean little more than perhaps a public 
dunking in a tub of water, if indeed that terrible.
Don John and later Iachimo must appear as petty villains 
next to Iago, for neither practices upon someone of 
Othello’s stature. Yet, Don John and Iachimo manifest 
essentially the same type of villainous approach as that 
used by Iago. The legal punishment for slander hardly 
ever seems to equal its evil potential, however, and it 
is perhaps for this reason that Shakespeare found this 
type of villainy challenging enough to explore so often
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in his plays.
The two villains in As You Like It. Oliver and 
Duke Frederick the usurper, are egotists whose jealousy 
of their brothers has prompted each to attempt murder. 
Although Oliver has done his best to turn Orlando into 
a fool by depriving him of an education, the latter 
possesses so many natural good qualities that all who 
meet him soon recognize this fact— including Oliver, who 
bitterly complains that he himself is ’’misprised.’’ The 
enviousness of Oliver and Frederick recalls the villainy 
of Claudius, in addition to that of Iago and Cassius; 
and they seem to share with these tragic villains the 
same degree of intensity in responding to this emotion. 
However, both villains in As You Like It undergo conver­
sion experiences, and Oliver’s is so complete as to make 
him even capable of love. By the time of Shakespeare's 
middle period, villainy in the comedies begins to assume 
a more sinister shape. The themes of repentance and 
forgiveness, moreover, are treated with greater serious­
ness as characters struggle to work out their moral flaws 
while in the process of overcoming obstacles to their 
worldly happiness. Thus, As You Like It stands as the 
last of the joyous comedies.
Following Twelfth Night and Troilus and Cressida. 
Shakespeare wrote Measure for Measure (1604)* This play 
has been designated as one of Shakespeare’s ’’problem
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plays," a term first used by F.S. Boas and later by other 
critics. A problem play is one that contains ethical 
difficulties. All's Well That Ends Well (1602-3) also 
belongs to this group, its very title suggesting the 
non-Aristotelian idea that the end justifies the means.
In Measure for Measure. Shakespeare uses for his villain 
a man that does not at first know himself. But then, 
neither does his heroine whose forthcoming marriage at 
the end of the play seems far away from her intentions 
of entering a cloistered religious order and from her 
complaint that the rules of the order are not strict 
enough. Both Angelo and Isabella represent untried . 
chastity, much as the proverbial medieval knight’s, but 
Isabella refuses to yield to temptation whereas Angelo 
degenerates into a murderous reprobate and hypocrite.
W.W. Lawrence has pointed to Shakespeare’s use of material 
from folk legends in having the Duke of Vienna mingle 
unrecognized among his people. Acting the part of a 
slightly imperfect God-figure, the duke understands that 
Angelo’s virtue is of an unknown quantity:
Good discussions of All’s Well That Ends Well and 
Measure for Measure are to be found in E.M.W. Tillyard, 
Shakespeare’s Problem Plavs (London: University of
Toronto Press, 1950); and W.W. Lawrence, Shakespeare’s 
Problem Comedies (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1931).
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Lord Angelo is precise,
Stands at a guard with envy, scarce confesses 
That his blood flows or that his appetite 
Is more to bread than stone. Hence shall we see,
If power change purpose, what our seemers be.
(I.iii.50-4)
Actually, the duke had his doubts when Angelo backed out 
of his pre-contract with Mariana when her dowry with her 
brother was lost at sea. That alone, however, has not 
been sufficient to convince the duke of Angelo's worth­
lessness, for there may have been some question of the 
lady's honor. By becoming Mariana's confessor during 
the period of his disguise, the duke learns that Angelo's 
insinuations at the time had indeed been false, although 
Angelo had perhaps rationalized himself into thinking 
them true.
The following comic exchange between Lucio and a
gentleman prepares the audience for what it is soon to
learn about Angelo's virtuous austerity:
Lucio. Thou concludest like the sanctimonious pirate 
that went to sea with the Ten Commandments, but 
scraped one out of the table.
2. Gent. 'Thou shalt not steal?'
Lucio. Aye, that he razed. (I.ii.7-11)
One of the first things that Angelo does when he assumes
office is, predictably, to launch an all-out attack upon
the local bawds. But his municipal clean-up program
claims a serious victim; and that is Claudio, brother of
Isabella, who has got his intended wife with child. As
he awaits execution, Claudio explains the extenuating
circumstances of his relationship with Juliet:
Upon a true contract 
I got possession of Julietta’s bed.
You know the lady. She is fast ray wife,
Save that we do the denunciation lack 
Of outward order. This we came not to,
Only for propagation of a dower 
Remaining in the coffer of her friends,
From whom we thought it meet to hide our love
Till time had made them for us. But it chances
The stealth of our most mutual entertainment 
With character too gross is writ on Juliet.
(I.ii.149-59)
Although a great deal has been said about the marriage 
contracts in Measure for Measure. Shakespeare himself 
does not take any great pains to quibble, except perhaps 
in allowing Claudio’s to be clandestine while Angelo's 
is not. Isabella takes an absolutist moral position that 
is as disappointing and yet as necessary as Hal’s re­
jection of Falstaff; but she does not wrong her brother:
Better it were a brother died at once
Than that a sister, by redeeming him,
Should die forever. (II.iv.l05-s)
Isabella does, however, wrong Mariana. Like The Merchant 
of Venice, the play explores the themes of justice and 
mercy; and though Isabella admits that her brother's 
sentence is just, yet she would have Mariana perform 
essentially the same act that Juliet has committed, 
but that she herself would never commit, in order to 
save her brother. Despite the narrowness of her vision, 
Shakespeare’s heroine is nonetheless virtuous. The play­
wright’s use of the duke in Measure for Measure probably
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recalls the Greek legend about Zeus’ disguising himself 
as a beggar to test the hospitable practices of his people. 
It is up to the duke to test his people also. Moreover, 
he takes upon himself the task of straightening out for the 
characters some aspect of their behavior as it relates to 
the theme of the play: "Like doth quit like, and measure
still for measure." Thus, he declines to tell Isabella 
of her brother’s safety so that he can test her sense of 
justice toward Mariana. Tyrone Guthrie, in his Preface to 
the Heritage edition of Shakespeare's comedies, has of­
fered the following observation:
I have never seen one of these great Finales 
played with anything approaching adequate brilliance. 
The technical demands are too great. But I have 
seen blinding flashes. I recall particularly, in a 
production of Measure for Measure by Peter Brook, 
the impact of Isabella’s forgiveness of Angelo.
Nothing is said. The text gives no indication of 
the moment. The effect is made by a sudden pause 
after whirlwind speed, by a profound silence after 
tumult, by stillness after movement— in short, by 
technical means inaccessible to a Reader, but which 
are the very fabric of good Theatre.3
By joining Mariana to plead for the life of the man she 
thinks executed her brother, Isabella shows that she has 
indeed passed the trial by fire.
Whereas most of Shakespeare's villains have little 
trouble in deciding upon a course of villainy, Angelo at
3william Shakespeare: The Comedies. ed. by 
Peter Alexander (New York: The Heritage Press, 195^), 
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least. displays something of a conscience-struggle.
Angelo has fooled even himself by his sanctimoniousness. 
When given absolute authority that makes him beholden to 
no one, all of Angelo’s defenses come tumbling down and 
he gives free rein to his passions. Isabella hits the 
right psychological key, unfortunately, when she asks 
Angelo to search inside himself to see if he can discover 
any fault like her brother’s. The scene ends with a 
soliloquy (II.iii.l62-l$7) that clearly describes the 
conflict within Angelo. "Oh, let her brother live," 
he says at one point; but more important are the last 
lines of his speech: "Ever till now/When men were fond,
I smiled, and wondered how." Like Shylock, Angelo pre­
sents a curious mixture of emotionalism and rationalism. 
Now, when Angelo exclaims, "Ha! Fie, these filthy vices!" 
he plays the hypocrite and not simply the self-righteous 
prude. At this point, too, his struggle within himself 
ceases. He becomes the true villain by confronting 
Isabella with an imperative— She must submit to Angelo, 
or Claudio will die.
In keeping with the comic spirit, Shakespeare has 
taken the edge off our worries by having the disguised 
duke visit the prison. Since Measure for Measure does 
give us an essentially comic world, in which everything 
works out for the best, we cannot gaze too closely at its 
ethics, and wonder about dukes who disguise themselves as
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friars and hear confessions. Actually, the only serious 
dilemma seems to be Isabella’s; but that is really more of 
a problem to moderns than it was to either Shakespeare 
or Isabella. After getting the wronged Mariana to sub­
stitute for Isabella by means of a "bed-trick,” the duke 
hies to the prison to await Angelo’s rescinding of the 
order to execute Claudio. Instead, Angelo confirms the 
previous sentence and asks that the head of Claudio be 
sent to him. The untimely death of another prisoner 
enables the duke to fulfill the order issued by his 
proxy. Meanwhile, he is gaining a very good understanding 
of Angelo’s character. Compromising a woman’s virtue is 
bad enough, but going ahead with the execution of her 
brother out-evils evil, even if both plans do miscarry.
To soften somewhat the audience's hatred of Angelo and 
prepare them for the mercy he finally receives, the 
playwright shows his villain’s inner conflicts once 
again:
He should have lived,
Save that his riotous youth, with dangerous sense,
Might in the times to come have ta’en revenge
By so receiving a dishonored life
With ransom of such shame. Would yet he had lived!
Alack, when once our grace we have forgot,
Nothing goes right. We would, and we would not.
(IV.iv.31-37)
Claudio’s reconciliation to death as well as his desire 
to receive pardon from his sister gives plausibility to 
•Angelo’s argument and suggests that Angelo's evil, though 
back, is not so black as it first appears. Despite the
duke’s giving Angelo a number of chances to confess his 
crimes, Angelo remains the liar until Lucio pulls off 
the friar's hood, thereby revealing Duke Vincentio. At 
this point Angelo confesses:
0 my dread lord,
I should be guiltier than rav guiltiness
To think I can be undiscernible
When I perceive your Grace, like power divine,
Hath looked upon my passes. Then, good Prince,
No longer sessions hold upon my shame,
But let my trial be mine own confession.
Immediate sentence then, and sequent death,
Is all the grace I beg. (V.i.371-9)
To someone of Angelo’s pride, the shame of discovery is 
as a death. And although Angelo emerges from the sit­
uation much better than he deserves, Shakespeare gives 
enough instances of his villain’s inner struggles to 
justify perhaps the words of Mariana:
They say best men are molded out of faults,
And, for the most, become much more the better 
For being a little bad. So may my husband.
(V.i.444-6)
In the comic world of moral relativity, Shakespeare 
sometimes allows certain characters of high authority to 
assume all responsibilities, as it were, for the irregular 
ethical behavior of good individuals. The Duke of Vienna 
in Measure for Measure functions in this manner. The
King of France in All’s Well That Ends Well likewise 
suggests such a figure, while one might perhaps be led 
to believe that if Portia should fail to stop Shylock’s 
plan then the Duke of Venice will probably step in at 
the last minute and do so himself. Don Pedro in Much Ado
About Nothing, however, manipulates events wisely at first 
but later succumbs to appearances and misjudges Hero 
along with the others. Oberon and Prospero likewise 
preside over events that occur although Oberon is in 
fact an immortal whereas Prospero is not. What the 
playwright seems to be suggesting is that certain persons 
such as the Duke of Vienna are to be accepted as possessing 
a sort of moral infallibility, possibly by virtue of their 
divine rights of rulership, while others such as Don Pedro 
are not to be viewed in this manner. Clearly, the plays 
do not provide any sort of blanket testimony to the idea 
that a person may do what he will so long as his motives 
are good. The laws are to be obeyed; but when innocents 
and sometimes even the guilty fall victims to the law, 
then those in authority must weigh all considerations and 
try to arrive at the most merciful verdict possible.
This is easier to do in the comedies, of course, because 
serious catastrophe is averted. Isabella herself argues 
that intentions and thoughts are not the same as the 
acts themselves, although we do find this theory countered 
Pericles. Despite its folk-tale aura, Measure for 
Measure strikes a stronger chord of realism than is to 
be found in Pericles. and so the ending to the latter 
play becomes an almost typical fairytale assurance that 
the good lived happily ever after while the wicked met 
disaster. Still, Shakespeare's comic villains seldom 
receive worse than they deserve, and they usually receive
better. The comedies, in fact, exhibit a great deal of 
humaneness in point of view. Some of the villains meet 
with justice but most find forgiveness and mercy. Although 
the villains of Pericles are punished for evil intentions 
that failed to take the lives of Pericles and his family, 
a murder has in fact taken place. Therefore, Dionyza 
must die and with her Cleon who, though unwilling to join 
her in villainy, became an accomplice through the knowledge 
of his wife’s wrongdoing and refusal to act upon it.
Pericles is not included in the first folio, possibly 
because of its composite authorship. The writer of the 
first two acts is unknown while material in the last 
three acts is recognizably Shakespeare's.^ The main 
villain in the first part of the play is Antiochus, who 
tries to have Pericles killed for being able to solve 
the riddle of the king's incestuous relationship with 
his daughter. Later on in the play we learn that the 
king and his daughter have been killed by a bolt of 
lightning sent by the gods. So much for Antiochus.
Bearing all of the characteristics of the envious ra­
tionalist, Dionyza orders Leonine to murder Marina, the 
daughter of Pericles, because Marina excels her own
^Tracing the images of growth and vegetation in 
Pericles, James 0. Wood argues that the continuity of 
imagery suggests Shakespeare's having written the entire 
play during his early years as playwright and having 
revised the last three acts during his maturity. "The 
Running Image in Pericles," Shakespeare Studies. 5(1970), 
240-52.
daughter in beauty and accomplishments. Since Pericles 
once saved their city from famine, Dionyza and Cleon the 
governor of Tarsus gladly agree to care for Marina as 
though she were their own, until such time as father and 
daughter can be reunited. Dionyza*s disposition changes, 
however, as the seeds of envy and hatred begin to well 
up within her breast. As she instructs Leonine to 
murder Marina, the wife of Cleon uses language that 
reveals an emotionlessness similar to that which we 
earlier find in Lady Macbeth:
Let not conscience,
Which is but cold, inflaming love i* thy bosom, 
Inflame too nicely, nor let pity, which 
Even women have cast off, melt thee, but be 
A soldier to thy purpose. (IV.i„4-b)
Dionyza likewise plays the role of hypocrite, pretending 
to love Marina and Pericles with "more than foreign 
heart." Leonine*s attempt to murder Marina is inter­
rupted by pirates who carry her off to sea. Like her 
mother and father, Marina must endure the sorrows of 
separation from her family as well as hazardous exper­
iences that test both her virtue and her love for her 
missing father. Dionyza rewards Leonine's complicity in 
her scheme by poisoning him, an act of Machiavellian 
rationalism; and when Cleon censures his wife for what 
she has done, Dionyza accuses him of turning a wchild 
again." His subsequent passivity in the face of injus­
tice confirms, moreover, his wife's words: "But yet I
know you'll do as I advise." Though Dionyza*s part is
relatively small, Shakespeare makes the most of her 
rationalism. In the following passage the playwright 
presents with utmost economy of language his villainess’ 
methods, her motives, her rationalizations, and her 
sophistry in seeking to justify her actions to Cleon:
Be it so, then.
Yet none does know but you, how she came dead,
Nor none can know, Leonine being gone.
She did distain my child, and stood between 
Her and her fortunes. None would look on her,
But cast their gazes on Marina's face.
Whilst ours was blurted at, and held a malkin,
Not worth the time of day. It pierced me thorough; 
And though you call ray course unnatural.
You not your child well loving, yet I find 
It greets me as an enterprise of kindness 
Performed to your sole daughter. (IV.iii.2£-39)
After years of hardship and suffering, Pericles and
his family are finally reunited. At the end of the play
Shakespeare pays tribute to Gower, one of the sources
for Pericles, by having the medieval Latin poet speak
the conclusion to the story: When the people learn of
the actions of Cleon and his wife toward the man who saved
their city, they burn the palace with the members of
Cleon's family inside.
Neither Cymbeline nor The Tempest can be termed
"doctrinal,” yet the Christian themes of forgiveness and
mercy are implicit in both plays. Interestingly,
Antonio (The Tempest) does not expressly repent for his
sins in the way that Iachimo and Angelo do. Shakespeare
focuses instead upon Prospero, the hero of The Tempest
and the poet's idealized conception of virtue. Prospero
goes beyond the step of causing those in his power to do 
good. He relinquishes such power altogether, again 
placing his faith in the free use of human will. Moreover, 
he can forgive his brothers without insisting upon any 
ritualistic confessions of guilt and sorrow. Alonso,is 
already penitent, but the same is not necessarily true of 
Sebastian and Antonio when Prospero pardons them outright 
and promises to "tell no tales." While Dionyza is the 
most rationalistic of the villains discussed thus far 
in connection with the comedies, it is not her rationalism 
which makes her more liable to punishment; it is the 
unregenerative spirit of her will. Iachimo, for instance, 
likewise displays more evidence of the rationalist in 
his character than that found in others of Shakespeare’s 
comic villains. But he does not commit murder, as 
Dionyza does; moreover, he confesses his crime and re­
pents, which Dionyza never does. Iachimo’s villainy 
like Don John’s and Iago’s transfers a certain measure 
of responsibility to those who succumb to it; and while 
the lower reason cannot deal easily with this type of 
villainy, yet Shakespeare shows instances in which it 
is met and conquered— by the Friar in Much Ado About 
Nothing and by Imogen in Cvmbeline. Both Imogen and 
Friar Francis display an ability to read the evidence 
before them and to reason from it correctly in deter­
mining the innocence of the one being slandered.
Cvmbeline actually contains two rational villains,
but one of them belongs more to the world of Cinderella
and Sleeping Beauty than to the world of real men. I
refer, of course, to Cymbeline's Queen, a wicked-stepmother
archetype, who attempts to disclaim her role as such:
No, be assured you shall not find me, Daughter,
After the slander of most stepmothers,
Evil-eyed unto you. (I.i.69-71)
The Queen has managed to fool King Cymbeline, but neither
Imogen nor Dr. Cornelius has any illusions about her
evil intentions. She has caused Cymbeline to banish
Posthumus because his marriage to Imogen has upset the
Queen’s plan for Imogen to marry Cloten, the Queen’s
brutish son by a former husband. One of the lords in
the play exclaims fittingly of Cloten: "That such a
crafty devil as is his mother/Should yield the world
this ass I" Despite Posthumus’ deplorable behavior in
trying to get Pisanio to murder Imogen when he thinks
her unfaithful, there is never any doubt that Imogen
has acted wisely in choosing a husband for herself.
Cloten is unregenerative, largely because of the way in
which Shakespeare portrays his brutality and lack of
awareness. Despite the confession of her crimes the
Queen is likewise an unregenerate, repenting "The evils
she hatched were not effected, so/Despairing died."
The conversation that opens Cvmbeline presents a
rapid exposition of what has already taken place at the
castle, and it lays the groundwork for what is yet to
come. The cave of Belarius provides a pastoral setting, 
in which the brothers of Imogen develop a strong bond of 
affection for a hapless youth (their sister disguised as 
a page). Belief that the page has died occasions a scene 
of mourning and the beautiful lyric "Fear no more the 
heat o f the sun." The third significant setting in the 
play is the Italian setting of Posthumus’ banishment. 
Whenever Shakespeare transports us to Italy, however, 
we are suddenly confronted by the sort of realistic 
world that produces men such as Iachimo, the villain of 
the play. Posthumus' smug assurance of his wife’s chas­
tity arouses the egotism of Iachimo and prompts him to 
wager that he can seduce Imogen. IachimoTs interference 
in the domestic life of others, his hypocrisy, use of 
trickery to gain evidence that will support his lies, 
and his egotism are all reminiscent of Iago. So, too, 
is Iachimo's lewdness. Unlike Iago, the villain in 
Cvmbeline succumbs to the pangs of tormented conscience 
and confesses his crime.
Iachimo’s deceit identifies him with a role of 
appearances. Instead of making a forthright and open 
attempt to seduce Imogen, Iachimo stretches the terms 
of the wager by swearing falsely against Posthumus.
Imogen responds to Iachimo’s accusations with a mixture 
of doubt and belief. But when Iachimo urges her to seek 
revenge for Posthumus’ infidelity by giving herself to
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Iachimo, Imogen immediately penetrates the deception—
"If thou wert honorable/Thou wouldst have told this tale 
for virtue,not/For such an end thou seek’st. . . Undaunted, 
Iachimo admits the falseness of the charges he made against 
Posthumus; he says that he was only "trying” Imogen and 
promises to report her faithfulness to Posthumus. This 
time, Imogen is deceived; she welcomes Iachimo as a friend 
of her husband’s and offers to install his chest of 
jewels in her bedroom for safe-keeping. Iachimo has 
apparently realized all along that his talents lay more 
in the direction of slander than seduction. Hiding in 
the chest until late at night, when everyone in the 
castle is asleep, Iachimo emerges from his place of 
concealment long enough to study the decor of Imogen’s 
bedroom,.steal a bracelet from her arm, and take careful 
notice of the mole on her left breast. Iachimo’s trick 
of hiding in the trunk recalls similar though less 
theatrical actions on the part.of the medieval Vice.
While it is the villainous logicians and sophists who 
seem most representative of rationalism, those who resort 
to the use of devices such as forged letters, stolen 
handkerchiefs, etc., likewise exhibit rational qualities.
If anything, such devices tend to denote a degree of 
foresight and planning ^ n the part of the villain.
Although Posthumus almost deserves the treatment he 
gets at the hands of Iachimo, Imogen does not deserve
the treatment she receives from either Iachimo or her 
husband. Obviously, Iachimo enjoys playing psychological 
games with his victims. Posthumus realizes that the 
description of Imogen's bedchamber could have been 
reported by hearsay, but he conceds the wager and hands 
over the diamond ring as soon as Iachimo produces the 
bracelet. But Iachimo refuses to allow Posthumus to 
concede at this point, and he even offers arguments as 
to why Posthumus should not suspect his wife upon evidence 
so slight as a bracelet. Actually, Iachimo wishes to 
humiliate Posthumus completely, in the same way that 
Iago sets about to degrade Othello, and to revel in 
his stolen victory. He achieves this end by referring 
as lasciviously as possible to the mole on Imogen's 
breast. Completely broken, Posthumus leaves the interview 
in haste and in his disillusionment begins to doubt the 
honesty of even his own mother. Posthumus has proved 
no match for the Italian sophisticate Iachimo. Unwilling 
to let matters lie until such time as he can confront 
his wife, Posthumus writes to Pisanio ordering him to 
kill Imogen. Fortunately, Pisanio only pretends to fol­
low instructions.
If one considers the complexity of the various 
actions taking place in Cvmbeline. he can hardly view 
the last scene as anything but a stroke of theatrical 
genius. Shakespeare prepares the audience for Iachimo's
willing confession by skillfully incorporating a scene
in which Posthumus disguised as a poor soldier of the
British army, disarms Iachimo, a member of the Roman
army, and then leaves without killing him. Iachimo
then begins to wonder if all of Britain’s common louts
can thus equal and surpass Rome's knights; but more
importantly, the incident causes him to look inward:
The heaviness and guilt within my bosom 
Takes off my manhood. I have belied a lady,
The Princess of this country, and the air on 't 
Revengingly enfeebles me. (V.i.1-4)
Posthumus’ exercise of restraint echoes his earlier
show of generosity in not killing Cloten when the latter
engaged him in a sword fight. Posthumus has been having
second thoughts of his own, meanwhile, and he bitterly
regrets the order he gave Pisanio. Born after his
mother’s death, Posthumus was given his name by King
Cymbeline. In context of the play, however, his name
suggests much more.' When Iachimo kneels before
Posthumus, confesses his crime, and offers his life in
atonement, Posthumus replies:
Kneel not to me,
The power that I have on you is to spare you,
The malice towards you to forgive you. Live,
And deal with others better. (V.v.417-20)
The King’s reaction to this scene— ’’We’ll learn our
freeness of a son-in-law”— suggests that society itself
has been redeemed through the more merciful inclinations
of the younger generation.
In Pericles. Cvmbeline, and The Tempest, the 
playwright utilizes certain characters to suggest the 
attainability of right reason. Unlike the representatives 
of rational order in the tragedies, these individuals 
seem decidedly neo-Platonic, for each has achieved a 
level of knowledge that not only suggests otherworldliness 
but which is also complemented by virtue. The first of 
these is Cerimon, the doctor who restores the life of 
Thaisa, Pericles1 wife. In speaking of his art (Ill.ii. 
26-42), Cerimon mentions virtue and skill as being 
greater than nobleness and riches:
Careless heirs 
May the two latter darken and expend,
But immortality attends the former.
Making a man a god. (III.ii.2£-31)
In Cymbeline it is Doctor Cornelius who possesses arcane 
knowledge. When the Queon asks him for poisons to 
experiment with on lower creatures, such as cats and 
mice, the doctor exercises wisdom by giving her potions 
that simulate death but cause the users to feel refreshed 
and revitalized after they awaken. Dr. Cornelius explains 
to the Queen that his ’’conscience" bids him ask her purpose 
in requesting the poisons; fortunately, he knows enough 
about her nature to withhold such drugs from her posses­
sion. It is Dr. Cornelius, too, who reports the unregen- 
erate condition of the Queen's soul at the time of her 
death. The third figure to which I refer is of course 
Prospero. Harry Berger, Jr. has given a very interesting
reading of The Tempest, although the critic apparently does
not think very highly of Prospero’s Platonic tendencies:
For Prospero’s secret study pretty clearly springs 
from and to a particular view of man. The curric­
ulum consists of two courses, magic and liberal 
arts, a combination familiar to anyone acquainted 
with the optimism or meliorism of the Florentine 
Neoplatonists.5
Some criticism of this aspect of Prospero’s personality
is indeed implicit in Shakespeare’s play, but not quite
to the extent, I believe, that Professor Berger says.
What Shakespeare does do, however, is to acknowledge the
age-old dilemma of the Platonists— one that Melville
certainly recognizes when in Moby-Dick he wonders how
many have sweetly perished in Plato’s honey-head.
Prospero fully realizes that he is relinquishing one
set of appearances only to embrace another of quite a
different sort. But he must think of Miranda who, if
we may judge by the optimism of her exclamations, will
likely tread the same philosophical path as her father.
In Cerimon, Dr. Cornelius, and Prospero, the poet
gives us portraits of virtuous men who have more in
common with each other than with, say, Kent in King Lear
or Lucius in Titus Andronicus. Though the plays, taken
^Harry Berger, Jr., "Miraculous Harp: A Reading of
Shakespeare’s Tempest," Shakespeare Studies, 5(1970),
258.
as a whole, exhibit a variety of humanistic strains in 
portraying rational villainy against a background of 
right reason, the dramatic romances show a decided 
tendency toward neo-Platonism. However, Shakespeare's 
Platonists are men who have come to terms with the world. 
The themes of forgiveness and mercy as these apply to 
villains and protagonists alike may also suggest the 
possibility of Shakespeare’s coming to recognize evil 
as a form of good in the making. From the early comedies 
through to the later dramatic romances, the tendency 
toward this view is present in Shakespeare. The Two 
Gentlemen of Ferona and As You Like It are of course a 
different sort of comedy, and the villain is actually 
more at home in the later comedies, all of which have 
tragic overtones.
Shakespeare's comic villains are by and large 
rationalists. But the playwright does not place these 
figures against the type of rational background that 
one ordinarily finds in the histories and the tragedies. 
Moreover, the playwright has introduced a number of comic 
figures whose purpose is to parody and ridicule the 
principles of logic. The scurrilous Parolles, for 
instance, is a reasoner. At face value, the rational 
villains and comical logicians seem to indicate that 
Shakespeare distrusted the human reasoning faculty.
Yet, nothing is actually farther from the truth. In
both the comedies and the tragedies, it is the perversion 
of reason that the dramatist lays open to criticism. Thus 
the "immutability" and "regeneration" themes of the 
comedies belong to a much broader background. In the 
comedies, Shakespeare has likewise tested Platonic theory 
against his own poetic imagination, arriving finally at 
the optimism which viewed the higher reason in terms of 
human attainability.
VII. CONCLUSION
The majority of Shakespeare’s villains are rational­
ists in the sense that they exhibit the dominant character­
istics of what we have differentiated as continental, 
or paradoxical, humanism— namely, materialism and self- 
interest. A corollary atheism, if not stated, is usually 
implied. Naturally, English humanists of the period 
regarded this type of thinking as irrational. To 
Shakespeare’s audiences, skeptics such as Aaron and Iago 
represented the rebellious minority who had abandoned all 
moral principles in order to satisfy purely selfish ends.
As empiricists, they are the skeletons in the Renaissance 
closet. Through the villains in the comedies, histories, 
and tragedies, the playwright has shown that reason withe-, 
out virtue can lead the mind of man no farther than the 
obvious limits of dead-end materialism. At the core of 
Renaissance humanism lies rational philosophy, and it 
leaves no room for rational villainy: To follow reason
is to be virtuous, and to lack virtue is to be irrational. 
Thus by alienating himself from divine Logos, the villain 
separates himself from reason and all that is rational.
Like Milton’s Belial "clothed in reason’s garb" he 
"makes the worse appear the better reason" and totally 
perverts right reason. In speaking of Shakespeare’s 
great villains, Roger Burbridge aptly refers to the
"irrationality which is at once the lure and the mystery 
of evil."-*-
One of the difficulties in assessing Shakespeare’s 
attitude toward reason is that while the worldview 
of the plays demonstrates orthodox humanism, the play­
wright at the same time shows that he holds little af­
fection for systems of logic. This attitude becomes 
particularly apparent in Shakespeare’s merciless ridicule 
of reasoners who appear in the comedies, and it is also 
manifested in his portrayals of clerical villains. 
Shakespeare’s contempt for enthusiastic logicians invites 
comparison with the opinion of Petrarch, who complained 
against "old dialectic cavilers." Both Petrarch and 
Shakespeare seem to be following their poetic instincts 
in questioning the ultimate usefulness of formal logic. 
While it is true that Plato utilizes the dialectic ap­
proach, his greatest moments are nonetheless recognized 
as being intuitive rather than logical. Moreover, the 
Greek philosopher readily abandons logic for myth whenever 
the occasion for it arises. The Rational worldview of 
Shakespeare’s plays contains intermittent strains of 
Platonism, and these are more in evidence toward the end 
of the playwright’s career. In discussing Shakespeare’s 
familiarity with theological and philosophical theories 
of the soul, Rolf Soellner has pointed to the rather
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strong influences of both Aristotle and Plato. But
Professor Soellner has shown that the dramatist, by-
aligning the mind with the soul instead of with the body,
tends to give emphasis to the Platonic concept; moreover,
the playwright follows the Orphic tradition by using soul
imagery to express some of his ideas, notably in The
2
Merchant of Venice.
Shakespeare chose to place his rational villains 
against a background of reason, but there are additional 
ways of expressing the ethical attitude. Some writers 
such as Dostoevsky prefer to stress the complex psycho­
logy by which the human conscience finally asserts it­
self. Others may deliberately omit the ethical attitude 
altogether. Take, for instance, the villain-narrators 
of Blake’s ”A Poison Tree" and Poe’s "Cask of Amontillado." 
Both are rationalists who escape poetic justice in this 
life while the works in which they appear give no indi­
cation of future retribution. Although one might perhaps 
argue that a compulsion to confess provides indirect 
criticism of these narrators, it could just as easily be 
asserted that their revelations of crime stem from 
feelings of self-satisfaction. In fact, rational villainy
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Rolf Soellner, "Shakespeare, Aristotle, Plato, and 
the Soul," Deutsche Gesellschaft-West. Jahrbuch- 
Heidelberg. n.v. (1968). 56-71.
is so closely linked to the ego that it clearly denotes 
a form of human pride in which self-love replaces love 
for God and one’s fellow man. In Shakespearean drama 
the d.eliberateness of the villainfs evil is delineated 
by his rationalism which, in turn, represents the willful 
perversion of man’s godlike part.
The implications of man’s middle position on the 
chain of being are explored in Hamlet as the hero 
struggles to reconcile the theory of man’s angelic 
nature with the realities of his uncle’s and his mother’s 
actions. Like most of his contemporaries Hamlet regards 
man as a being composed of body and soul, a creature 
whose passions link him with the beasts and whose reason 
links him with God. Hamlet’s thoughts are presented in a 
manner of clearcut simplicity. Because of Gertrude’s 
hasty marriage following the death of his father, Hamlet 
identifies his mother with bestiality and passion— ”A 
beast that wants discourse of reason/Would have mourned 
longer” (I.ii.150-1). To Hamlet the union of his mother 
and Claudius is a situation in which "reason panders will, 
and the shock of his mother’s easy sensuality is a shock 
to Hamlet’s whole theory of man. Thus in Hamlet's eyes 
her marriage is an affront to her own divinity. Since 
Hamlet's views are entirely orthodox, it cannot be 
argued that he expects too much. Still, Hamlet is an 
immature individual who is unable to witness discrep-
ancies in theory and practice without allowing himself
to fall apart as a result. The hero’s attitude toward
Horatio provides an interesting contrast:
Give me that man 
That is not passion’s slave, and I will wear him 
In my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart,
As I do thee. (Ill.ii.76-9)
Thus Hamlet identifies Horatio with reason and his mother 
with passion. Throughout his disillusionment, Hamlet 
remains committed to the idea of man’s divinity and to 
the belief that it is man’s reason which separates him 
from the brutes. But Hamlet is likewise an empiricist 
or he would never have allowed his ideals to be broken 
upon the rack of reality. The hero's complex metaphys­
ical explorations are obviously drawn with a certain 
amount of sympathy. Clyde Williams has noted, for 
instance, that Shakespeare consistently disapproves of
excessive drinking and that Hamlet serves as a means
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through which the playwright expresses this view.
Though Hamlet’s remarks on the subject are aimed at 
Claudius, the hero’s censure of drinking has general 
application while his complaint that overindulgence 
breaks down the "pales and forts of reason" seems 
entirely characteristic of his way of thinking. If
•^Clyde V. Williams, "A Glass of Wine, A ’Dram of 
Eale’ : Claudius, Cassio, and Shakespeare’s Dramatic
Art, ’’ in Essays in Honor of Esmond Linworth Mar ill a. 
eds. Thomas A. Kirby and William John Olive (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp.
78-88.
Hamlet is Shakespeare’s most skeptical play, then it must 
also be a work that finally argues for rather than against 
reason. Hamlet's lament over man's failure to fulfill 
the expectations of his divinity may or may not be 
Shakespeare’s, but it is never denied that the key to 
such hopes rests somewhere in the reason.
The views expressed in Hamlet suggest a valid way 
of approaching the subject of Shakespeare's attitude 
toward reason; but it is of course one thing to oppose 
man’s reason with his animal instincts and quite another 
to set humanity itself against man's reasoning. In 
Hamlet reason offers an alternative to passion, but the 
playwright's treatment of this faculty does not in and 
of itself provide a perspective for viewing rational 
villainy. For this purpose a theory of right reason 
is almost essential. Though definitions of right reason 
differed from one humanist to another, the remaining 
constants were always reason and virtue. The plays of 
Shakespeare reflect these varying humanistic attitudes 
toward rational order, but the playwright seems to be 
moving from a rather generalized acceptance of right 
reason to a more particularized preference for Platonic 
thinking on the subject. The plays are never without 
a humanistic worldview, but the emphasis shifts from 
external to internal order as one moves from the 
histories and early comedies through to the tragedies,
late comedies, and dramatic romances.
In the histories the representatives of rational 
order are individuals whose motives spring from a desire 
to insure the welfare of the state. However, only a 
few of Shakespeare’s historical personages, such as 
Duke Humphrey, Henry Tudor, and Henry V, actually serve 
this function. The rational worldview of the histories 
tends to lie, rather, in the continuity of the plays.
The chief symbol for rational order is the king, even 
though he may be inept, and a well-functioning state. 
Rational villains in the histories are agents of disorder. 
The power-plays of Richard III, Cardinal Beaufort, and 
Cardinal Wolsey, exhibit the rationalist’s desires for 
personal aggrandizement and the moral irrationality which 
inevitably results from activated self-interest.
The rational background of the tragedies tends to 
be Aristotelian-Senecan, representing an ethical view as 
opposed to the religious view of Christian Providence 
which pervades the histories. Following classical and 
renaissance traditions of civic idealism, Shakespeare’s 
tragedies express their author’s realization that man 
must live in the world. Interestingly, the playwright 
applies this facet of humanism in a highly specific way 
by arguing the necessity for worldly wisdom. Brutus, 
for instance, possesses intelligence and virtue but 
lacks practical understanding. Menenius and Kent have
already learned th u;- ir-^.n must live in the here and now, 
but Prospero must discover it for himself. Worldly 
wisdom usually helps, though not always, to safeguard 
its owner from the dangers of deception and fraud. The 
rational villain makes it his business to observe the 
men around him whereas the tragic hero often shows defi­
ciency in some vital area of human understanding. The 
villains of the tragedies cause a great deal of political 
damage, as they do in the histories; but it is the 
enormity of the personal injuries they inflict upon 
others which gives power to the villainy of Iago and 
Edmund. By characterizing these villains as continen- 
talists, Shakespeare treats reason in a particular sense 
just as he has done in Hamlet. When used to promote 
self-interest, reason becomes a diabolical instrument 
rather than an emblem of the divinity in man. To 
proceed from the tragedies to the comedies is to move 
from Aristotelian ethics toward neo-Platonic Christianity 
and from external rational order to intuitive rational 
order. The comedies likewise betoken a changing attitude 
toward villainy. Although even in comedy the audience 
can derive satisfaction from seeing evil punished, 
Shakespeare declines this gambit in favor of forgiveness 
and mercy. In the comedies, villainy shows a gradual 
working out of Platonist theories evolved not overnight
but over a period of time as the poet sought to reconcile 
his belief in the divinity of man with the existence of 
evil in the world.
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